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I
t is not difﬁcult to fathom why the simplest form of ﬁnancial service can make a signiﬁ-
cant difference to a poor family.  Many of the world’s poor are microentrepreneurs—
farmers, shopkeepers, weavers, small commodity producers, traders, and the like. Like
other businesspeople, they require access to simple instruments for obtaining working capi-
tal, maintaining assets, or expanding businesses. Lacking these instruments, they remain
trapped in a vicious cycle of low ﬁnancial returns and low incomes. 
Financial service is equally important in the management of household consumption, be-
cause it provides families with the means to maintain consumption when income ﬂuctuates
downward or when essential expenditures such as those relating to health care have to be ﬁ-
nanced. 
In the face of inadequate responses from either the private or the government sector, non-
government organizations (NGOs) in Bangladesh have spearheaded a worldwide movement
to provide affordable ﬁnancial services to the poor. IFPRI is making lessons from the
Bangladeshi experience available to a global audience. In 1988, IFPRI published a research
report that examined the Grameen Bank’s approach to providing credit services and the man-
ner in which it affected the livelihood of its clients. Other successful models of credit and sav-
ings delivery have emerged since then; and this research report by Manfred Zeller, Manohar
Sharma, Akhter U. Ahmed, and Shahidur Rashid looks at three institutions that represent three
distinct approaches to providing services to households organized in small groups. 
The authors report on three major issues. First, they examine the manner in which NGOs
place their branches and services in different areas of Bangladesh. They conclude that the
tension involved in reaching the poor, maximizing impact, and containing operational costs
results in NGOs establishing higher levels of services in locations that have better access to
transport and communication infrastructure. The authors then provide policy guidelines on
how to reduce this tension so that the poor in disadvantaged locations are better served. Sec-
ond, recognizing the central importance of group-based transactions, the authors explore how
such groups are formed, the activities they pursue, and the ways in which they impact re-
payment rates of loans. Among other things, they ﬁnd that the active policy of targeting poor
women to join credit groups does not necessarily translate into women receiving higher credit
lines than men. Repayment rates, however, are higher for groups that consist mostly of
women. They are also higher in relatively poor and isolated areas where alternative banking
facilities are less likely to be available. 
Third, the authors measure the impact of the access to NGO credit services on various
household welfare indicators. Overall, the results point to signiﬁcant positive impact in the spheres of income generation, house-
hold food security, social attitudes, and the
mobility of women. And evidence strongly
suggests that the household-income impact
of the services provided is larger than the
full cost of delivery. Hence, the study con-
cludes that the group-based institutional ap-
proach of NGOs seems to be an effective
response to state and market failure in the
rural ﬁnancial sector in Bangladesh. Repli-
cation of the group-lending techniques
elsewhere should, however, proceed with
caution, recognizing that differing social,
economic, and cultural settings are likely to
have bearings on both the scale of beneﬁts
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I
n the past two decades, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Bangladesh have pro-
vided millions of poor rural people with savings and credit services at low cost. With these
services, they have reduced poverty, improved food security and nutrition, and achieved
positive social change as well. These NGOs have different structures, modes of operation,
and program goals, and are not legally registered as banks. Unlike formal ﬁnancial interme-
diaries, such as nationalized commercial banks, that lend based on collateral—thus effec-
tively excluding the poor—these microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) provide services to
solidarity credit groups that poor community members create. Small groups (5 to 10 mem-
bers) form larger groups that then procure ﬁnancial services. The NGOs thus make use of
joint liability, peer selection, and experience with repeated ﬁnancial transactions to overcome
the informational constraints in formal ﬁnancial markets. The MFIs harness some of the
strengths of local organizations while also practicing sound business management. 
Despite these programs and the increases in per capita income, widespread poverty and
malnutrition continue to exist in Bangladesh. In 1997, the country was the eighteenth poor-
est in the world. The level of extreme poverty has hardly changed over time and the incidence
of poverty is greater now in rural areas, where 50 percent of the households are landless and
employment opportunities are low. The natural disasters Bangladesh experiences have
caused even further setbacks in development.
Given the relative success of the MFIs and the pressing need for further poverty allevia-
tion, Manfred Zeller, Manohar Sharma, Akhter U. Ahmed, and Shahidur Rashid undertook a
study to examine four issues: (1) The determinants of the formation and outreach of MFIs;
(2) the credit group formation process, the determinants of program eligibility, and the im-
plications of eligibility requirements for the structure, conduct, and performance of the
groups; (3) the ﬁnancial sustainability of the lending institutions; and (4) the effects of par-
ticipation on household resource allocation, income generation, food and nonfood con-
sumption, and the social attitudes and capacities of their members. 
In Group-Based Financial Institutions for the Rural Poor in Bangladesh: An Institutional-
and Household-Level Analysis, the authors examine these issues by looking at the workings of
three different institutions: the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the As-
sociation for Social Advancement (ASA), and Rangpur-Dinajpur Rural Services (RDRS).
These NGOs represent, respectively, the three types of MFIs in Bangladesh: those that have
transformed their ﬁnancial programs into banks; those that collect savings and make loans, but
rely on the wholesale functions of rural banking networks; and those that do not handle funds,
but instead facilitate the formation of member groups and their linkage with banks. xii SUMMARY
Reaching the Poor
Overall, the NGOs are highly successful in
reaching those rural poor who farm less
than 0.5 acre. They tend to place their of-
ﬁces within more developed rural areas
with better access to infrastructure and
banks, and avoid areas that are at high risk
of ﬂooding and other adversities. Within the
more developed areas, the NGOs provide
poorer villages with their services and,
within the villages, reach very poor people,
mostly women.  But generally the NGOs
have not assisted the ultra-poor or the many
agricultural smallholders who farm more
than 0.5 acre. 
Services and Sustainability
The selected NGOs exhibit important differ-
ences with respect to target groups and the
type of services provided. Whereas ASA
mainly ﬁnances off-farm enterprises for
women, BRAC lends to women and men for
both agricultural and nonfarm activities.
Households with less than 0.5 acre may join
ASA or BRAC groups. The loans usually
have a one-year maturity. Because borrow-
ers must repay in weekly installments, many
invest in businesses with a continuous cash
return. During the 1990s, ASA focused on
providing ﬁnancial services while reducing
its nonﬁnancial ones, such as business
management training. It has also begun
serving households with more than 0.5 acre
of land. BRAC, in contrast, assists in prod-
uct marketing and operates as an integrated
development organization, providing health
services and medium-term investments for
community improvement, among other ac-
tivities.
RDRS promotes income generation
within agriculture, animal husbandry, and
ﬁsh-farming. Because many of these enter-
prises require longer gestation periods,
loans with different repayment plans are of-
fered. RDRS also provides nonﬁnancial
services and assists in product marketing.
In 1989, RDRS changed the membership
eligibility criterion from ownership of less
than 1.0 acre to a maximum of 1.5 acres.
The MFIs, unlike the government banks
that require heavy subsidies to remain sol-
vent, are ﬁnancially sustainable and among
the most efﬁcient credit organizations
worldwide. The MFIs charge interest rates
10–20 percent above the inﬂation rate yet
have achieved repayment rates as high as 98
percent on average. The large Asian MFIs,
including ASAand BRAC, have performed
their operations on average without any sub-
sidies. Smaller South Asian MFIs, however,
spend about $0.17 per dollar lent, of which
$0.05 must be covered by subsidies.
Impact on the Poor
The targeted credit programs have had a
positive impact on household welfare in a
number of ways. The quantity and quality
of food consumed, the health of house-
hold members, and children’s education
have improved. The survey on social atti-
tudes and social capacity shows progress
in social change, particularly in the areas
of intrahousehold decisionmaking and
women’s coping capacity, physical mobil-
ity, and attitudes.
An econometric analysis reveals that
credit access has a signiﬁcant and strong ef-
fect on income generation and food and
calorie consumption. Each Tk 100 of credit
access generates an additional Tk 37 of an-
nual household income to ASA and BRAC
members. This compares favorably with
the cost of subsidizing this access. With a
social cost of Tk 5 in the case of small and
medium-sized MFIs, microﬁnance NGOs
in Bangladesh are producing a net social
beneﬁt of Tk 32 for every Tk 100 they lend. 
Policy Implications 
Group-based ﬁnancial institutions can con-
tribute greatly to poverty reduction in
Bangladesh and offer a viable alternative to
state and market failures in rural ﬁnance.
Therefore, continuing public support for
the expansion of these MFIs appears war-
ranted. However, the current subsidy ﬁg-
ures underestimate the actual costs of the
programs. The study did not conduct a fullSUMMARY xiii
cost-beneﬁt analysis. The data do not in-
clude past subsidies for innovation and ex-
pansion phases or unsuccessful MFIs.
These costs would need to be considered in
determining whether to invest in MFIs or
other avenues for rural development.  Nev-
ertheless, the subsidy ﬁgures appear quite
favorable compared with other capital
transfers to the poor. Finally, to replicate the
MFIs elsewhere, we must consider that
their successful implementation necessar-
ily involves adapting the organizational
structure and practices to different socioe-
conomic and agroecological environments.CHAPTER 1
Introduction
B
angladesh has gained an international reputation for leading the development com-
munity with innovations such as the Comilla model of rural development and the
Grameen Bank model of a targeted group-based credit program for the poor. Despite
these creative programs, widespread poverty and undernutrition continue to be fundamental
problems in Bangladesh.
Many credit and savings schemes targeted on the poor have been introduced during the
past two decades in Bangladesh, mainly by nongovernmental organizations. The predominant
rationale for these schemes is their potential for reducing poverty by improving the ability of
the poor to generate more income on or off the farm. These programs are also expected to
have beneﬁcial welfare outcomes such as improved food security and nutrition as well as
positive social change. With this in view, the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) designed a study to analyze the institutional performance of selected group-based
financial institutions and their household-level impact on selected indicators of welfare and
social change. This report provides the ﬁndings of the study.
The report is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents major socioeconomic data
on Bangladesh, an overview of the rural financial sector, and the research objectives, ques-
tionnaire design, and sampling procedure. The second chapter analyzes the geographic loca-
tion of group-based ﬁnancial institutions at the county level. The structure, conduct,
repayment performance, and financial self-sufficiency of group-based financial institutions
are the subject of Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes the socioeconomic characteristics of house-
holds participating in group-based ﬁnancial institutions compared with differentgroups of non-
participants. It further explores the determinants of participation. Chapter 5 contains the
household-level analyses of the effects of participation in group-based ﬁnancial institutions
on various outcome variables, such as social change, income, and food consumption. The ﬁnal
chapter presents the major conclusions.
Poverty, Food Insecurity, and Undernutrition
With per capita gross national product (GNP) of US$270 Bangladesh was the eighteenth-
poorest country in the world in 1997 (World Bank 1998). Ten years ago, the country ranked
ﬁfth poorest, with per capita GNP of about US$170. Despite this improvement in per capita
income in both absolute and relative terms, pervasive poverty persists in Bangladesh. Themost recent poverty estimates of the 1995/96
Household Expenditure Survey (HES), based
on the cost-of-basic-needs (CBN) method,1
suggest that 53.1 percent of the national pop-
ulation were poor (below the upper poverty
line) and 35.6 percent were very poor (below
the lower poverty line).2 The incidence of
rural poverty was much higher than that 
of urban poverty. In rural areas, 56.7 percent
and 39.8 percent of the rural population were
classiﬁed as poor and very poor, respec-
tively, whereas in urban areas, 35.0 percent
were poor and 14.3 percent were very poor
in 1995/96 (BBS 1998).
Although the long-term trends in the
incidence of overall poverty show modest
improvement, extreme poverty has hardly
changed (Rahman 1994, 1995; Sen 1992).
Behind this stagnation in the incomes and
welfare of the very poor group lies acute
pressure on land owing to the increasing
population, and a resultant steady growth in
landlessness. This highly vulnerable group
continues to exist at the margins of human
survival.
The most startling consequence of wide-
spread poverty in Bangladesh is that the very
poor group (over one-third of the national
population in 1995/96) remain seriously
underfed because their incomes are too low to
buy enough food to satisfy minimum energy
requirements. An IFPRI study in Bangladesh
by Ahmed (1992) provides poignant evidence
of the severity of food insecurity, as por-
trayed in Box 1.1.
Bangladesh has made considerable prog-
ress in food production since independence
in 1971. Cereal production increased by about
60 percent over the 20-year period from
FY78 to FY98. This achievement, however,
has been eroded by a continued high (though
declining) rate of population growth. Total
population increased by about 50 percent over
the two decades. Consequently, the country
has not been able to overcome the chronic
shortage in domestic food production to meet
basic nutritional needs. Bangladesh contin-
ues to depend on food aid imports to help
meet food deﬁcits.
Bangladesh is highly prone to natural
disasters, such as ﬂoods, cyclones, and oc-
casional droughts. Crop failures from such
disasters cause acute food shortages. Acrop
failure in 1974, for example, caused a dev-
astating famine. Sudden food shortages dis-
rupt the government’s long-run development
objectives as resources are diverted to short-
term crisis management.
Some groups within poor households
are at a greater nutritional risk than others.
Nutrition studies in Bangladesh as well as in
other low-income countries in general sug-
gest that preschool children and pregnant and
lactating women are the groups facing the
most acute nutritional risks. The ﬁndings of
the Child Nutrition Survey conducted by
the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in FY96
(BBS 1997) suggest that 59.7 percent of
children aged 6 to 71 months were malnour-
ished in terms of reduced height-for-age
and weight-for-height measurements. An
estimated two-thirds of deaths of children
under ﬁve years of age are related to malnu-
trition. About 11 percent of all children in
Bangladesh die in their ﬁrst year of life and
19 percent die before their ﬁfth birthday
(UNICEF 1991). About 30,000 children go
blind every year from vitamin A deﬁciency
and 50 percent of them die within a year of
a blinding episode (BNNC 1997). Malnutri-
tion of children can be traced back to the
malnutrition of mothers. Underweight and
anemia among mothers contributed to low
birth weight. About 80 percent of pregnant
and lactating women suffer from iron deﬁ-
ciency anemia (BNNC 1997).
Among the poor, urban slum dwellers and
the rural landless face the greatest hardships.
2 CHAPTER 1
1 The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) ﬁrst adopted the CBN method for reporting the ﬁndings of the 1995/96
HES, and has decided to use this method for future rounds of the HES. For a comprehensive discussion of the CBN
method, see Ravallion (1994). Until the 1991/92 HES, BBS used food energy intake (FEI) and direct calorie intake
(DCI) for measuring the incidence of poverty.
2 For an explanation of the upper and lower poverty lines under the CBN method, see Wodon (1996).The rural landless, constituting about 50 per-
cent of rural households, depend mainly on
agriculture for wage employment. Since the
demand for labor in agricultural production
is seasonal, the landless remain under-
employed during the slack season. Moreover,
natural disasters and the resulting crop fail-
ures cause acute deprivation among the
landless. High food prices and unemployment
caused by crop failure often mean starvation
for the rural landless.
Astudy by Chowdhury (1992) found re-
gional differences in food intake of as much
as 70 percent. Such disparity arises because
of wide regional differences in both income
and prices. Employment opportunities, the
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Box 1.1 The Agony and Privation of a Poor Family
Abdul Karim, about 35, is the head of a landless household. He lives with his wife, Ayesha, and their
three children in Puthimari village of Chilmari Thana, one of the most distressed areas of Bangladesh.
Abdul’s household is among the many severely poor households in the village that were not covered by
any of the government intervention programs. The household was included in the control group of
IFPRI’s consumption and nutrition survey.
Abdul’s one-room house, with walls made of Kash (a kind of tall, wild grass) and bamboo, and a
straw roof, is too small for his family. It is clear that the household is in extreme poverty. The severity
of malnutrition that the family members are suffering from is evident from their skeleton-like features.
IFPRI ﬁeld investigators Zobair and Farzana interviewed Abdul and Ayesha. “You can see our mis-
erable condition. Yet, we are not included in any of the government programs,” Abdul said bitterly. “It
is true that most of them who are getting ration are also poor, but none of them are as needy as we are,”
Abdul asserted.
“Two days ago, I worked on a neighbor’s land, weeding his radish ﬁeld. He gave me ﬁve taka, and a
meal of rice and dal for the whole day’s work. Abdul continued, “Yesterday, I went to him again, but he
offered me only three taka and a meal. I accepted and worked from morning till evening.”
The day we visited them, nobody in the family could ﬁnd any work. Abdul spent his eight taka in
buying about a kilogram of wheat. Ayesha was frying the wheat in an earthen pot. “I soaked the wheat
in salt-mixed water before frying. The wheat becomes hard and brittle after frying. This fried wheat is
all we have for today’s meal. From this, I have to save some for tomorrow also,” Ayesha said. Farzana
asked her why they didn’t crush the wheat to make atta (whole wheat ﬂour). “With atta from this wheat
I could make only a few rooti, which the children would eat in no time because they are so hungry. In-
stead, we can chew the fried wheat for a long time,” Ayesha explained. “I know that I am cheating my
own children,” she sobbed, “But what can I do? We don’t have money to buy more wheat or rice. No-
body wants to hire me or my husband for work because we are so weak. But if we can’t ﬁnd work, then
we can’t eat, and without eating we will become weaker.”
Abdul nodded, “She is right, Aswin and Kartik (the lean season) are the most difﬁcult months. Many
children in this area die during this time. They are so weak that even simple diseases kill them,” he said,
looking at his own children. “But things will improve after a month during Aman rice harvest. Every-
body will get work. Ayesha will parboil paddy and husk rice in farmers’houses,” Abdul tried to console
himself.
“But what will happen to us next? The river will probably take away our house next year,” Ayesha
expressed her anxiety, and then maintained, “We were not this poor when we got married. We had some
land, and we produced enough rice for our small family during that time. But one night, there was a big
land erosion and the rakkushi (a legendary animal, like a dragon) river swallowed our land. Except this
house, we have nothing left now. Last month, I sold my gold nose pin to a neighbor for one-fourth the
price my husband paid for it. With that money we bought some rice and wheat.”
Abdul sold a mango tree early that month for only 100 taka. “The tree could easily fetch 500 taka.
Big and sweet mangoes used to grow on that tree. But the man who bought the tree, cut it for ﬁrewood,
because it could go into the river during the next ﬂood. You see, the river is the cause of all our misery,”
Abdul concluded.
The interview was over, and we were about to leave Abdul’s house. At that time, Biplab, Abdul’s
eight-year old son, came running with a large and beautiful water hyacinth ﬂower in his hand. He gave
the ﬂower to Farzana and said to her shyly, “Please come again.” Farzana had managed to hold her tears
during the interview. She could not hold them any longer.
Source: Ahmed (1992).incidence of natural calamities, agricultural
technology, infrastructural development, dis-
ease, sanitation, and food prices all vary sub-
stantially across regions. Flood-prone rural
areas—particularly zones affected by land
erosion along the major river banks—appear
to be the most nutritionally distressed areas
of the country.
In Bangladesh, food intake varies by 10
to 20 percent from the lean to the plentiful
months (Chowdhury 1992). Fluctuations in
both food prices and incomes drive this sea-
sonal variation. Food prices peak in March–
April and in September–October. Absence
of employment before the Aman (winter
rice) harvest makes the September–October
period especially acute, particularly for the
rural landless, who depend on wage labor for
their income. Poor water quality emerges as
a problem in March and April, just before the
monsoon rains begin. This aggravates the
incidence of diarrhea at that time. The preva-
lence of diarrhea peaks again in September
and October. The coincidence of all these
forces yields two principal lean seasons in
Bangladesh, one in March–April and a more
severe one in September–October (Chen
1983; Clay 1989; Chowdhury 1992). Nu-
tritional stress reaches its peak in these
months.
Freedom from hunger and malnutrition
is a basic human right. Malnutrition is both
a cause and a consequence of underdevelop-
ment. Amalnourished population contributes
less effectively to economic development
than a properly fed, physically strong, and
active population does. Bangladesh is very
likely paying a high price for its widespread
malnutrition and the resulting low produc-
tivity of its labor force. Efforts to ensure food
security and eradicate malnutrition in Bang-
ladesh are key investments in human capital,
contributing effectively to poverty allevia-
tion. Targeted credit and savings programs
for the rural poor have been increasingly
promoted in Bangladesh for improving the
income and food security of the poor and
thereby enhancing human, social, and eco-
nomic development.
The Rural Financial Sector in
Bangladesh: Review of Policy
and Performance
The structure of the rural ﬁnancial market in
Bangladesh is typically dualistic, consisting
of formal/semiformal and informal ﬁnancial
intermediaries. The formal and semiformal
intermediaries are subject to central bank or at
least some government regulations, whereas
the informal ﬁnancial sector operates essen-
tially outside of these controls, although it
may be indirectly inﬂuenced by them.
Various types of formal intermediaries
service the rural ﬁnancial market in Bangla-
desh. These include the public sector banks
(especially two agricultural banks, the Raj-
shahi Krishi Unnayan Bank and the Bangla-
desh Krishi Bank), the rural branches of three
nationalized commercial banks (Sonali, Ja-
nata, and Agrani Bank), and credit coopera-
tives supported by the Bangladesh Rural
Development Board (BRDB). Private banks
play a negligible role in the rural market.
During the past two decades, credit and sav-
ings programs administered by national or
international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have gained increasingly in impor-
tance, mainly as semiformal group-based
ﬁnancial institutions that are not registered
as legal entities under banking law. Yet the
NGO movement led to the establishment of
two rural poverty-focused banks, the Gra-
meen Bank in 1983 and the bank of the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
(BRAC) in 1998.
Arange of informal lenders operate out-
side the regulatory framework for the ﬁnan-
cial sector. These informal institutions include
local moneylenders, traders in agricultural
inputs and outputs markets, shopkeepers,
landlords, friends, and relatives (Murshid and
Rahman 1990; Rahman 1992).
A Brief Historical Perspective
Until 1982, all formal ﬁnancial institutions in
Bangladesh were government owned. Some
efforts aimed at liberalizing the ﬁnancial sec-
tor were initiated during the mid-1980s. Two
banks were denationalized in 1984 and, in
4 CHAPTER 11986, a few private banks were allowed to
start operations. However, the role of private
banking institutions in rural areas was still
negligible, and the government continued to
intervene in the ﬁnancial system through a
network of nationalized commercial banks
(NCBs). Interest rates were strictly regulated
and funds were allocated to sectors and for
uses that received government priority. Fa-
vored sectors, which received the lion’s share
of funds, were state enterprises, agriculture,
and, increasingly, private manufacturing.
The pervasive bureaucratic and political
control of ﬁnancial institutions led to the un-
dermining of basic principles of sound bank-
ing. Noneconomic considerations in routine
lending decisions and the lack of an enforce-
ment mechanism eroded ﬁnancial discipline
among borrowers. This resulted in low rates
of loan recovery and greatly weakened ﬁnan-
cial institutions.
Rural Branches of NCBs. During the 1970s
as well as in the 1980s, a basic assumption
driving government policy seemed to be that
replicating the traditional urban-based bank-
ing structure in rural areas, and fortifying it
through a package of banking legislation
and subsidized capital, would be sufﬁcient to
kick-start a viable ﬁnancial sector in the rural
areas. In 1977, for example, the replication
effort took the form of the so-called “two-
for-one” banking policy. This required com-
mercial banks, which were all government
owned, to open two rural branches for every
urban branch (Khalily and Meyer 1993).
This period also saw the establishment of a
second specialized agricultural development
bank, the Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan Bank
(RAKUB), with a speciﬁc mandate to de-
liver agricultural credit in addition to the
Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB), which had
been founded in 1972.
Implicit in this latter decision was the
realization that some change in banks’orga-
nizational structure was indeed necessary to
make the carryover to the rural sector. How-
ever, in reality, the basic principles of bank-
ing remained more or less unchanged: loans
continued to be strictly collateral based, and
structures within banks did not provide suf-
ficient incentives for managers to screen
borrowers for creditworthiness or to enforce
contract compliance adequately. In addition,
the ready availability of cheap funds from
the central bank, combined with the oligo-
polistic power of public sector banks in 
the rural ﬁnancial market, encouraged inef-
ﬁciency and impeded innovation at the insti-
tutional level.
As a result, recovery rates on rural sec-
tor loans made by nationalized commercial
banks (Table 1.1) were not only low to be-
gin with, but steadily declining during the
1980s—from about 51 percent in 1981/82 to
under 19 percent in 1988/89 (Khalily and
Meyer 1993). More recent data show that
repayment rates for agricultural loans by the
two specialized agricultural banks, BKB and
RAKUB, also hovered around 20 percent
during 1991/92 to 1995/96. Moreover, data
from the Central Bank of Bangladesh show
that the repayment rate of total agricultural
credit, whether advanced by the NCBs or
by the specialized agricultural banks,
ranged between 19.7 percent and 32.7 per-
cent from 1981/82 to 1995/96.
Other factors exogenous to the banking
system also contributed to this environment
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by state-owned commercial banks, 











Source: Khalily and Meyer (1993).
a The recovery rate is deﬁned as the percentage of target
loans recovered relative to total target loans, including
principal and interest.of lax credit discipline. First, legal recourse
to the foreclosure and liquidation of collateral
was, in practice, nearly impossible (World
Bank 1994), especially in the agricultural
sector. This greatly encouraged strategic de-
fault while giving the banks a false sense of
safe, collateralized lending. Second, confus-
ing signals created by frequent announce-
ments of loan amnesties and interest
remission programs—the results of direct
political interference (Khalily and Meyer
1993)—increased the incentives to default,
even among creditworthy borrowers. Indeed,
rural ﬁnancial institutions were used to
providing political favors, especially before
elections, through a policy of “give and for-
give.” Third, non-economic considerations
in routine lending decisions coupled with
high transaction costs for clients made for-
mal banks less attractive long-term partners
for most small and marginal farmers. This
perceived short-term association provided
further incentives for strategic default. For
these reasons, by the end of the 1980s rural
branches of the state-owned banks were
utterly failing to carry out their mandates.
Instead, the entire network of branches had
metamorphosed into a structure that was no
longer sustainable.
Moreover, the public sector banks
(PSBs) also demonstrated weak outreach to
the poorer segments of the population. A
survey by the World Bank (1996) indicates
that PSBs granted loans to 19 percent of
landless borrowers and to 49 percent of
small and marginal farmers (0.5–2.5 acres).
Across occupational groups, the bulk of
PSB loans went to large farmers, to larger
off-farm enterprises and businesses, and to
salaried households. This regressive pat-
tern of credit allocation occurred despite
the declared objectives of the public banks
to alleviate poverty. Almost half of the total
loan portfolio from 1991/92 to 1995/96
was supposed to be for special loans for
poverty alleviation, with most of the re-
mainder being given for crop loans, less for
livestock, and the balance for irrigation and
agricultural equipment.
The performance of public banks was
also dismal in terms of savings mobilization
in rural areas. The total (rural and urban)
nominal value of deposits in PSBs increased
three times (from Tk 103.9 billion to Tk 
309 billion) between 1986 and 1994. Of this,
10 percent originated in the “agriculture and
ﬁsheries” sector (World Bank 1996). Data
obtained by the World Bank show that the
agricultural banks experienced a fourfold
increase in deposits (from Tk 4.3 billion to
Tk 17.1 billion) between 1986 and 1994. In
comparison, member deposits in the Gra-
meen Bank increased 47 times over the same
period.
Financial Sector Reforms
In view of the obvious failures in the state-
controlled ﬁnancial sector, the government
took a series of actions to liberalize and re-
form the ﬁnancial sector, in particular under
the Financial Sector Reform Project (FSRP)
initiated in 1989 (Ali and Murtaza 1993;
Ahmed and Khan 1994; Cookson and Alam-
gir 1993; Cookson and Zaman 1994). The
FSRP included several major reforms:
• Exchange rate decontrol. A number of
exchange rate controls were relaxed or
withdrawn and taka convertibility on
current account transactions has been
introduced.
• Interest rate deregulation. The earlier
practice of ﬁxing interest rates through
administrative ﬁat has been discontinued.
Initially, the banks were given the freedom
to ﬁx interest rates within a certain band.
Since 1992, however, except for opera-
tions such as agriculture and certain export
and small-scale industrial activities, inter-
est rates on lending activities have been
completely liberalized. The band for agri-
cultural lending was 11–15 percent per year
in 1994. Real interest rates were positive
because the inﬂation rate hovered around
2 percent in 1994 (World Bank 1997). As
far as interest rates on deposits are con-
cerned, complete regulation has given way
to the speciﬁcation only of minimum rates
on deposits.
6 CHAPTER 1• Reforms on credit control. Direct credit
control by the government has been re-
placed by the use of indirect monetary
instruments such as a cash reserve re-
quirements, open market operations, and
the ﬁxing of bank rates.
• Strengthening the ﬁnancial position of
banks. New rules have been introduced for
assessing loan quality and making provi-
sion for bad debt so that banks’accounting
systems accurately reﬂect their ﬁnancial
state. Capital adequacy rules were also
introduced to protect depositors.
• Reforms in the legal framework. In order
to increase the rate of loan recovery, spe-
cial ﬁnancial loan courts were established
to arbitrate default cases; reforms of com-
mercial laws relating to negotiable instru-
ments and bankruptcy were also initiated.
Despite these reforms, the nationalized
commercial banks continue to dominate the
ﬁnancial sector. In 1993, NCBs accounted
for 63 percent of bank deposits and 53 per-
cent of loans. Their oligopolistic power over




Since the early 1980s, yet another type of
savings and lending institution operating in
the rural sector has experienced phenomenal
growth. Group-based institutions, engineered
and propagated by various NGOs, differ from
other formal ﬁnancial institutions in two
fundamental ways. First, unlike institutions
that lend primarily on the basis of physical
collateral, ﬁnancial institutions operated by
NGOs lend to groups and make use of joint
liability, peer selection, and investments in
repeated ﬁnancial transactions to overcome
the informational constraints in ﬁnancial mar-
kets (Zeller et al. 1997). Second, these
institutions do not depend solely on the gov-
ernment for loanable funds, nor have they
been subjected to interest rate and other
controls imposed by the central bank.3
Therefore, right from the beginning, the
group-based ﬁnancial institutions, unlike the
NCBs, were unimpeded in their pursuit of
sound banking principles. In practice, how-
ever, most NGOs depend on grants as well
as loans from the state or donors. These loans
are often at concessionary interest rates. The
concessionary funds are often linked with
certain restrictions, such as interest rate ceil-
ings or the establishment of new branches in
disadvantaged areas.
All NGO institutions are nonproﬁt insti-
tutions that are guided by special mandates
to assist the poor. In rural areas, they there-
fore typically target rural households with less
than half an acre of land. These institutions
have on the whole shown that providing ﬁ-
nancial services to the rural poor in Bangla-
desh not only is feasible, but can achieve high
repayment and savings rates combined with
a rapid growth of clients.
By and large, however, the majority of
poor rural households in Bangladesh con-
tinue to be served by a vast number of infor-
mal lenders who, because of their superior
information and low transaction costs, are
able to provide a range of ﬁnancial services
especially tailored to their clients (Zeller and
Sharma 1998).
Research Questions
Amyriad of credit and savings programs for
the rural poor are implemented by govern-
ment and nongovernmental organizations in
Bangladesh. Some of the organizations were
established in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
such as the Grameen Bank, the Association
for Social Advancement (ASA), and the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
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3 Since 1991, a government-owned institution called the Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) has been providing
loans to microﬁnance NGOs. PKSF limits the interest rates that can be charged to their clients by the borrowing member-
based ﬁnancial institutions. The Association for Social Advancement became a partner of PKSF in 1995 and the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee in 1997.(BRAC). These three institutions, in partic-
ular, have gained an international reputation
for obtaining high repayment rates from mil-
lions of very poor borrowers who were pre-
viously thought of as unbankable.
Yet relatively little research has been
conducted on various aspects of the institu-
tional performance of group-based ﬁnan-
cial institutions. In particular, the
determinants of the geographic placement
of group-based ﬁnancial institutions and
the repayment performance of credit
groups as well as their implications for
poverty outreach and ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity have not sufﬁciently been explored.
Most studies focus on the household and in-
trahousehold level, and rarely go beyond
case-study approaches or purely descrip-
tive analysis. One of the few in-depth
econometric studies to investigate the ef-
fects of these group-based ﬁnancial institu-
tions on household welfare is by Pitt and
Khandker (1996), who analyze the impact
of the Grameen Bank, BRAC, and the
Bangladesh Rural Development Board.
This study ﬁnds signiﬁcant and relatively
large effects on a number of welfare out-
come variables, notably food expenditure,
education, fertility, labor supply, and asset
accumulation. More speciﬁcally, the mar-
ginal return to weekly consumption expen-
diture per capita due to female borrowing
from the Grameen Bank is 19 percent.
Based on this result, Khandker (1996) cal-
culates that the average female Grameen
Bank borrower would require nine years of
membership to move out of poverty. How-
ever, using the same data as Pitt and Khand-
ker (1996), Morduch (1998b) applies an
alternative econometric model and ﬁnds no
signiﬁcant impact on the level of consump-
tion expenditure due to participation with
the Grameen Bank.
The main objectives of this study are to
analyze
1. the determinants of the formation and
outreach of group-based rural ﬁnancial
institutions;
2. the process of group formation and the
determinants of program eligibility and
their implications for the structure, con-
duct, and performance of savings and
credit groups; and
3. the effects of participation in group-based
credit and savings programs on household
resource allocation, income generation,
and food and nonfood consumption.4
Data for this study were collected by
IFPRI in a comprehensive survey in Bang-
ladesh in 1994. Acommunity-level survey in
120 villages obtained data related to objec-
tive (1), complemented by secondary data at
the county level. Data to address objectives
(2) and (3) were obtained from a random
sample of 128 credit groups and a three-
round survey of 350 households, respectively.
Appendix A describes the survey modules,
the sampling frame, and the location of the
survey areas.
The Selection of Credit 
and Savings Schemes
Three group-based ﬁnancial institutions
were selected for this study:
• the Association for Social Advancement
(ASA),
• the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Com-
mittee (BRAC), and
• Rangpur-Dinajpur Rural Services (RDRS).
The reasons for selecting these programs
are as follows. In the past, the Grameen Bank
has been the subject of many studies (see,
for example, Hossain 1988; Wahid 1993;
Khandker, Khalily, and Khan 1995; Todd
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4 This report does not address intrahousehold aspects of welfare impact. On this issue, see, for example, the research by
Pitt and Khandker (1998), Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley (1996), and Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996).1996; Matin 1997; Pitt and Khandker 1998),
whereas the three selected programs—with
the exception of BRAC—have not previ-
ously been comprehensively analyzed.
More importantly, the three selected pro-
grams represent different approaches to ﬁ-
nancial intermediation in Bangladesh. The
group-based NGO movement in microﬁnance
in Bangladesh can be broadly classiﬁed into
three categories:
1. NGOs that have transformed into banks.
Examples are the Grameen Bank and,
more recently, BRAC.
2. NGOs that have not registered as banks,
but collect savings and make loans
through their own local branch network.
Most microﬁnance NGOs fall into this
bracket (among the larger ones are, for
example, UDDIPAN and Proshika) (Ja-
hangir and Zeller 1995). ASA is the
largest of them, and grew the fastest
during the 1990s in terms of absolute
numbers of new members.
3. NGOs following the linkage approach.
These NGOs promote the formation of
credit and savings groups, but they
do not provide savings and credit serv-
ices through agents. Rather they facilitate
a linkage between the groups and
branches of rural state-owned banks. Ex-
amples of this category are Swanirvar
and RDRS.
ASA, BRAC, and RDRS have been selected
to represent these three categories of group-
based ﬁnancial institutions. BRAC is an
NGO that developed its group-based credit
and savings program into a registered rural
bank (like Grameen Bank), and operates this
bank as a subsidiary holding company sepa-
rated from its nonﬁnancial services. ASA
represents the mainstream of NGO-based
credit schemes in Bangladesh that continue
to rely on the rural banking network for the
wholesale functions of rural ﬁnance. Within
this type, ASA is at present the largest in
Bangladesh, and has made major progress in
becoming ﬁnancially self-sufﬁcient, increas-
ingly diversifying and disentangling its
credit, savings, and insurance products in re-
sponse to client demands and ﬁercer compe-
tition. RDRS is situated at the other extreme
of the institutional spectrum; it merely facil-
itates the formation of self-help groups and
their linkage with the rural banking sector.
Thus, RDRS serves as a promoter, whereas
ASA and BRAC are providers, as distin-
guished by Rutherford (2000).
The selected NGOs exhibit other impor-
tant differences with respect to target groups
and the type of services provided. These dif-
ferences are highlighted in the following.
Whereas ASA mainly ﬁnances off-farm en-
terprises for women only, BRAC lends to
women and men for both agricultural and
nonfarm activities. The two credit programs
provide loans to individuals who are mem-
bers of a group. The loans usually have a
maturity of one year. Households are eligi-
ble to join ASAor BRAC groups if they pos-
sess less than 0.5 acres of land. The loans
have to be repaid in weekly installments.
Many borrowers therefore invest in busi-
nesses with a continuous cash return (such as
trading or short-cycle production activities).
In the early years, ASA offered a range of
nonﬁnancial services, such as business
management training and social awareness
classes. During the 1990s, ASAincreasingly
focused on providing a diverse range of sav-
ings, credit, and insurance products while
reducing its nonﬁnancial services and aiming
to become ﬁnancially self-sufﬁcient. ASA
has in recent years also ventured into pro-
viding ﬁnancial services to the moderately
poor, that is, households possessing more
than 0.5 acres (Healey 1999). BRAC, in
contrast, not only offers ﬁnancial services
but also assists members in the marketing of
their products and, in some cases, promotes
housing loans and medium-term group in-
vestments, such as tubewells for irrigation.
Thus, whereas ASA seems to be streamlin-
ing its business and concentrate on ﬁnancial
services only, BRAC continues to operate as
a multi-input integrated development organ-
ization. As such, BRAC also provides health
INTRODUCTION 9services and invests in community schools
for its members.
The RDRS program emphasizes the pro-
motion of income generation within agri-
culture, animal husbandry, and ﬁsh-farming.
Many of these enterprises require longer
gestation periods. Two types of loans with a
maturity of one year are offered. The ﬁrst
type is meant for trading, service, and pro-
duction activities with a short gestation pe-
riod for generating cash. This loan has to be
repaid in bimonthly installments. The sec-
ond type of credit has to be repaid in a single
installment (RDRS 1995).
Like BRAC, the RDRS program con-
ducts training in social awareness and busi-
ness management and provides assistance in
the marketing of products. A major distinc-
tion between RDRS and BRAC/ASAis that
RDRS forms and trains groups but does not
handle any savings deposits, loan repay-
ments, or loan disbursement. Group members
transact directly with rural banks at going
market interest rates. Thus, the RDRS pro-
gram can be characterized as a “linkage pro-
gram” (Kropp 1990). Earlier examples of
linkage programs in Bangladesh include the
Dheki loan program and the Swanirvar
Bangladesh program. Linkage programs are
also increasingly promoted in other coun-
tries, in particular India. Households owning
less than 1.0 acre of land are eligible for
membership in RDRS groups. Since 1989,
with the implementation of the banking
component within the MSFSCIP5 project,
the eligibility criteria have been increased to
a maximum of 1.5 acres of land.
ASA’s community ofﬁcers directly handle
all the monetary transactions and maintain
savings accounts in the name of ASAgroup
members. BRAC ofﬁcers, too, collect savings
and credit payments (at weekly meetings), but
they deposit this money in BRAC’s banking
network. Thus, BRAC (like the Grameen
Bank) operates as a bank and assumes all
banking functions, whereas ASA performs
banking functions only at the retail level. The
staff of RDRS, on the other hand, do not deal
with monetary transactions at all; their sole
function is to form and train the groups and
to facilitate the initial contact between the
group and the bank.
In summary, the main differences among
the three programs are the degree of involve-
ment by the NGOs in the provision of ﬁnan-
cial services and their dependence on the
rural banking institutions, the gender of the
target group, the range of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial services offered by the NGOs, and
the eligibility criteria for membership.
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5 MSFSCIP stands for Marginal and Small Farms Systems Crop Intensiﬁcation Project in the Kurigram District (MSF-
SCIP 1995). This project has been supported by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (for small farm-
ers owning more than 1.5 acres of land) and by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (for marginal
farmers owning less than 1.5 acres of land). Since 1989, the GTZ and the Department of Agricultural Extension have
promoted direct linkages between groups being formed by the RDRS and commercial banks in the Kurigram District.CHAPTER 2
Determinants of the Placement 




articipation in ﬁnancial institutions varies considerably across counties and commu-
nities in Bangladesh. Secondary data from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and
information gathered from the major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for 391
out of the total of 486 thanas (counties) of Bangladesh show that, whereas some thanas have
almost a third of their population as members of some group-based ﬁnancial institution, others
have not a single such person (Table 2.1). What makes for this difference in institutional den-
sity? Khandker, Khalily, and Khan (1995) ﬁnd that commercial banks in Bangladesh favor
well-endowed areas, and a study in India (Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig 1993)
concluded that commercial banks are more likely to be located in places where the road
infrastructure and marketing system are relatively developed. Is this also the case with group-
based ﬁnancial systems promoted by NGOs? In other words, do NGO programs target serv-
ices on the poor in relatively underdeveloped or disadvantaged regions or do they locate their
branches in the relatively better endowed areas? What kinds of tensions arise between orga-
nizational goals and operational realities in making decisions about branch placement? Once
branches have been placed, what does client coverage look like across branches? For ex-
ample, do decisions on branch placement and client coverage follow similar patterns, or are
they different? To what extent does decisionmaking related to client coverage appear to be
decentralized (Ravallion and Wodon 1997)? Knowing whether certain types of area are sys-
tematically favored or disfavored is of interest and importance to policymakers as well as
to program managers. This knowledge can also assist in disentangling program effects from
location effects and hence is useful for an assessment of the impact of group-based credit pro-
grams (Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons 1995).
This chapter uses secondary thana- (upa zilla) level data from 391 thanas in Bangladesh
to examine the placement of branches and group coverage of the Association for Social Ad-
vancement (ASA), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), and Proshika,
institutions for which all relevant data were available. First, conceptual considerations instudying the placement of group-based ﬁ-
nancial institutions are discussed and their
implications for the speciﬁcation of the
econometric model are derived. Results from
the estimation of determinants of the place-
ment of NGO branch ofﬁces in rural areas
as well as determinants of their outreach to
rural households are then presented.
Analytical Considerations in
Studying the Placement and
Outreach of Rural Financial
Institutions in Bangladesh
When guided by the sole objective of maxi-
mizing proﬁts, the decision by a ﬁnancial ﬁrm
to place a branch ofﬁce in a particular loca-
tion is relatively straightforward because it
can be based on standard investment theory:
it makes sense to open an additional outlet
whenever discounted returns exceed the dis-
counted costs for establishing and operating
the branch ofﬁce. Before resources to a new
branch ofﬁce are committed, the ﬁrm is free
to choose the scale of operations based on its
knowledge of expected demand conditions.
The decision on the size of the branch ofﬁce
will affect its future unit cost of supplying
services. Once a branch is opened—that is,
once resources in the form of building and
equipment are committed and the scale of the
operation has been determined within some
limits—the service volume in the short run
(during which time scale is quasi-ﬁxed) is
provided such that marginal revenue equals
marginal costs. Of course, the possibility of
expanding the scale of operations in the fu-
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics of regression variables: Thana level (n = 391)
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
Presence of NGOa 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Presence of ASAa 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
Presence of BRACa 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Presence of Proshikaa 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Client density (all)b 17.86 33.01 0.00 297.59
Client density (ASA)b 1.94 6.35 0.00 39.80
Client density (BRAC)b 9.35 24.45 0.00 297.59
Client density (Proshika)b 6.57 19.95 0.00 155.99
Independent variablesc
Years of operation (BRAC) 1.46 3.33 0.00 18.00
Years of operation (ASA) 0.41 1.33 0.00 7.00
ELECTRICITY 6.96 8.47 0.00 54.90
LANDSIZE 23.90 7.60 1.97 52.87
LITERATE 24.54 9.94 11.00 60.40
MARKET 26.22 13.37 1.00 75.00
DENSITY 791.10 666.54 93.20 10,557.35
URBAN 11.26 16.58 0.00 100.00
ROAD 0.17 0.21 0.00 2.61
POSTOFFICE 16.18 9.69 1.00 82.00
HOSPITAL 12,576.33 11,499.45 0.00 99,726.00
DOCTOR 42,905.03 44,555.82 0.00 329,739.00
DISTRESS 1.10 0.15 1.00 1.50
Sources: BBS, Statistical yearbook (various issues); BRAC 1994; ASA1994; data for Proshika obtained in interviews from
Head Ofﬁce; data for variable distress index from HKI 1994.
a Dummy variables.
b Client density (that is, outreach) is deﬁned as the number of NGO clients in the thana divided by the thana’s population
multiplied by a factor of 1,000.
c For deﬁnition of variables, see page 16.ture remains; this decision would depend on
expected changes in the demand for services
and the extent to which moving on to a larger
scale of operation would bring about a sub-
stantial reduction in unit costs of providing
services. The ﬁrm might also decide to close
an existing branch ofﬁce. It will do so in the
short run with the objective of proﬁt maxi-
mization if variable costs are no longer cov-
ered by revenue, and in the long run if the
discounted total costs (including deprecia-
tion) of maintaining the branch exceed ex-
pected discounted revenue.
Can the above framework be applied to
analyze the NGOs’ decisions for placing
branch ofﬁces and for determining their
outreach to clients? The answer is in the
negative mainly because proﬁtmaking is not
a principal aim of these organizations. Two
additional considerations are likely to affect
the branch placement and client outreach de-
cisions of the NGOs. First, as indicated in the
previous chapter, BRAC, Proshika, and
ASA came into being principally as a re-
sponse to the challenge of delivering basic
social services to a destitute population,
which was further impoverished, at that
time, by a devastating war of liberation. The
management decisions within these organi-
zations are therefore primarily guided by the
goals underlined in the original mission or
the charter under which these institutions
were established. Second, the original mis-
sion is likely to be modiﬁed by at least one
other important consideration: the interest
represented by the principal donors or in-
vestors in these institutions, composed of in-
ternational donor organizations as well as
development organizations and foundations
such as Bread for the World and MIS-
EREOR. All three NGOs received and con-
tinue to receive funding from such sources
and, by implication, are likely to be bound
by some type of conditionalities accom-
panying these funding arrangements. Some
of these conditionalities relate primarily to
maintaining some minimum standards of ﬁ-
nancial performance (for example, achieving
loan repayment rates above 90 percent and
having low administrative costs per unit of
loan lent). Other investors may also insist on
evidence of satisfactory outreach to the poor
and a reasonable growth in the numbers of
poor reached. More recently, investors have
become increasingly interested in obtaining
evidence on the impact of the program on
poverty reduction. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that aiming to fulﬁll the origi-
nal organizational objectives as well as the
conditionalities imposed by the “investors”
results in four speciﬁc considerations con-
cerning branch placement and client cover-
age: (1) poverty targeting, (2) expected
demand for services, (3) the cost of supply-
ing services, and (4) the perceived riskiness
of operations. These ideas are further ex-
panded below.
The placement rule followed by NGOs is
speciﬁed as
Bi = f[P i, E(Di), E(Ci), Ri], (2.1)
where the decision to place a branch, Bi, by
an NGO credit institution is speciﬁed as a
function of P i,a vector that describes poverty
conditions in location i, E(Di), the expected
level of demand for credit services in that
area; E(Ci), the expected level of cost of
providing services, and Ri, an index of the
riskiness of conducting credit-related busi-
ness in that particular area. Each of these is
discussed below.
Poverty Targeting
All group-based NGOs considered in this
study claim to be guided, ﬁrst and foremost,
by a common mission to serve the poorest
in the rural areas (ASA1996a, 1996b; Lovell
1992; BRAC 1994). ASA, for example,
which provides credit exclusively to women,
aims to create “a broader space for margin-
alized women of rural areas as they can par-
ticipate in income generation activities to
increase income” (ASA1994). BRAC, on the
other hand, aims to work “exclusively with
disadvantaged sections of the community”
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and focuses on poor landless groups; Pro-
shika has an explicit mission to “empower
the poor” (Jahangir and Zeller 1995). Given
these kinds of mission statement, a reason-
able hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus,
locations with higher poverty levels will
have a higher probability of a branch
placement.
There are, however, two additional ques-
tions: (1) What criteria of poverty do these
institutions apply in targeting individuals at
the operations level? (2) What criteria do
these institutions apply in making opera-
tional decisions about the areas in which to
target their activities?
The answer to the ﬁrst question is rela-
tively straightforward. All three programs
have clear poverty-based eligibility rules.
BRAC lends only to those who own less than
0.5 acres of land and who additionally work
as a laborer for at least 100 days in a year
(Lovell 1992). ASAlends to women who own
less than 0.5 acres of land, whose income
does not exceed Tk 1,200 per month, and
who also sell their labor for at least 200 days
a year (ASA1993).
The response of NGOs to the differences
in poverty levels between different locations
in making decisions about placement is a
more difﬁcult question. Areasonable assump-
tion is that the NGOs base their decisions
on various types of area-level indicators of
poverty. One testable hypothesis is that
NGOs locate their branches in thanas that
have larger proportions of households own-
ing less than 0.5 acres of land, because this
criterion most closely deﬁnes their target
households.6This need not be the only crite-
rion, however. To explore other criteria, two
additional measures are proposed in this
study: thana-level literacy rates and thana-
level scores on the “distress” index developed
by Helen Keller International (HKI 1994)
in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to operationalize the
vulnerability focus of its program. Literacy
rates in general correlate highly with poverty
levels, and the HKI distress index combines
information on susceptibility to ﬂooding (a
frequently occurring natural disaster in Bang-
ladesh), general wage levels, and the avail-
ability of irrigation facilities, all major
factors affecting the well-being of the poor
in Bangladesh.
Expected Level of Demand 
for Credit Services
The expected level of demand for credit
services in an area is likely to receive im-
portant consideration for two reasons. First,
it would be important for the NGOs to avoid
areas where credit demand is likely to be
either nonexistent or lower than some mini-
mum threshold below which credit delivery
is prohibitively costly to administer. Second,
the marginal impact of NGO services on par-
ticipating households—a major concern for
the NGOs—is likely to be highest in areas
where the marginal productivity of credit, and
therefore its demand, is likely to be highest.
The marginal productivity of credit, in turn,
is likely to be high in areas that are affected
relatively less by other accompanying con-
straints on labor and product markets,
transportation, and information. Hence, the
expected demand for credit is expressed as
E(Di) = g(Wi), (2.2)
where the vector, W i,consists of thana-level
variables that affect the level of credit demand
and may include the following variables:
• the level of physical infrastructural de-
velopment such as access to markets,
roads, electricity, irrigation, and other
services;
• agroclimatic conditions and general in-
come levels; and
• the level of urbanization and commercial-
ization of the local economy.
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6 The poor landless nonfarm population also constitutes the target population. However, the ofﬁcial data set does not con-
tain this information.The Cost of Supplying Services
As indicated before, whereas proﬁtseeking
institutions select locations where expected
revenues are at least as high as expected total
cost, this may not necessarily be the case for
NGOs because proﬁt maximization is not
their stated objective. Further, NGOs receive
subsidies of different types. Some are ex-
plicitly given to set up branches in speciﬁc
geographical areas. NGOs also are known to
cross-subsidize operations between branches.
For this reason, they are not likely to base
their placement decision solely on expected
net revenues. The way in which expected ﬁ-
nancial performance affects the placement
of branches is thus essentially an empirical
issue.
But at least three other cost-related issues
are likely to be important in deciding where
to locate a branch ofﬁce. These concern the
general security of the operations, the avail-
ability of banking services, and staff incen-
tives for working in backward areas. Credit
transactions necessarily involve the handling
of cash, which raises security concerns. Prox-
imity to a police station and other law and
order establishments may therefore be impor-
tant. Moreover, when NGOs do not provide
their own banking services (with the excep-
tion of the Grameen Bank and, more re-
cently, BRAC) but depend on the branch of
a public sector bank to make cash disburse-
ments and deposits, then convenient prox-
imity to rural banks becomes important. If
banks are generally located in areas that are
more urbanized or beneﬁt from better infra-
structure (as Khandker, Khalily, and Khan
1995 have shown), then NGOs may also tend
to place branches in or near these locations.
The third issue relates to the stafﬁng of
branches. Since branch managers are re-
cruited from a central pool, and since salaries
and other compensation do not reward ap-
pointments in more remote locations, man-
agers are likely to prefer locations that have
fairly well-developed education, market, and
health services. If these considerations are
signiﬁcant in the decision to place branches,
placement will be higher in thanas that have
such services.
To account for all of these considerations,
the expected total cost function is speciﬁed as
E(Ci) = g(Zi), (2.3)
where the vector Zi consists of thana-level
variables that affect the level of unit service
delivery costs. In practice, vectors Wi in
equation (2.2) and Zi are likely to be very
similar, if not identical.
Perceived Riskiness
An important goal of NGOs administering
credit programs is to maintain high repay-
ment rates. Indeed, as noted earlier, all NGO
programs report repayment rates in excess
of 90 percent. Achieving acceptable repay-
ment rates is critical for NGOs, because most
of the subsidies they receive from national
and international donors appear to be condi-
tional on maintaining such rates. This objec-
tive of maintaining high repayment rates7
may also affect the placement of branches.
In particular, NGOs are likely to avoid areas
where marginal returns from new microenter-
prises are low (poor, backward areas where
complementary services either do not exist
or are highly inadequate). They are also
likely to avoid areas that are particularly sus-
ceptible to natural disasters such as ﬂooding
and other covariate risks. The risk expecta-
tion function is speciﬁed as
E(Ri) = g(Vi). (2.4)
Elements in V i include poverty indicators
such as the literacy rate, the level and distri-
bution of landholding, and also the distress-
level indicator described earlier.
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7 Note that the repayment rate is different from net ﬁnancial returns. Net revenues may be negative even when repayment
is 100 percent.Econometric Speciﬁcation
Alinear speciﬁcation of the placement equa-
tion (2.1), upon substituting for (2.2)–(2.4),
would be
Bi = Piα+Wiβ+Ziγ+Viδ. (2.5)
However, as indicated in the previous sec-
tion, it is in principle (and also as a result of
data limitations) very difﬁcult to identify P,
W, Z, and V separately. For example, it is
hard to ﬁnd variables that affect poverty
levels but not credit demand or the riskiness
of conducting business. Amore practical for-
mulation is therefore to regard the elements
in P, W, Z, and Vas common and represented
by the vector Xi, as
Bi =ΣηiXi +µ d + ei, (2.6)
and interpreting its coefﬁcient, ηi = (αi +β i
+γi+δi), as the combined effects of the four
determinants of placement. After all, infra-
structure, urbanization, and other community-
level endowments are likely to jointly affect
levels of poverty as well as demand for credit
services, the cost of credit service delivery,
and the riskiness of conducting business.
Similarly, susceptibility to natural disasters
simultaneously affects poverty, credit de-
mand patterns, and the riskiness and costs of
doing business. Note that a priori expecta-
tions on the sign of the ηi’s are difﬁcult to
place unless αi, βi, γi, and δi are of the same
expected signs. However, it is possible to
make inferences based on the signs of the es-
timated coefﬁcients on the relative strengths
of some subset of the variables. This is done
in the next section.
A different consideration is the effect of
unobservables. If the placement of govern-
ment infrastructural programs as well as
levels of poverty are functions of unobserv-
able factors such as agroclimatic potentials
of lands, or historical or political considera-
tions, then exclusion of such factors in equa-
tion (2.6) is likely to lead to biased estimates
of the ηi’s. In order to minimize bias arising
out of location-speciﬁc unobservables, a
district-level effect, µd, is included in equa-
tion (2.6). Since B i in equation (2.6) is a bi-
nary dependent variable taking the value of
1 whenever there is a branch of the NGO in
a thana and 0 otherwise, the equation is es-
timated using the ﬁxed-effects logit model
that sweeps out the effects of district-level
unobservables. The last term in the equation,
ei, represents the random error.
The vector X in equation (2.6) contains
the following variables (see Table 2.1 for
descriptive statistics) relating to the thana:
Poverty-related variables
LANDSIZE The percentage of farms that
are below 0.5 acres in size
LITERATE The percentage of population
that is literate
Infrastructure-related variables
ELECTRICITY The percentage of villages
electriﬁed
MARKET The number of market centers
DENSITY The population density
URBAN The percentage of urban pop-
ulation
ROAD Kilometers of metaled road per
1,000 persons
HOSPITAL The number of people per hos-
pital bed
DOCTOR The number of people per
doctor
POSTOFFICE The number of post ofﬁces
Risk/poverty-related variable
DISTRESS The thana-wide distress index
computed by HKI (the higher the value,
the more prone to distress is the thana)
Except for the distress-level index, which
was directly obtained from HKI in Dhaka,
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the 1994 Statistical yearbookof Bangladesh,
published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Sta-
tistics. Data on the dependent variables for
the different programs were obtained from
annual reports from BRAC, ASA, and the
Grameen Bank for 1994 (BRAC 1994; ASA
1994; Grameen Bank 1994). The data for
Proshika also refer to 1994, and were ob-




Placement of branch equations were esti-
mated for all three NGOs taken together
and for each separately. These are discussed
below.
All NGOs
The estimated logit equation where the de-
pendent variable takes on a value of 1 when
a branch of at least one of the three NGOs
exists in the thana and 0 otherwise is pre-
sented in Table 2.2. Anumber of interesting
results are discussed below. The coefﬁcients
of ROAD and POSTOFFICE are positive
and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. These
are both infrastructural variables measuring
the extent of transportation and communica-
tion facilities in the thana. Neither the per-
centage of urban population (URBAN) nor
population density (DENSITY) is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Nor are the two health serv-
ice indicators (HOSPITAL) and (DOCTOR),
the number of market centers (MARKET), or
the percentage of villages that are electriﬁed
(ELECTRICITY). It appears therefore that
placement decisions are mindful of trans-
portation and communication facilities that
directly affect the transaction costs of supply-
ing ﬁnancial services, but that the net effect
of other infrastructural facilities measured or
proxied by population concentration, urban-
ization, and the availability of medical and
health services is insigniﬁcant.
The coefﬁcient of LITERATE is nega-
tive and strongly signiﬁcant. The illiteracy
rate serves in the analysis as an indicator of
poverty and backwardness. Hence, NGOs
are more likely to place branch ofﬁces in
thanas with lower literacy rates. Note that if
considerations of demand, costs, and riski-
ness favor thanas with higher literacy rates,
that is, if (βliterate +γ literate +δ literate) > 0,
then it may be concluded that the NGOs’
strategy to reach the poor (αliterate) is suf-
ﬁciently large to overturn the combined
positive effect, so that the net effect is neg-
ative (that is, |αliterate| > |βliterate +γ literate
+δ literate|). The positive coefﬁcient of the
landholding variable, LANDSIZE, suggests
a similar interpretation as far as the farming
population in the thana is concerned: the
NGOs’ desire to improve poverty outreach
in counties with a higher proportion of farms
below 0.5 acres seems to outweigh the com-
bined negative effects on risk costs. How-
ever, the coefﬁcient is highly insigniﬁcant
for the case of all NGOs combined. More-
over, the use of this variable as an indicator
of poverty in the thana is problematic be-
cause it does not take into account the poor,
landless, nonfarm population, a declared tar-
get group of BRAC and ASA. The variable
solely measures the percentage of marginal
farms below 0.5 acres. NGOs may actually
prefer landed households with less than half
an acre of land as clients, compared with
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Table 2.2 Placement of all NGOs: 









HOSPITAL 4.11 × 10−6 0.294




Log likelihood =− 172.79
** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.households with no land at all, which may be
considered a greater credit risk. Therefore,
the partially signiﬁcant results of the variable
LANDSIZE in the subsequent models in this
chapter need to be interpreted in light of this
variable being an indicator of the number of
poor, marginal farmers, and not of the num-
ber of poor landless households overall.
The coefﬁcient of DISTRESS is nega-
tive and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
NGOs thus are less likely to place branches
in high distress locations that are prone to
natural disasters such as ﬂoods. Unlike the
case of LITERATE, it appears that poverty
considerations (which are attendant on high-
level distress) are not strong enough to com-
pensate for the negative effects arising out of
providing credit services in risk-prone areas.8
This result indicates the lack of preparedness
of even large NGOs, such as BRAC and
ASA, to cope effectively with covariant risks.
Overall, the estimated branch placement
equation indicates that, although NGOs
appear to respond to poverty, they are more
likely to place branches in locations with
favorable infrastructure. They also are less
likely to place branches in counties with a
high exposure to covariant risks.
NGO-Speciﬁc Equations
The equations describing thana-level place-
ment of branches of ASA, BRAC, and Pro-
shika are presented in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and
2.5. The explanatory variables are the same
as in the combined regression in Table 2.2
except for one extra consideration: the re-
sponse of an NGO to existing branches of
other NGOs. On the one hand, NGOs may
prefer to work in exclusive markets, with no
competition or any other type of inﬂuences
from other providers of similar services. On
the other hand, existing branches of other
NGOs in a particular location may signal to
a potential entrant a community’s positive
social capital, which contributes to social
receptivity and the successful operation of
group-based programs; if this were the case,
clustering of NGOs would be observed. How
NGOs respond to existing branches of other
NGOs is, hence, an empirical question. For
this reason, a dummy variable PRIOR-
COMP—which takes the value 1 whenever
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8 Zeller, Diagne, and Mataya (1998) ﬁnd that group-based ﬁnancial institutions in Malawi also shy away from placing
branch ofﬁces in areas exposed to covariant drought risk. This is presumably to reduce the risk of systemic loan default.














Log likelihood =− 45.23
* =signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** =signiﬁcant at 5 per-
cent level.














Log likelihood =− 98.88
* =signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** =signiﬁcant at 5 per-
cent level.a branch of another group-based NGO in the
thana existed prior to the placement of a
branch of the NGO in question—is used in
the regression equation.9For example, in the
BRAC equation, the variable PRIORCOMP
would equal 1 whenever a branch of a com-
peting NGO existed in the thana prior to the
establishment of the BRAC branch, and
would equal 0 otherwise. Hence, the esti-
mated coefﬁcient would indicate the extent
to which the existence of a competing insti-
tution operating in the area affects the deci-
sion to establish a branch. Unfortunately,data
on the year of branch establishment were
available for BRAC and ASA but not for
Proshika. Therefore, only the regressions for
BRAC and ASA account for the effect of
competing institutions operating in the thana.
Also, because BRAC’s group-based credit
operation was established well before ASA’s
(Jahangir and Zeller 1995), a subset of ob-
servations that include data only after 1987,
when ASA’s credit programs were fully ini-
tiated, was used in the analysis. The results
of the estimated ﬁxed-effects logit equations
are discussed below.
• The coefﬁcient of PRIORCOMP in both
the ASAand BRAC equations is negative
and signiﬁcant, indicating that both ASA
and BRAC are less likely to establish
branches in locations that already have a
“competitor’s” branch.
• The coefﬁcient of the percentage of popu-
lation owning less than half an acre of land
(LANDSIZE) is positive and signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level in both the ASA and
BRAC equations, but not in the Proshika
equation. On the other hand, the coefﬁ-
cients of literacy rate (LITERATE) are neg-
ative in all three NGO-speciﬁc equations,
though they are statistically signiﬁcant
only in the BRAC and Proshika equations.
Note also that LITERATE is the only sig-
niﬁcant variable in the Proshika equation.
The results of the NGO-speciﬁc equations
thus are indicative of placement decisions
responding to poverty conditions, espe-
cially BRAC’s, which respond to both lit-
eracy and landholding levels. It is noted
that the landholding variable is not sig-
niﬁcant in the combined NGO regression
in Table 2.2.
• As for the transport and communication
variables, POSTOFFICE is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in the
BRAC equation, while ROAD is positive
and signiﬁcant, also at the 5 percent level,
in the ASAequation. This is an interesting
result because in the early 1990s BRAC
was already planning eventually to conduct
its own banking services, whereas ASA
had no such plans and was likely to con-
tinue to use banking services offered by
commercial banks. Probably for this rea-
son, it is important for ASA to locate
branches in areas with better access to
transport infrastructure because it is here
that rural banks are located. In fact, since
1998 BRAC no longer depends on rural
banking branches, as it has established the
Bank of BRAC as a subsidiary holding
company.
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Log likelihood =− 93.42
** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
9 The variable PRIORCOMPconsiders the prior existence of the three largest NGOs in Bangladesh: the Grameen Bank,
BRAC, and ASA. The reporting system of these organizations provides information on the year of establishment of
their branch ofﬁces, differentiated by thana. The following reports were used to obtain these data: BRAC 1994; ASA
1994; Grameen Bank 1994.• The coefﬁcient for the DISTRESS vari-
able, reﬂecting covariate ﬂood and other
risks of distress in the thana, is both neg-
ative and signiﬁcant only in the BRAC
equation.
• None of the other variables is signiﬁcant
in any of the equations. However, in the
framework adopted here, this does not
mean that the other variables are not con-
sidered at all in the placement decision. It
just means that their net effect through the
four factors (poverty, demand, cost, and




Having examined branch placement out-
comes for the three NGOs, the analysis now
examines factors that inﬂuence the client
outreach of thana-level branches. Apart from
learning which poverty characteristics affect
the density of outreach to clients, it is also
of interest to examine whether any type of
decentralization process characterizes the
geographical distribution of service delivery.
As Ravallion and Wodon (1997) point out, in
programs targeted to the poor, it may be that
headquarters makes a decision on where to
place a branch, but subsequently leaves it up
to local managers to determine the scale of
operation of the established branch. Is this
also the case with Bangladeshi NGOs? As an
indicator of client outreach, the participation
density (OUTREACH) is used. Outreach is
measured as the number of participants in a
speciﬁc program per 1,000 people in the
thana.
The econometric speciﬁcation of the out-
reach regression equations is similar to that
of the branch placement equation in equa-
tion (2.6) except that the dependent variable
OUTREACH is a truncated variable: client
coverage is observed only in thanas that have
branches. The procedure used to correct this
sample selection bias is the two-stage Heck-
man procedure (1979) whereby a Mills ra-
tio (LAMBDA) computed from the branch
placement (logit) equation is used as an ad-
ditional regressor in the participation density
equation and appropriate adjustments are
made in the computation of standard errors
(Greene 1993). An additional variable,
YEARS, is used in the outreach equation to
control for the fact that client density is ex-
pected to increase with years of operation of
the branch. YEARS is the number of years
for which the branch has been in operation.
However, because YEARS was not avail-
able for Proshika, the outreach equation was
estimated using data only for BRAC and
ASA, with YEARS computed as the sum of
years that branches of both ASAand BRAC
had been in operation in the thana.The com-
bined outreach equation estimated for ASA
and BRAC is presented in Table 2.6. The co-
efﬁcients of only three variables are signiﬁ-
cant: YEARS, LANDSIZE, and DISTRESS.
• The coefﬁcient of YEARS is positive and
highly signiﬁcant, indicating that NGO in-
stitutions have expanded their client base
through time. Indeed, if YEARS were the
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DENSITY −0.77299 × 10−2 −0.569
URBAN −0.89751 × 10−1 −0.283
ROAD −0.62777 −0.023
POSTOFFICE −0.84270 × 10−1 −0.213
HOSPITAL −0.15839 × 10−3 −0.595




Log likelihood =− 572.11
F12,108 = 4.62
* =signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** =signiﬁcant at 5 per-
cent level.only signiﬁcant variable in the equation,
this would have suggested that, once a
branch is placed in a particular location,
client coverage is not determined by local
speciﬁcities. However, this is not the case,
since at least two other area characteristics
appear to inﬂuence outreach.
• Outreach is signiﬁcantly higher in thanas
that have a higher distress index. This re-
sult is completely opposite to that of the
placement equation, which had indicated
that NGOs disfavored areas with higher
covariant risks. The result thus suggests
that, though branches are less likely to be
placed in such areas, once established,
they have higher client densities. This ap-
pears plausible for three reasons. First, it is
likely that demand for ﬁnancial services
is especially large in these backward, high-
risk thanas, especially since these areas
are inadequately served by the banking
sector. Second, it may indeed be part of in-
stitutional policy to have higher levels of
outreach in relatively more depressed areas.
Third, the result may indicate partial de-
centralization in service delivery whereby
local branch managers, once the branch is
set up, exercise more control in outreach-
related decision functions and can thus be
more responsive to local conditions.
• Outreach is signiﬁcantly lower in thanas
with a higher proportion of marginal farm-
ers, as shown by the negative coefﬁcient
of LANDSIZE. But it remains unclear
whether this result is driven by supply or
demand factors. A signiﬁcant proportion
of the projects ﬁnanced by NGOs are off-
farm microenterprises in rural trading,
food processing, and handicraft production
(ASA 1993; BRAC 1994; Dupuis 1994).
If, indeed, ﬁnancing off-farm microenter-
prises (rather than agricultural production)
is one of the main strategies of the NGO
institutions, then outreach would respond
not just to the proportion of the population
owning less than 0.5 acres of land, but also
to the presence of landless wage laborers,
who are likely to be even poorer.
• Although it was clear from the placement
equations that branches are more likely to
be established in thanas with better com-
munication and transportation infrastruc-
ture, there is no evidence that, once a
branch is established, client outreach also
responds to infrastructure-related character-
istics. This once again suggests discontinu-
ities between the placement and outreach
decision functions.
The NGO-speciﬁc equations in Tables 2.7,
2.8, and 2.9 largely echo the ﬁndings of the
combined equation in Table 2.6 and are there-
fore not discussed separately.
Conclusions
The analysis indicates that, even though 
the placement of branches of NGO institu-
tions responded to poverty considerations,
branches were more likely to be established
in locations that had better access to trans-
port and communication infrastructure. This
is presumably out of a desire to reduce trans-
action costs in supplying ﬁnancial services.
Hence, it appears that NGO services are
geared more towards the poor in relatively
well-developed areas rather than towards
the poor in more remote and less developed
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HOSPITAL 0.20427 × 10−3 1.229




Log likelihood =− 88.64
F12,17 = 1.92
* =signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** =signiﬁcant at 5 per-
cent level.regions. The client outreach of existing
branches, however, did not exhibit such a
pattern. It actually tended to be better in less
favorable and more “distressed” locations.
Greater concentration of branches in the
better areas may in part be the result of a
search for locations where the marginal
impact of credit services is the greatest. Typ-
ically, accompanying constraints on produc-
tion or income—for example, those imposed
by the lack of markets, transportation, and
communication—are likely to be less severe
in areas that have good infrastructure. For
example, loans for ﬁnancing the production
of highly market-dependent outputs, such as
commercial crops, and other nonfarm micro-
enterprises are less suitable for remote areas.
Moreover, banking services become espe-
cially risky in remote areas where covariance
in household incomes is likely to be higher
because the rural economy tends to be less
diversiﬁed. In such areas, the high repayment
rates that are necessary to maintain NGOs’
access to subsidized funds from various
agencies are more difﬁcult to achieve. Fur-
thermore, the absence of rural banks limits
ﬁnancial operations in remote or poor loca-
tions because it increases the transaction
costs of branch ofﬁces in disbursing loans
and collecting savings that are channeled
through the rural banking system. Hence, as
suggested in the previous section, NGOs
may follow a strategy of placing fewer
branches in distressed areas, but with each of
these branches serving a larger number of
clients and achieving a high level of market
penetration. The tension between targeting
poverty and ensuring adequate ﬁnancial per-
formance is thus quite clear in the way the
NGOs place their services spatially.
If simultaneous efforts to reach the
poor, to maximize the marginal impact of
services, and to minimize loan default in-
troduce considerable tension in NGOs’serv-
ice placement decisions, solutions for
reducing this tension lie in innovative lend-
ing technologies that reduce transaction costs
for both lenders and borrowers and increase
the marginal returns on loans to the poor in
disadvantaged locations. Four strategies are
identiﬁed: (1) area-speciﬁc innovations and
differentiations in ﬁnancial products, (2) per-
22 CHAPTER 2











HOSPITAL −0.24825 × 10−3 −0.689




Log likelihood =− 328.69
F12,56 = 1.85
** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.










HOSPITAL 0.37920 × 10−3 1.258




Log likelihood =− 197.0947
F11,33 = 2.04
* =signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** =signiﬁcant at 5 per-
cent level.formance and location incentives for branch
staff, (3) a reduction in dependence on branch
ofﬁces of commercial banks, and (4) donor
support for the expansion of programs in
remote and vulnerable areas.
1. Area-speciﬁc innovations and differenti-
ations in ﬁnancial products. The demand
for different types of loan and savings
services is affected by a range of area-
speciﬁc factors. Reducing the cost of
credit delivery and increasing the mar-
ginal impact of credit on the borrower
depend on the extent to which credit and
savings services are responsive to area-
speciﬁc characteristics. However, it is cur-
rently the case that the ﬁnancial products
of nongovernmental organizations are
usually standardized for the entire coun-
try. Although branch managers have
sufﬁcient ﬂexibility in managing the
headquarters-prescribed array of ﬁnan-
cial products, they do not have the ﬂexi-
bility to design new ﬁnancial products 
or to introduce modiﬁcations to existing
ones. Headquarters ofﬁces are unlikely
to possess the full information necessary
to evaluate the potentials and constraints
of service branches. Hence, lower-tier in-
stitutions, such as divisional or district of-
fices, should be given some ﬂexibility and
incentives to modify existing ﬁnancial and
other services or to introduce new serv-
ices on a pilot basis. Such area-speciﬁc
and demand-led product diversiﬁcation
might well alter the terms of the ﬁnancial
contract, including spatial differentiation
of interest rates.
2. Performance and location incentives for
branch staff. To improve outreach and
cost recovery in bank branches, managers
and their staff could receive special in-
centives for above-average performance.
Successful innovations by branch or dis-
trict managers, as mentioned above, could
be especially rewarded. Furthermore, if,
as seems likely, good managers choose
well-developed areas, some form of
compensatory payments could be given
to managing staff or branch ofﬁces in re-
mote areas where access to basic social
services and economic infrastructure is
lacking.
3. Areduction in dependence on branch of-
ﬁces of banks. Most ﬁnancial NGOs de-
pend on the proximity of a bank branch
ofﬁce where funds are deposited and with-
drawn. An increasing distance from the
NGO branch ofﬁce to the nearest bank
branch ofﬁce raises the transaction costs
of NGO operations and jeopardizes its
financial performance. This limits the out-
reach of the NGOs to those areas where
such bank branches exist or are close by.
The Grameen Bank, one of the pioneers
in microcredit, has chosen to maintain its
own network of branch ofﬁces that per-
form all functions of money transfer be-
tween branches and regional ofﬁces and
headquarters. BRAC followed this ex-
ample in 1998 by establishing its own
bank subsidiary. When other NGO-
supported ﬁnancial systems, such as ASA,
reach a certain size, they may well follow
this example. However, this would not be
economical for the many smaller NGOs.
A solution here may lie in the establish-
ment of subcounty NGO units in remote
areas to act as “NGO bank branches” by
mediating between individual branch of-
fices and commercial bank branches. Such
units could well be supported by a con-
sortium of social investors targeting a
particularly vulnerable area, so that the
unit services a number of NGOs simulta-
neously. Another possibility is mobile
banking, in which remote branch ofﬁces
are served by regional or district NGOs
or commercial bank ofﬁces on a pre-
scribed time schedule. In so far as man-
agers with above-average skills prefer to
locate themselves near towns, mobile
banking would allow remote branches to
be served by a cadre of qualiﬁed man-
agers instead of being “trainee branches.”
For the borrower or saver, this system
would provide access to ﬁnancial ser-
vices not previously available.
4. Government and donor support for the
expansion of programs in particularly
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ment of a branch ofﬁce, the recruitment
and training of its personnel, and the for-
mation and training of groups require
considerable up-front investments, espe-
cially in more remote or risk-prone areas.
However, it is also likely that many re-
mote thanas in Bangladesh that are cur-
rently not served have sufﬁcient long-
term demand to support the total operating
costs. Hence, donor and government
support to target selected remote areas and
to accelerate expansion of the branch net-
work in these areas could in many cases be
justiﬁed, from both efﬁciency and equity
perspectives.
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Group-Based Financial Institutions:
Structure, Conduct, and Performance
G
roup-based ﬁnancial services provided by NGOs in Bangladesh have gone a long
way toward demonstrating that the task of ﬁnancing the poor is indeed feasible.
Lending on the basis of group liability and peer monitoring enables these institutions
to overcome problems relating to screening, monitoring, and enforcement, problems that
plague the more traditional formal institutions. This chapter analyzes the structure, conduct,
and performance of credit groups supported by three NGOs in rural Bangladesh: Rangpur-
Dinajpur Rural Services (RDRS), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC),
and the Association for Social Advancement (ASA).
The ﬁrst section presents a descriptive analysis of the structure of the groups, the process
of their formation, and the changes in membership within groups over time. In the second
section, the conduct of the groups is described. Activities and regulations are reviewed and
compared between the programs. Next, we consider measures related to the performance
of the microﬁnance institutions (MFIs). The third section discusses the performance of the
groups, paying special attention to repayment rates. The analysis is based on a survey of 128
groups participating in credit and/or saving programs of the three institutions in four districts
of Bangladesh: Dhaka, Rahshahi, Khulna, and Sylhet. The survey consisted of interviews
with leaders of the group selected. The number of groups surveyed is presented by adminis-
trative division in Table 3.1. The fourth and ﬁnal section presents secondary data on the costs
and ﬁnancial self-sufﬁciency of microﬁnance institutions in South Asia and other regions. Al-
though a cost–beneﬁt analysis is beyond the scope of this report, the data are useful in as-
sessing the approximate extent to which the government or donors subsidize the group-based
ﬁnancial institutions in Bangladesh.
The Structure of the Groups
The structure of the groups is determined not only by the endogenous process of group for-
mation itself, but also by regulations and procedures imposed by the ﬁnancial institution con-
cerned. All three institutions have rules related to the size of a group and the gender of its
members and other eligibility conditions based on landownership and family income levels.Who are the principal agents who initiate
the process of group formation? Generally, it
is expected that institutional employees will
play a greater role when a program is ﬁrst
introduced, since the idea of group formation
is likely to be an alien concept in the commu-
nity in the initial phase. However, one might
expect more locally initiated groups over time
if the NGOs’ services are perceived to be
beneﬁcial by the people.
Table 3.2 provides information on the
agent(s) who were crucial in initiating the
process of group formation in the survey
areas. It is clear that, overwhelmingly (espe-
cially in the case of RDRS), the initiation of
group formation is the result of outreach 
efforts by NGOs. All programs use a cadre
of specially trained motivators and orga-
nizers to assemble potential borrowers 
into groups. Of the programs surveyed,
BRAC has the highest percentage of 
locally initiated cases. Not surprisingly,
BRAC’s credit programs have been around
the longest in the sample areas (see below),
indicating that success, as well as a period of
“learning,” are likely to be important neces-
sary conditions for triggering local initiatives
for group formation and participation. How-
ever, the substantial variation in local initia-
tives between ASAand RDRS indicates that
the program character is also an important
element determining group formation.
Table 3.3 shows that, whereas the mean
age of the groups is about 5 years for RDRS
and BRAC, it is only 2.8 years for ASA. The
mean age is a function, among other things,
of the length of time the program has been
in place. The maximum age of the group re-
ported may be taken as an indicator of this
length of time, since a program that has been
around longer is more likely to have older
groups that were formed when the program
was initiated. On this basis, it can been seen
that BRAC (maximum = 12 years) has been
in the sample areas for longer than either
RDRS or ASA.
The variance of the age of the group is
higher for BRAC than for the others. This
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Table 3.1 The number and type of groups, 
by division
Program
Division RDRS BRAC ASA
Dhaka 0 29 25
Chittagong 0 7 15
Rajshahi 19 12 7
Khulna 0 14 0
Barishal 0 0 0
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: BRAC’s credit program is known as the Rural Credit
Project. ASA administers its credit and saving services
through its Income Generation Through Credit Program.
RDRS credit services are provided under the Marginal
and Small Farms Systems Crop Intensiﬁcation Project
(MSFSCIP) in the Kurigram District of Bangladesh. The
project links groups of borrowers to commercial and
agricultural banks and receives support from the German
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the Gov-
ernment of Bangladesh. RDRS provides training and tech-
nical assistance to the groups.
Table 3.2 The principal person promoting the creation of groups (%)
Program
RDRS BRAC ASA
Principal person n = 19 n = 62 n = 47
Agent of the NGO group 94.7 71.0 74.5
Member of the group 4.3 29.0 21.3
Other 0.0 0.0 4.3
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Table 3.3 Age of groups (months)
Program
RDRS BRAC ASA
n = 19 n = 62 n = 47
Mean 60 63 34
Variance 944 1,625 611
Minimum 12 0 0
Maximum 108 144 96
Source: IFPRI 1994.is expected because BRAC’s credit program
was established earlier than the others, so that
there is likely to be a greater number of groups
at different stages of the “life cycle.” Note that
the minimum age for RDRS is 12 months,
indicating that no new groups are currently
being formed; the minimum is zero for both
BRAC and ASA, indicating that these two
NGOs continue to accept new groups.
Table 3.4 provides details on the rela-
tionship between members of the same group.
In all three of the credit programs an average
of nearly 97 percent of members of a partic-
ular group live in the same village, and most
also live in the same hamlet. This implies that
information exchange between members is
facilitated and that the costs of monitoring
peers can be expected to be relatively low.
Nearly half the members are related to each
other, which is a further reason that moni-
toring costs are likely to be low: relatives are
likely to have greater knowledge of each
others’assets, liabilities, and credit histories.
The ﬁndings taken together imply that, dur-
ing a group’s formation, substantial impor-
tance is placed on known information about
potential members.
Note that although simultaneous mem-
bership of two credit programs is not totally
absent, its incidence was reported to be quite
low. Most credit programs, some explicitly
and others implicitly, discourage members
from joining other similar programs at the
same time.
Table 3.5 presents information on the
dynamics of group size. Groups in the BRAC
program are, on average, twice as big as those
in RDRS and ASA. BRAC groups also had
the highest degree of ﬂuctuation in member-
ship and, on average, decreased substantially
in size in the ﬁve years prior to the survey
(from 56.2 to 36.9). The high drop-out rates
are also evident in ASAgroups and, margin-
ally, in RDRS groups. The high rates can be
caused by client dissatisfaction (Meyer 2001)
or by members expelling peers for loan de-
faults. Diagne (1998) points out that this type
of limited group liability (where the de-
faulter is excluded but the rest of the group
continues to have access if it is willing to
pay for the defaulted loan) can be superior
to joint and several liability as it is ofﬁcially
demanded by the three NGOs.
The characteristics of members in the
three programs are shown in Table 3.6.
BRAC and, especially, ASA target women,
but this is not the case with RDRS. There is,
however, a remarkable similarity in age, level
of education, and level of landownership
among members across the three programs.
Most of the members are illiterate (around
80 percent), possess less than 0.5 acres of
land, have the same family size, and are
about the same age. The average area of cul-
tivable land owned is slightly below 0.5
GROUP-BASED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27




Type of relationship n = 19 n = 62 n = 47
Have family relations 46.4 52.7 53.7
Member of the same club 4.8 3.1 0.0
Live in the same village 98.9 95.6 97.3
Live in the same hamlet (para) 91.0 80.3 85.3
Member of another NGO group as well 1.6 8.1 7.5
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Table 3.5 Fluctuation of members, by type of group
Program
RDRS BRAC ASA
n = 19 n = 62 n = 47
Members now 17.1 36.9 18.1
Members ﬁve years ago 19.7 56.2 25.0
Members two years ago 16.6 49.8 19.9
Members quitting 2.3 17.8 4.7
Members joining 1.43 6.3 3.4
Fluctuation indexa
Mean 10.5 42.4 32.2
Coefﬁcient of variation 152.5 55.4 89.9
Source: IFPRI 1994.
a Fluctuation index = [(number of members joining + number of members quitting) /
members at creation] × 100.acres in the case of ASA and BRAC mem-
bers. This is consistent with conclusions
reached by a number of other studies. Mor-
duch (1998b), using the data set of the study
by Pitt and Khandker (1998), shows that 28
percent of Grameen Bank members and 21
percent of BRAC members had initial land-
holdings above 0.5 acres of land at the time
of joining the program. Zaman (1997) ﬁnds
that 28 percent of borrowers from BRAC are
above the eligibility criteria.
Obviously, given their small landholding,
most members derive a signiﬁcant part of
their income from nonagricultural sources.
The percentage reporting farming as the main
occupation is signiﬁcantly higher for RDRS
than for the other groups. This may be due
to the fact that RDRS, supported by the
Marginal and Small Farms Systems Crop
Intensiﬁcation Project (MSFSCIP), takes in
members who have as much as 1.5 acres of
land, whereas ASAand BRAC limit eligibil-
ity to households owning less than 0.5 acres.
The fact that a large proportion of mem-
bers—with the exception of RDRS—derive
most of their income from nonagricultural
sources has important implications for the
ﬁnancial institutions: because of the wider
spectrum of activities in the nonagricultural
sector, the incomes of group members are
likely to be less correlated. This may have a
positive impact on repayment performance,
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Table 3.6 Characteristics of group members, by NGO program
Program
RDRS BRAC ASA
n = 325 n = 2,315 n = 880
Age of members (years) 35.2 33.3 32.0
Member is head of household (%) 67.1 22.8 13.8
Share of women (%) 28.6 86.4 98.0
Household size of member 4.8 4.8 4.8
Number of household members under 14 years of age 1.9 1.8 2.0
Cultivable land owned by household (decimala) 47.4 41.1 49.7
Occurrence of major sickness/death (%)b 15.7 18.3 20.9
Occurrence of crop loss (%)b 17.2 28.4 21.6
Occurrence of major social event (%)b 17.8 21.7 27.4
Level of education (%)
Illiterate 76.3 79.7 81.0
Primary education 11.1 10.0 11.4
Secondary education 9.8 8.9 7.3
Higher education 2.8 1.4 0.3
Major occupation of member (%)
Household work 27.1 64.4 66.4
Farmer 14.8 3.1 4.9
Large business 0.0 0.0 0.0
Small business 9.8 12.9 19.8
Salaried professional 2.2 2.3 0.2
Day laborer 36.6 8.2 2.8
Craftsman 1.2 3.0 4.4
Fisherman 0.6 0.8 0.0
Rickshaw puller 3.4 0.7 0.0
House servant 2.2 2.7 0.8
Other 2.1 1.6 0.7
Source: IFPRI 1994.
a 100 decimals = 1 acre.
b Over previous 18 months.since members can potentially bail each other
out of household-speciﬁc income shocks.
The Conduct of Groups
The conduct of groups is inﬂuenced both
by regulations stipulated by the NGOs as
well as by regulations that are internally de-
cided upon by the members. Table 3.7 not
only presents the major functions of the
groups, but also indicates how priorities
have changed over time. Respondents were
asked to rank functions in order of priority at
two points in time: during the year of group
formation and during the survey year. Most
of the functions listed in Table 3.7 are exter-
nally stipulated.
Clearly, saving was the most important
function during the first year of group 
formation in all three credit programs. This
is because all three credit programs require
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Table 3.7 Ranking of functions of groups in the ﬁrst year and in survey year (%)
Program
RDRS BRAC ASA All
n = 19 n = 62 n = 47 n = 128
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank
123123123123
Saving together
In the ﬁrst year 100 0 0 100 0 0 89 11 0 96 4 0
In 1994 90 13 0 55 44 0 53 47 0 59 41 0
Receiving credit
In the ﬁrst year 0 0 0 0 27 39 11 52 39 4 35 36
In 1994 11 44 0 45 55 0 47 53 0 41 53 0
Purchasing inputs or selling 
outputs together
In the ﬁrst year 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
In 1994 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
Investing jointly in business
In the ﬁrst year 0 50 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 2
In 1994 0 31 46 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 8




In the ﬁrst year 0 20 57 0 12 14 0 2 0 0 9 13
In 1994 0 6 31 0 0 14 0 0 30 0 1 21
Receiving training in gender 
issues, human rights, 
and social awareness
In the ﬁrst year 0 0 43 0 7 14 0 2 19 0 4 14
In 1994 0 0 8 0 2 10 0 0 19 0 1 12
Improving education for 
children
In the ﬁrst year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In 1994 0 0 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 0 0 30
Improving education for 
adults
In the ﬁrst year 0 20 0 0 54 22 0 30 35 0 42 27
In 1994 0 0 8 0 0 8 0 0 33 0 0 15
Solving social problems
In the ﬁrst year 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 2
In 1994 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 3
Helping each other in crisis
In the ﬁrst year 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 2
In 1994 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 3
Other functions
In the ﬁrst year 0 10 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 1
In 1994 0 6 0 0 0 11 0 0 7 0 1 7
Source: IFPRI 1994.members to save initially. RDRS, for ex-
ample, requires members to save during the
training period, which takes place before the
groups are certiﬁed as creditworthy. BRAC
and ASAhave similar conditionalities. There
was a signiﬁcant drop in the number of
groups in ASAand BRAC that still regarded
saving as the most important activity at the
time of the survey in 1994. In the case of
RDRS, although saving activities continued
to be the main priority in 1994, groups saved
only a minimum with the banks. Whenever
savings increased beyond the minimum
stipulated, they were withdrawn. This may
indicate that saving is mainly the result of
conditionalities imposed on loans by ﬁnan-
cial institutions and that households view it
merely as part of the cost of obtaining a loan.
It could also indicate that the interest rates
offered by the ﬁnancial institutions on sav-
ings are lower than yields on investment
elsewhere.
Groups with RDRS do not borrow at all
in the ﬁrst year of formation, and no BRAC
groups reported borrowing to be the most
important activity. In contrast, 11 percent of
ASAgroups ranked receiving credit ﬁrst. The
relatively few credit transactions in the year
of group formation indicate considerable
screening and monitoring of group members
prior to the initiation of a full-ﬂedged lend-
ing program. This time may also be used 
by the members themselves to assess each
others’ creditworthiness. Training and adult
education are important functions in the ini-
tial year of group formation, but their role
generally declines over the years.
For the survey year, most groups indi-
cated that both credit and saving were the
most important services. Close to one-half
of the groups belonging to BRAC and ASA
ranked both credit and saving as most im-
portant. In the case of RDRS, saving con-
tinued to be the most important service;
only 11 percent ranked credit ﬁrst. How-
ever, even in the case of RDRS, 44 percent
reported credit to be the second most im-
portant activity.
The Performance of Credit
Groups: An Examination of
Loan Default Rates
The performance of groups can be evaluated
in two general areas: (1) the extent to which
they are able to take advantage of the serv-
ices provided by the ﬁnancial institutions and
use them to enhance their own welfare, and
(2) their performance in complying with the
contractual arrangements. The ﬁrst area will
be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. This sec-
tion will focus on the second area, and more
speciﬁcally on the repayment performance
of groups—in other words, the default rate
of credit groups. Loan default is one of the
most important determinants of banks’costs.
Thus, the ﬁnancial sustainability of NGO-
based ﬁnancial systems, like that of banks,
rests on keeping the default rate below 10 if
not below 5 percent.
Table 3.8 shows the historical repayment
performance of all ASA, BRAC, and RDRS
groups combined. In total, the 128 groups
(and their respective subgroups of approxi-
mately 5 members each) received 1,725
loans of which 876 were due before the date
of survey. The group leaders were asked
about the repayment status, and the infor-
mation provided was veriﬁed with the local
NGO branch ofﬁce. Overall, 85 percent of
loans were reported to be fully repaid at the
due date, but 15 percent were in arrears.
The repayment rates are favorable when
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Table 3.8 The number of group loans and their repayment rate
Number Percent
Total number of loans obtained 1,725
Due after date of survey 758
Repayment status not clear 91
Due before date of survey 876
Loans for which due date has passed
Fully paid at due date 743 85
Partially paid at due date 133 15
Totally unpaid 0 0
Source: IFPRI 1994.compared with those for government-owned
commercial banks, which, in 1992, averaged
only 19 percent.
Why Are the Repayment Rates 
of Group-Based Organizations 
So Good?
Fairly recent work in institutional economics
has shed considerable light on why new
group-based institutions have been able to
perform so well, whereas others fail.
In group lending programs, the functions
of screening, monitoring, and enforcement of
repayment are, to a large extent, transferred
from the bank’s agent to the borrowers—the
group members themselves. It is argued that
groups accomplish these tasks better than
banks and therefore achieve higher repay-
ment rates. Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990)
discuss these perceived advantages of col-
lective action in the screening of loan ap-
plicants and monitoring of borrowers. The
incentives for screening and monitoring the
actions of peers arise from joint liability and
the potential loss of access to future loans.
The main argument is that, compared with
socially and physically distant bank agents,
group members can obtain information, at a
low cost, on the reputation, indebtedness, and
wealth of loan applicants, and about their
efforts to ensure the repayment of a loan.
Zeller (1994) shows that members of formal
groups—like informal lenders—consider a
peer’s indebtedness in the informal market
as a major determinant of credit rationing.
Thus, group members are able to access
complex and sensitive information, just like
informal lenders. Groups may also have a
comparative advantage in the enforcement
of loan repayment. Whereas the formal lender
usually has limited means to compel repay-
ment from delinquent borrowers, group
members have the potential to employ social
sanctions or seize physical collateral (Besley
and Coate 1995). In many rural societies,
including those in Bangladesh, commercial
bank agents have little leverage actually to
go to a village and seize a defaulter’s collat-
eral. Furthermore, group members appear
to be in a better position to assess the reason
for default and to offer insurance services to
those members experiencing shocks beyond
their control, while imposing sanctions on
willful defaulters.
It is important to note, however, that
group lending may not ensure higher repay-
ment rates at all times. First, because the risk
of loan default by an individual is shared by
their peers, a member may choose a riskier
project than if it were an individual contract.
This may occur because the individual bor-
rower counts on other members to repay the
loan so that they can secure future loans for
themselves. Bratton (1986) analyzes the re-
payment record of credit groups in Zimbabwe
and shows that expectations about peers’
probability of repaying a loan inﬂuence the
repayment behavior of an individual member:
group loans performed better than individual
loans in years of good harvest, but worse in
drought years. Varian (1990) argues that such
domino-like effects may be mitigated if group
members are able to exclude potentially bad
borrowers. Similar reasoning underlies the
suggestion by Stiglitz (1990) and by Deve-
reux and Fishe (1993) that individuals facing
a similar magnitude of risks have an incen-
tive to form groups.
However, there is also the problem of
covariate shocks when the impaired repay-
ment ability of some members coincides with
the equally impaired capacity of other mem-
bers to bail them out. The empirical analysis
by Zeller (1998) suggests that individuals
may attempt to exploit economies of risks by
grouping with others whose income streams
are negatively correlated with theirs. In other
words, heterogeneity among members with
respect to economic activities or risk expo-
sure is potentially beneﬁcial for repayment
rates. The role of mutual intra-group insur-
ance in credit groups is also conﬁrmed by
Sadoulet and Carpenter (1999), who ﬁnd
that risk heterogeneity among group mem-
bers in Guatemala facilitates mutual help.
The sustainability of group lending programs
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the ability of the ﬁnancial intermediary to
reschedule defaulting members’ loans or to
raise funds from borrowers during a normal
year to cover such contingencies.
Lastly, there is the question of the optimal
group size. Groups beyond a certain size may
experience increased difﬁculty in exchang-
ing information and in coordination. Further,
the disincentives to reneging on contracts
diminish, because each member may expect
the effect of their action on other members to
be diluted (Glance and Huberman 1994).
To sum up, although the empirical evi-
dence suggests that the repayment records
of group-based credit systems are much
better than those of traditional commercial
banks, economic theory still suggests situ-
ations where groups may actually perform
poorly. From a policy point of view, it is
important to know more about these types
of situation, so that changes can be made 




The dependent variable used in this study is
the default rate (DEFAULT), deﬁned as the
percentage of debt in arrears at the date when
complete repayment was promised. DE-
FAULT = 0 implies the complete repayment
is on time, whereas DEFAULT=100 implies
complete default. There were no cases of the
latter.
The default function is deﬁned as follows:
DEFAULT = f(LNAMNT, X, Z, M), (3.1)
where LNAMNT is the loan size, X is a vec-
tor of group characteristics, Z is a vector of
community characteristics, and M is a vector
of lender characteristics. Note that this
function is deﬁned only for LNAMNT > 0.
Afunction is speciﬁed with the property that
LimLNAMNT → 0 DEFAULT = 0. This is a
reasonable assumption, since defaults on
small amounts of loans are indeed likely to
be zero. When equation (3.1) is a linear
function, this speciﬁcation is achieved by in-
teracting X,Z,Mwith LNAMNT,as in equa-
tion (3.2). A corollary of this assumption is
that the effects of X, Z, and Mon the default





and similarly for Z and M.
Also, because the dependent variable is
truncated at zero (the group decides not to
default), the estimating equation is speciﬁed
more generally as (for the i’th group)
DEFAULTi* =β 1(LNAMNT) 
+ (LNAMNT)Xβ2 + (LNAMNT)Zβ3
+ (LNAMNT)Mβ4 + ei, (3.2)
where
DEFAULTi = 0 if DEFAULTi* ≥ 0
and
DEFAULTi = DEFAULTi*
if DEFAULTi* > 0.
In this framework, DEFAULTi* is a latent
variable observable only when it takes a
positive value. Equation (3.2) is estimated
by using the Tobit maximum likelihood
technique (Maddala 1983), after correcting
for heteroskedasticity, based on the method
proposed by Greene (1993). This model
was implemented on a subset of the data set
that included only those transactions whose
due date had passed at the time of the inter-
view (n = 876 in Table 3.8) and for which
information on X, Z, and M was completely
available. These transactions totaled 868
loans given to the subgroups of all 128
groups.
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Discussion of Results
Table 3.9 presents the results of the Tobit
maximum likelihood estimation of the de-
fault equation. GROUPSIZE is deﬁned as the
average size of a subgroup in a group. If there
are no subgroups, GROUPSIZE is equal to
the size of the group. The hypothesis is that,
the bigger the group, the more likely it is
that information ﬂows are imperfect between
members. Hence, problems arising out of
asymmetric information make monitoring
and enforcement costly and less effective.
Rates of default are therefore expected to
increase with group size. The sign of the
coefﬁcient is positive as expected; however,
it is insigniﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
LNAMNT and (LNAMNT)2 are the
value of the loan, in taka, and its square, re-
spectively. Two factors are at work. First, the
greater the loan size, the greater the proba-
bility of default. Second, the larger the loan,
the higher is the borrower’s cost of delaying
payment [= (1 + r + p)* LNAMNT], where p
is the incremental penalty rate of interest. The
second factor puts pressure on the borrower
to reduce late payments. Consideration of
this factor is important, because default in
the sample appears to mostly consist of ar-
rears that are eventually paid, even if they are
paid late (as opposed to complete default).
A squared term is included for this reason.
The coefﬁcient on LNAMNTis positive and
signiﬁcant and therefore supports the ﬁrst
part of the hypothesis. Though the sign of
the coefﬁcient on the squared term is nega-
tive, as expected, it is not signiﬁcant.
M_LAND is the mean amount of land
owned by the group. Since it reﬂects owner-
ship of an important asset, it was expected
that it would enhance the capacity of the
group to repay loans on time. In the equation,
the effect of landownership on the default
rate is found to be negative and signiﬁcant,
as expected. This indicates the importance
of even a marginal difference in the amount
of land owned, since all three programs, es-
pecially BRAC and ASA, limit their lending
to persons in households owning less than
0.5 acres of land. This result may be partly
due to the high marginal productivity of land
at such low levels.
VARLAND is the variance of the land
owned by members of a particular group.
This variable was used as one indicator of
the portfolio diversity among members of a
group. It was hypothesized that, the greater
the diversity, the less the covariance of the
incomes. Hence, a higher variance was ex-
pected to be associated with a lower rate of
default, because it would enable a better pool-
ing of risk among members. Asimilar meas-
ure of portfolio diversity was used by Zeller
(1998) in relation to the repayment perform-
ance of credit groups in Madagascar. The
coefﬁcient is negative, but not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. The insigniﬁcance may
also be due to the fact that both ASA and
BRAC use a strict criterion for landowner-
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Table 3.9 Determinants of default on group loans (Tobit)
Variablea Mean Unit Coefﬁcient t−ratio
LNAMNT 12.031 taka 0.11 × 10−4 4.922**
(LNAMNT)2 25.5×107 −0.35 × 10−11 −0.23
GROUPSIZE 12.5 number 0.18 × 10−7 1.48
M_LAND 0.50 acres −0.14 × 10−7 −2.06**
VARLAND 1.62 −0.33 × 10−6 −0.73
RATION 25.0 percent −0.54 × 10−7 −3.85**
(RATION)2 5,140.0 0.46 × 10−10 2.26**
RELATIVES 51.5 percent 0.19 × 10−7 1.82*
SHOCKS 22.0 −0.46 × 10−7 −2.68**
AG_PROP 0.3 percent −0.56 × 10−5 −2.88**
M_DRT 0.35 percent −0.19 × 10−4 −4.43**
PCFEMALE 87.0 percent −0.57 × 10−7 −6.73**
DUMINTD 0.30 0.15 × 10−5 3.60**
LN_AGE 1.55 years −0.35 × 10−7 −0.15
DISTANCE 12.0 miles −0.18 × 10−6 −2.19**
SAMITY 0.23 number 0.97 × 10−6 1.612*
FFW 0.23 dummy variable −0.11 × 10−5 −1.63*
IRRI 30.0 percent 0.18 × 10−7 1.88*
PARTRATE 200.0 per í000 − 0.69 × 10−8 −3.86**
DUMRDRS 0.013 dummy −0.18 × 10−5 −0.26
DUMBRAC 0.71 dummy 0.41 × 10−5 2.71**
Log likelihood =− 438.27
*= signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; **= signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
a Each variable is interacted with loan size.ship of 0.5 acres or less as one of their
eligibility requirements.
RATION is computed as the difference
between the value of the loan applied for
and the actual value of the loan received,
expressed as a percentage of the total loan
amount. A higher degree of rationing im-
plies a higher level of unfulﬁlled credit de-
mand. If this generates a greater concern
for future borrowing privileges, groups can
be expected to increase efforts to lower de-
fault rates. However, if the degree of ra-
tioning is too high, it is likely to render the
loan amount more and more trivial (in
comparison with the demands of the loan
applicant), so that the lender may not be
considered a worthwhile long-term part-
ner. This may increase incentives to default
at the margin. In the regression, the coefﬁ-
cients of both RATION and (RATION)2
are signiﬁcant and carry the expected sign,
supporting both hypotheses.
RELATIVES measures the proportion of
members in the group that are related to each
other. Since information ﬂows are expected
to be better among relatives, there would be
less moral hazard associated with bailing out
a relative who is unable to meet the repay-
ment requirements. However, cultural factors
are important and may limit screening and
enforcement among relatives. The coefﬁcient
in the regression is positive and signiﬁcant,
implying that the latter effect outweighs the
former. The social cohesion among related
members seems therefore to work against
high repayment rates. This is contrary to 
the result found by Zeller (1998) for credit
groups in Madagascar, where more socially
cohesive groups had lower loan default rates.
The empirical analysis by Wydick (1999) on
groups in Guatemala ﬁnds that improve-
ments in repayment rates are associated with
variables that proxy for the ability to moni-
tor and enforce a group relationship, such as
knowledge of peers’market transactions. He
does not ﬁnd evidence that social ties have an
impact on repayment rates. To the contrary,
members are sometimes found to be softer
on their defaulting friends.
SHOCKS is the number of different types
of shock (family emergencies, crop/income
loss, major social events) in the previous 18
months, reported by members of the group.
The coefﬁcient is obviously expected to be
positive. However, the results show that it is
negative and signiﬁcant. This is most likely
because the SHOCKS variable contains only
incomplete information on the shocks re-
ceived by groups. As important as the num-
ber of shocks, it seems, is their severity;
SHOCKS does not contain any information
on magnitudes.
AG_PROPis the proportion of members
reporting agriculture as the principal occu-
pation. It is therefore another indicator of
asset portfolio diversity within groups. An
important eligibility criterion, used especially
by ASAand BRAC, is that members do not
possess land in excess of 0.5 acres. The base
scenario is therefore one in which most
members derive a major part of their income
as agricultural wages or proﬁts from off-farm
microenterprise. As AG_PROP increases
from this base scenario, incomes within
groups tend to be less covariant, making it
easier to bail out errant members. Further,
since most households generally own very
little land, those that report agriculture as
their main occupation are likely to be tenant
farmers who rent in land. This suggests that
they have other borrowing privileges (for
example, from a landlord) that may be used
to meet the repayment schedule of group
loans. In addition, because nonagricultural
incomes tend to be more risky, especially
from casual laboring, unwilling default, on
the average, is likely to be greater for those
groups that have a larger proportion of non-
agricultural income. The result in the model
supports this hypothesis, since the coefﬁ-
cient is strongly signiﬁcant with a negative
sign.
M_DRTis the group’s mean dependency
ratio (children as a proportion of total house-
hold size). In general, the higher the de-
pendency ratio, the lower the capacity of the
household to bear risks, since the conse-
quences of adverse economic shocks are
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paribus,the higher the dependency ratio, the
less likely the default, because households
with lower risk-bearing capacity would want
to avoid the loss of future borrowing privi-
leges. In other words, vulnerable households
put a higher premium on maintaining access
to future credit, and thus may be willing to
make more sacriﬁces in order to repay the
loan promptly. The coefﬁcient in the esti-
mated model is signiﬁcant with the expected
sign, supporting the hypothesis.
PCFEMALE is the percentage of group
members who are female. The coefﬁcient is
negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the
default rate decreases as the share of female
members increases. This result has been 
obtained in a number of previous studies
(for example, Khandker, Khalily, and Kahn
1995; Rahman 1998; Hashemi, Schuler, and
Riley 1996). According to these studies, the
major reasons for the better repayment per-
formance of women compared with men are
the lack of alternative borrowing options
among women, the lower mobility of women
in Bangladesh, and the sociocultural pres-
sures imposed especially on women. The ﬁrst
reason relates to the dynamic incentives to
repay in order to maintain future access to
credit. The second reason reduces the pos-
sibility of ex post moral hazard (Morduch
1999). In relation to the third reason, Rahman
(1998) argues that women strive to repay
their loans because a default would reﬂect
poorly on the reputation of their household.
DUMINTD is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when the group is initiated by an
NGO agent and 0 otherwise. It may be
hypothesized that screening is more effec-
tive within self-selected groups than within
groups formed with the intervention of an
outside agent. However, placing an a priori
expectation on the sign is difﬁcult and the
interest here is to examine whether or not
the manner in which the group was formed
makes any difference. The coefﬁcient is sig-
niﬁcant and positive, indicating that default
rates are lower for groups that form on their
own.
LN_AGE is the number of years be-
tween the time of borrowing a speciﬁc loan
and the year of the survey. If each subse-
quent loan transaction reinforces the value
of the credit service to the borrower, then
one might expect default to decrease with
each successive transaction. If this is in-
deed so, default on more recent loans
would be lower than on ones in the past.
However, if borrowers perceive the rela-
tionship to be only transitory, then one
might expect the default on later loans to
increase. Hence, the expected sign of the
coefﬁcient is ambiguous. The regression
determines a negative coefﬁcient, but it is
insigniﬁcantly different from zero.
DISTANCE is a community-level vari-
able computed as the mean distance from the
village to nine types of service center, rang-
ing from a post ofﬁce to a health post to an
agricultural input dealer. The closer the vil-
lage is to the service centers, the less remote
and more buoyant the local economy. Hence,
default rates are likely to be lower. However,
the coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant and
therefore does not support the hypothesis. A
possible explanation is that, the more remote
the village, the more value is placed on the
credit services of the group programs be-
cause fewer alternatives are available (for
example, loans from traders or employers);
default rates are low to avoid the loss of fu-
ture borrowing privileges from this impor-
tant source. Wenner (1995) ﬁnds a similar
result for Foundation for International Com-
munity Assistance (FINCA) groups in Costa
Rica. Groups in better-off towns had higher
default rates, presumably because locations
with improved soft and hard infrastructure
offer borrowers more or better alternatives
for obtaining loans.
SAMITY is the number of self-help
groups in the village (used here as a proxy
for informal safety nets). The fewer the num-
ber of self-help groups, the greater the value
of an outside agency that provides credit,
savings, and insurance services for consump-
tion smoothing. Therefore, lower default rates
can be expected. This hypothesis is con-
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tive and just signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
FFW is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the village has a Food for Work (FFW)
program. Because FFWs are generally placed
in relatively depressed areas, poverty-related
unwilling default in such villages is likely to
be relatively large. On the other hand, the
more impoverished the village, the greater
the value that is placed on continued access
to these credit programs. Hence, the net ef-
fect on default is not clear. The coefﬁcient
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
conﬁdence interval, implying that the sec-
ond effect is dominant—areas with above-
average poverty rates can have better
repayment records.
IRRI is the proportion of the cultivated
area in the village that can be irrigated.
Higher levels of irrigation not only increase
the income levels of a village, but also reduce
the riskiness of agricultural incomes. Hence,
unwilling default is likely to be lower. The
coefﬁcient is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant, indicating that other factors associ-
ated with a higher level of irrigation—
such as, perhaps, a more active informal
credit market and better overall access to
banking services—are leading to greater de-
fault in group-based programs and thereby
outweighing the hypothesized positive di-
rect effect of irrigation on group repayment.
PARTRATE is another community-level
variable indicating the number of persons
participating in group-based institutions per
1,000 inhabitants of the village. The higher
the participation rate, the greater the demon-
strated beneﬁts of group-based lending in the
community. This contributes importantly to
the viability and perceived permanence of
participating institutions. Hence, default rates
are likely to be low as groups act to preserve
transactions well into the future. The coefﬁ-
cient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Lastly, DUMRDRS and DUMBRAC are
dummies for RDRS and BRAC, respec-
tively, that indicate whether or not default
rates vary across the institutions, even when
all the other variables are controlled. The re-
sults show that there is no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between ASA and RDRS, but BRAC
has a signiﬁcantly higher default rate than
the other two, at least in the sample of the
group selected for the analysis.
Conclusions from the Analysis 
of Default Rates
Anumber of conclusions can be drawn from
the analysis. First, a heartening discovery in
the repayment records of group-based ﬁ-
nancial systems is that, once the right insti-
tutional structures are in place, no major
conﬂict need occur between prudent ﬁnan-
cial management and lending to the asset
poor. The repayment rates of group-based
systems are especially good in relatively re-
mote communities, even in communities that
are likely to have higher than average rates
of poverty. The secret seems to lie not just in
innovations in delivery systems that reduce
the cost of screening, monitoring, and enforc-
ing loan contracts, but also in the successful
demonstration to clients in rural communi-
ties that group-based institutions are not a
transitory phenomenon, that they address,
through pro-poor product differentiation, their
demand for ﬁnancial services, and that it is
worthwhile for them to invest in a long-term
relationship with the group-based ﬁnancial
institution. In fact, it is precisely this type of
realization among borrowers that has con-
tributed to the building up of a critical mass
of social capital that supports these institu-
tions. Without this critical mass, the concept
of joint liability would quickly ﬂounder. Re-
cent research by Diagne and Zeller (2001) in
Malawi indicates that clients’ perceived net
beneﬁt of access to future ﬁnancial services
and not joint liability mainly drives the deci-
sion to repay the loan.10 Healey (1999) sim-
ilarly concludes that ASA has shown that
the group guarantee principle is not an in-
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10 See, also, Morduch (1999), who stresses the importance of dynamic incentives for good repayment performance.dispensable element of credit delivery. In
Bangladesh, mandatory group liability is
not always strictly enforced. Instead, program
agents often exclude the defaulting member,
then renegotiate with the repaying members
and reconstitute the group with new mem-
bers (Hashemi and Schuler 1997a; Matin
1997).
Understanding the poor’s demand for ﬁ-
nancial services is therefore essential. After
all, borrowers have little incentive to build a
lasting relationship with institutions that do
not address their diverse demand for savings,
credit, and insurance services (Rutherford
1998; Zeller and Sharma 2000; Zeller 2000;
Meyer 2001). Also, when new activities or
new technologies are introduced, it is im-
portant to take steps to ensure that they are
properly understood by borrowers. NGO in-
stitutions’ general practice of combining
lending services with a range of social and
entrepreneurial education is a good example.
A second conclusion is that the process
of group formation should be made more
endogenous to members themselves and less
subject to external rules, a conclusion that
Sadoulet and Carpenter (1999) also reach.
The analysis indicates that factors such as
diversity of the asset portfolio within groups
signiﬁcantly affect repayment rates. In gen-
eral, potential members are in a better posi-
tion to screen and select the right partners for
group formation, giving due consideration
to, for example, information asymmetry and
the potential beneﬁts of pooling risks and
mutual insurance. A good mix of income
activities, including agricultural production
activities, is likely to lead to better repay-
ments; hence, change in eligibility conditions
that increase the maximum allowable land-
ownership from the current low level of
about 0.5 acres needs to be considered. ASA
has recently started lending to households
owning more than 0.5 acres through its
Small Entrepreneur Development Program,
which reaches 60,000 small entrepreneur
clients who are classiﬁed as nonpoor but
vulnerable (Healey 1999). ASA has done
this in order to diversify its loan portfolio
and to tap into new market segments that
can expand its lending activities ﬁnanced by
member savings.
Finally, the experience of group lending
shows that the basic principles of prudent
banking have to be adhered to at all times.
Delivering ﬁnance to the poor should not
mean that loan evaluation or rationing are
assigned a secondary place. On the con-
trary, loan size has to take into consideration
the limited investment capacities and risk-
bearing abilities of the rural poor. Indeed, the
analysis showed that default rates increase
with loan size. Hence, objective and realistic
project evaluation is necessary prior to loan
approval. Yet it is important to ensure that
this evaluation is not based on traditional
forms of gender or age bias. Such biases,
however deep rooted, are totally misplaced.
The Sustainability of Group-
Based Financial Institutions
High repayment rates, as analyzed above, by
no means ensure that group-based ﬁnancial
institutions are able to cover their costs with-
out any ﬁnancial support by governments or
donors or without eroding their equity capi-
tal over the years. Increasing the repayment
rate has an administrative cost, and may also
increase the social costs to the clients of the
microﬁnance institution.
This section provides an overview of
the concepts of sustainability, highlighting
the different cost components of ﬁnancial
institutions, and then presents secondary data
on the unit costs and levels of operational
and ﬁnancial sustainability of group-based
ﬁnancial institutions in the South Asian con-
text. The results are linked in the concluding
Chapter 6 with the household-level impact
presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Cost Components of
Microﬁnance Institutions
In the literature on microﬁnance, sustain-
ability is usually considered at two levels.
Operational sustainability refers to the ability
of institutions to generate enough revenue
to cover their operating costs. Operating costs
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of providing funds, but only the costs that
the microﬁnance institution (MFI) actually
incurs. If the MFI cannot cover its actual
costs through revenues, it will incur ﬁnancial
losses that will need to be covered through
depletion of its equity capital (if a donor or
government does not eventually cover the
losses). MFIs often receive capital at con-
cessionary rates, as well as other forms of
subsidies, from either the government, in-
ternational or national donors, foundations,
or nongovernmental organizations. In the
following, these institutions are summarized
under the term “social investor.” Yaron,
Donald, and Piprek (1997) distinguish the
following types of subsidies that social in-
vestors provide to MFIs:
• an interest rate subsidy on funds borrowed
at concessionary rates,
• the opportunity cost of the equity capital of
the MFI,
• exemptions from reserve requirements,
• coverage of the costs incurred through
loan losses and foreign exchange ﬂuctua-
tions (on loans issued under foreign cur-
rency), and
• free equipment or free training for staff.
To determine the real costs to society of
maintaining or expanding an MFI, measur-
ing its performance from the viewpoint of
the social investor should take into account
the above subsidies (Yaron 1992). Conven-
tional ﬁnancial accounting measures provide
information only on operational sustain-
ability, not on ﬁnancial sustainability. The
latter performance criterion explicitly seeks
to account for the above subsidies by calcu-
lating the true costs to society incurred by
the social investor. Financial sustainability
measures the degree to which MFIs cover all
of their direct and imputed social costs, and
adjusts the above costs and subsidies to re-
ﬂect real costs at market prices, including the
social opportunity costs of capital.
The more recent concept of economic
sustainability (Zeller et al. 1997; Zeller and
Meyer 2001), however, seeks to go one step
further by comparing the social beneﬁts with
the social costs incurred by the social in-
vestor in subsidizing the MFI. If the MFI
achieves higher social beneﬁts than social
costs, it can be economically sustainable,
although it may not be sustainable in the op-
erational or even the ﬁnancial sense.
Recent Evidence on the 
Financial Performance of
Microﬁnance Institutions
The costs of 104 MFIs in the database of the
Calmeadow Foundation assist us in illus-
trating the concept of economic sustainabil-
ity.  The major results are shown in Table
3.10 (Christen 2000). On average, the MFIs’
costs of providing US$100 of credit are
US$35.90. These costs have been adjusted
for subsidies and valued at market prices. The
average MFI has a ﬁnancial sustainability
ratio of 92.1 percent, implying that about
7.9 percent of the above costs (or US$2.84)
need to be covered by social investors, that
is, by subsidies; the remainder of the costs
are covered by the interest and other earn-
ings of the MFI itself.11 If the net beneﬁt to
the average MFI client resulting from credit
access of US$100.00 exceeds these social
costs of US$2.84, the MFI is economically
sustainable because it generates social bene-
ﬁts in excess of its social costs.
In the following, information on opera-
tional and ﬁnancial sustainability is given for
104 MFIs located in developing and transfor-
mation countries worldwide (Christen 2000).
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11 This calculation does not include the social opportunity costs of capital that result from alternative uses of the capital
by the social investor—for example, subsidizing road construction instead of MFIs. However, assumptions about these
opportunity costs in any given country could be incorporated into the calculation of economic sustainability. We fur-
ther assume that net social beneﬁts or costs for nonclients are negligible. At least in theory, the net beneﬁts to clients
could be smaller than the social costs incurred by nonclients due to the MFI, so that the Pareto principle is violated.Because of the lack of cost data for the three
group-based ﬁnancial institutions, Table 3.10
provides an overview of the costs of all the
MFIs, as well as a breakdown of large MFIs
located in Asia. ASA and BRAC are two of
the ﬁve MFIs in this subgroup. From the ev-
idence presented in other reports discussed
below, ASA is likely to be ﬁnancially sus-
tainable and BRAC may have a ﬁnancial
sufﬁciency ratio of above 90 percent. As a
comparative group for RDRS, the small/
medium MFIs in South Asia are chosen.
However, RDRS is not part of this group.
Table 3.10 also presents indicators for poverty
outreach and administrative costs (adjusted
for subsidies and loan loss provisions) as a
percentage of the average loan amount. At
the outset, it should be noted that this sample
represents MFIs with above-average per-
formance. Nevertheless, the ﬁgures show
that 60 out of the 104 MFIs provide ﬁnan-
cial services on a sustainable basis. In other
words, they do not depend on subsidies in
carrying out their business while preserving
their equity capital in real terms.
The ﬁrst row in Table 3.10 refers to all
104 MFIs in the sample. The average loan
size here is US$755.00, and 56.1 percent of
borrowers are women. An indicator of the
depth of poverty outreach is the average loan
size divided by gross national product (GNP)
per capita, expressed as a percentage. The
average for all MFIs is 66.6 percent, imply-
ing that the average loan size is about 
two-thirds of per capita GNP. Administra-
tive expenses, adjusted for the real cost of
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Table 3.10 Performance indicators of microﬁnance institutions
Average Administrative Average
outstanding expense/ Of which Average ﬁnancial
Number of balance per Percent of Poverty average provision  operational sustain-
observations borrower women outreacha loan for loan sustain- abilityc
(N) (US$) borrowers (%) portfolio (%) loss abilityb (%)
Sustainability
All MFIs 104 755 56.1 66.6 35.9 2.6 109.2 92.1
Financially 
sustainable 60 803 54.7 79.3 24.4 7.2 134.3 113.5
Regional size
Large MFIs 
in Asiad 5 382 >80.0e 23.4 9.4 0.6 111.8 100.9
Small/medium  
in South Asia 6 102 67.6 24.1 17.1 1.5 92.4 70.3
Lending method
Individual 
lending 43 1,269 109.6 19.7 2.1 126.9 105.2
Group-based 
lending 33 381 33.2 47.0 2.6 95.4 83.5
Village banking 22 126 162.0 48.6 2.0 96.9 81.3
Target groupsf
Low end 43 131 15.7 54.7 2.2 96.5 79.3
Broad 47 857 59.8 23.1 2.8 116.9 100.5
High end 8 2,833 329.9 13.7 1.3 126.9 100.9
Age
3–6 years 22 419 55.3 47.0 1.6 99.4 86.3
7+ years 58 651 59.4 27.3 2.7 122.0 101.7
a Poverty outreach is deﬁned as the average outstanding loan balance per client divided by GNP per capita. A
b Operational sustainability = [(operational income)/(interest plus loan loss and administrative expense)].
c Financial sustainability is like operational sustainability, but costs include adjustments for subsidies received.
d This group is composed of ﬁve MFIs: ASA, BRAC, BAAC of Thailand, BRI of Indonesia, and Bank Dagang of Bali, Indonesia.
e Greater than 80 percent for ASAand BRAC combined.
f Low end: MFls for which the average loan balance is less than US$150 or less than 20 percent of GNPper capita; broad: 20–149 percent of GNPper capita;
high end: 150 percent or above.subsidies and for loan loss provisions, are
35.9 percent of the average outstanding loan
portfolio. In other words, it costs roughly
36 cents to provide a loan of US$1.00 for one
year. Of these administrative costs, only an
absolute 2.6 percent (or 2.6 cents per dollar
of outstanding loan balance) is for loan loss
provisions, perhaps indicating the very suc-
cessful loan repayment rates in this sample
of 104 MFIs. The average operational sus-
tainability is 109.2 percent, implying that
revenues exceed costs by 9.2 percent when
using costs as the basis of comparison. If
revenues and costs are adjusted for subsidies
as well as for loan loss provisions (see Chris-
ten 2000), the ﬁnancial sustainability falls to
92.1 percent. In other words, about 7.9 per-
cent of costs valued at social prices need to
be covered by subsidies in order for the MFIs
to break even (that is, US$2.84 of a total cost
of US$35.90 per US$100.00 of outstanding
loan balance). If these costs were not cov-
ered by subsidies, in the short run the MFI
would be forced to deplete its equity capital
(adjusted for inﬂation), and, in the long run,
it would eventually go out of business.
The ﬁve large MFIs in Asia are ASA,
BRAC, Bankya Rakyat Indonesia, the
Bank for Agricultural Credit and Coopera-
tives (BAAC) in Thailand, and Bank
Danang in Bali, Indonesia. BAAC and BRI
are successful state-owned MFIs; Bank
Danang is a commercial bank catering for a
poorer clientele. The average loan size is
US$382, which is much larger than the av-
erages for ASA and BRAC. In terms of
poverty outreach, this group reaches a
much poorer clientele than the average of
all MFIs. Differentiation by the poverty
level of the target group shows that admin-
istrative costs per dollar lent, and therefore
operational and ﬁnancial sustainability, de-
cline with increasing poverty level. Despite
this, the large MFIs in Asia achieve ﬁnan-
cial self-sufﬁciency of 100.9 percent. In
other words, their operations do not require
any subsidies. This outstanding perform-
ance is likely to be a result of including the
very successful BRI (Charitonenko, Patten,
and Yaron 1998). In recent years, ASA has
reached ﬁnancial sustainability, according
to its own statements provided to the Credit
and Development Forum in Bangladesh
(CDF 1998). Other analyses (Berthold and
Ledgerwood 1996; Rutherford 1995; and
Alamgir 1997) support the view that ASA
is ﬁnancially sustainable and fully covers
its operational costs in the mature branches.
Thus, for the group of large MFIs in South
Asia as a whole, the data suggest that social
investors no longer need to subsidize cur-
rent operations. The MFIs are therefore
economically sustainable if their clients
generate any beneﬁt from borrowing (how-
ever small), assuming nonclients are not
made worse off by the MFIs.
In contrast, smaller and medium-sized
MFIs in South Asia (to which RDRS be-
longs) achieve a ﬁnancial sufﬁciency ratio
of only 70.3 percent—they may not have
adequately exploited economies of scale
and scope. Thus, about 29.7 percent of the
administrative costs of these MFIs need to
be covered by subsidies. Their administrative
expenses amount to 17.1 percent of the out-
standing loan portfolio (Table 3.10). Thus, on
average, these smaller MFIs in South Asia
spend about 17 cents per dollar lent, of which
5 cents need to be covered by the social in-
vestor. In order to be economically sustain-
able, the MFIs’clients would need to generate
a net beneﬁt of more than 5 cents for an ad-
ditional US$1.00 of credit access. In Chap-
ter 5, we compare these cost levels with the
income beneﬁts arising from credit access.
From the perspective of a social investor
concerned about transferring ﬁnancial re-
sources to the poor, a useful alternative way
to look at cost efﬁciency is to compare the
costs of transferring money through MFIs
withthe costs of other forms of income trans-
fers. In his study of the cost-effectiveness of
the rural food rationing program, Ahmed
(1993) ﬁnds that the ﬁscal cost of transfer-
ring US$1.00 of income is US$6.55. He com-
pares this ﬁgure with the cost efﬁciencies
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reviewed by Garcia and Pinstrup-Andersen
(1987). The most cost-effective program,
the pilot food price subsidy scheme in the
Philippines, required a ﬁscal cost of US$1.19;
the highest cost was US$2.38 for the pre-
school feeding program in Brazil. The in-
come transfer programs compared by Ahmed
(1993) do not require the recipient to repay
the transfer of US$1.00. Thus, the costs
include the loss of the principal. If one as-
sumes, for the purposes of comparison with
a loan scheme, that the recipient repays the
transfer after one year, and that this repay-
ment does not create any transaction costs
to the state, the food price subsidy scheme
would still incur costs of US$0.19 to the
social investor. Comparing this with the social
costs of US$0.05 for every dollar lent by
small MFIs in South Asia, US$0.00 for large
MFIs in Asia, and US$0.28 for all 104 MFIs
in the database shows that MFIs could be
quite cost-efﬁcient in transferring resources
to the poor if they reached a clientele as poor
as that of the food price subsidy scheme.
Admittedly, this comparison is somewhat
crude, and ignores a number of issues, such
as targeting efﬁciency, leakage to the non-
poor, and the need to discount costs (as-
suming continued re-lending of US$1.00
for an indeﬁnite period to match the one-
time capital transfer of US$1.00). None-
theless, it suggests a nonnegligible poten-
tial of the established and successful MFIs
to be comparatively cost-efﬁcient in trans-
ferring resources to the poor.
The data from the 104 MFIs presented
in Table 3.10 indicate that a considerable
number of MFIs in the developing world
are able to cover their costs on their own, or
that the subsidies they require are not unrea-
sonable compared with the potential beneﬁts
or compared with the costs of an alternative
capital transfer. However, two disclaimers
to this positive statement need to be men-
tioned. First, most, if not all, of the 104
MFIs in this table will have required subsi-
dies in the phases of their formation and ex-
pansion, which may date back more than
20 years. These past subsidies are not taken
into account in the calculation of the subsidy
levels, referring only to more recent annual
data. Second, the 104 MFIs in this data set
are among the most successful in the devel-
oping world; many thousands are too small
or too inefﬁcient even to come close to the
self-sufﬁciency ratios presented in Table
3.10. In other words, the majority of MFIs
may well have transfer cost efﬁciency ratios
as weak asor even worse than those in the in-
come transfer programs reviewed by Ahmed
(1993).




his chapter describes and analyzes the pattern of household participation in group-
based ﬁnancial institutions and its effect on access to credit, as measured by the con-
cept of credit limits (Diagne, Zeller, and Sharma 2000; Diagne and Zeller 2001). The
first section provides a descriptive overview of the socioeconomic characteristics of participant
and nonparticipant households. This is followed by an econometric analysis of the determi-
nants of program participation. The third section focuses on the nature of loan transactions,
and the chapter concludes with the determinants of the credit limits that are available to
households from formal lenders.
Overview of the Socioeconomic Characteristics of Households
Table 4.1 presents the characteristics of households, differentiated by their status of partici-
pation in NGO credit programs and by landownership. In order to facilitate comparison be-
tween program households and control households (the latter being those that are eligible for
NGO credit programs because they have less than half an acre of land), participating and non-
participating households have been subgrouped along the cutoff for program eligibility of
half an acre of land owned.12
The average household size of the entire sample of 350 households is 5.1 persons. This is
slightly lower than the average rural family size, as found by the Household Expenditure Sur-
vey (HES) of 1991/92, which reports an average rural family size of 5.4 persons (BBS 1995).
Family size in rural Bangladesh is higher in high-income households than in lower-income
households. This relationship is also suggested by data in Table 4.1 that show an average
household size of 6.1 persons for nonparticipant households owning above 0.5 acres of
land, compared with 5.1 and 4.1 persons for NGO participants and for eligible nonparticipants,
respectively.
The NGO participant households have the highest proportion (8.9 percent) of female-
headed households, compared with eligible nonparticipants (6.2 percent female headship)
and with the wealthier nontargeted household group (1.6 percent). These ﬁgures suggest that
12 The data in Table 4.1 and all other descriptive tables in Chapters 4 and 5 have been weighted to correct for the choice-
based sampling procedure.the NGO programs successfully reach out
to female-headed households. The income-
generating opportunities of female-headed
households are very limited, owing to their
low levels of physical and human capital.
Consequently, female-headed households are
among the poorest in rural Bangladesh. An
IFPRI survey conducted in rural Bangladesh
in 1991/92 on targeted food intervention pro-
grams showed that about 28 percent of the
beneﬁciary households in the Vulnerable
Group Development (VGD) program were
headed by females (Ahmed 1993). Accord-
ing to the 1991/92 HES, 7.6 percent of rural
households in Bangladesh are female headed
(BBS 1995). However, the 1988/89 HES re-
ported a much lower proportion (4.4 percent)
of female-headed rural households (BBS
1991).
The average years of schooling of the
household head (mostly male) of the NGO
participating households is very low (1.7
years), and even lower for the spouse (0.7
years). Among NGO households with less
than 0.5 acres, 58 percent of adult male
household members and 70 percent of adult
female members never attended school. These
low levels of education are in stark contrast
to the much higher education level of non-
eligible nonparticipants, whose average years
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Table 4.1 Socioeconomic characteristics of sample households, by program participation
Eligible Noneligible
NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households households
ASA BRAC RDRS households < 0.5 acre (< 0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre) All
Number of sample 
households 43 40 41 124 105 97 129 350
Household size 5.3 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 4.1 6.1 5.1
Sex of household head
Male (%) 95.3 85.0 92.7 91.1 91.4 93.8 98.4 93.9
Female (%) 4.7 15.0 7.3 8.9 8.6 6.2 1.6 6.1
Years of schooling, 
household head 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.1 5.1 2.4
Years of schooling 
spouse of household head 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 2.2 1.1
No schooling, 
adult male (%) 55.4 56.2 55.1 55.6 58.1 62.2 27.3 53.3
No schooling, 
adult female (%) 67.8 62.3 66.3 65.5 69.6 71.5 51.6 66.3
Dependency ratioa 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.33 0.34 0.37
Total land possessed by the 
household (decimals)b 23.5 23.8 22.9 23.4 14.6 11.9 266.4 91.4
Aman 1993 cultivated area 2.8 6.0 7.9 5.4 2.9 2.2 148.9 48.1
Boro 1994 cultivated area 7.0 8.3 6.5 7.3 3.2 2.7 142.5 43.9
Primary occupation of 
household head (%)
Crop/animal production 9.3 7.5 26.8 14.5 13.3 16.5 73.6 35.3
Wage earner 20.9 47.5 46.3 37.9 39.0 39.2 1.6 24.4
Craftsman 2.3 2.5 0.0 1.6 1.9 3.1 0.8 2.3
Off-farm microenterprise 48.8 17.5 22.0 29.8 31.4 21.6 4.7 21.0
Salaried professional 2.3 10.0 2.4 4.8 3.8 3.1 13.2 5.8
Other 16.3 15.0 2.4 11.3 10.5 16.5 6.2 11.1
Source: IFPRI 1994.
a Dependency ratio = [number of dependants (age =10 years and =60 years) / total members].
bAll land possessed by the household (including homestead, khashland or land received temporarily, and land obtained as a temporary gift). Land area is ex-
pressed in decimals (1 acre = 100 decimals).of schooling are 5.1 and 2.2 years, respec-
tively, for head and spouse. The ﬁndings of
two previous IFPRI surveys conducted in
Bangladesh on targeted food intervention
programs in 1991/92 and in 1994 suggest
that, among adult household members, 69
percent of the males and 90 percent of the
females in the VGD program, 72 percent of
the males and 92 percent of the females in
the Rural Maintenance Program (RMP), and
52 percent of the males and 75 percent of
the females in the Food for Work (FFW) pro-
gram never attended school (Ahmed 1993;
Ahmed and Shams 1994).
The size of landownership is the most
important determinant of household welfare
in the land-poor and predominantly agrarian
society of Bangladesh. Ravallion (1989)
shows a strong positive correlation between
income and landholding in rural Bangladesh.
Table 4.1 shows that the average area of
land possessed by the entire sample of NGO
households is, at 23.4 decimals, almost double
the area of land possessed by the eligible
nonparticipants. Of the 124 NGO households,
105 households had less than 0.5 acres of land
at the time of the survey, whereas 19 house-
holds exceeded this cutoff. About half of the
latter households had increased their land-
holdings since joining the NGO program,
while the other half were accepted into the
program despite not meeting the criteria for
maximum ownership of land. Table 4.1 fur-
ther shows that the average area of land pos-
sessed by the participants across the three
NGO groups is very similar. The noneligible
nonparticipants, in contrast, own, on average,
266.4 decimals, which is about 11 times more
land than the NGO households own. These
figures suggest that, although the NGOs reach
out to very poor people, and usually are suc-
cessful in accepting only households owning
less than half an acre, they seem predomi-
nantly to attract or enable the participation of
the better-off within that group of very poor
people. In other words, the ultra-poor fail 
to participate proportionately in NGO-based
credit schemes.
Since both participants and eligible
nonparticipants possess very little cultivable
land, wage-earning is by far the major oc-
cupation of the heads of these households.
However, off-farm microenterprise is the
primary occupation of considerably more par-
ticipating household heads than of nonpartic-
ipating household heads. This suggests that
the NGO schemes are indeed successful in
achieving their declared objective of empow-
ering poor women and men to start up their
own microenterprises.
Land Use
The cropping seasons in Bangladesh are
generally classiﬁed by the period from sow-
ing to harvest of the three rice crops: Aus
(March–April to July–August), Aman(July–
August to November–December), and Boro
(December–January to April–May). The Aus
season is also termed Kharif I, the Amansea-
son Kharif II, and the Boro season the Rabi
season. The main crops grown during the
Aus season are Aus rice and jute; during 
the Aman season, Aman rice; and during the
Boroor Rabi season, Bororice, wheat, pulses,
oilseeds, and potatoes. The average cropping
intensity in Bangladesh is about 200 percent.
The use of land by participant and non-
participant households during the 1993 Aman
rice season is shown in Table 4.2. Aman rice
is by far the most important crop cultivated
in Bangladesh, accounting for about 70 per-
cent of the net arable area in the country. In
recent years Aman rice has accounted for
about 56 percent of the total rice area and
51 percent of total rice production.
Average farm sizes, as measured by the
area of cultivated land, are extremely small
for both NGO households and eligible non-
participants. Farm sizes are relatively higher
in the upland than in the lowland across all
participants and nonparticipants. Mainly the
traditional variety of broadcast Aman (also
known as the “deep-water” Aman) rice is
grown in the lowland area during the Aman
season. Both the local and the modern or high-
yielding varieties of transplanted Aman rice
44 CHAPTER 4are cultivated in the uplands during the Aman
season.
Participants with less than half an acre
cultivate much more land than they own in
both lowland and upland areas. In contrast,
the eligible nonparticipants (the control
group) cultivate less land than they own. The
most common form of tenancy relationship
in Bangladesh is sharecropping. Sharecrop-
ping terms are usually 50 percent of the crop
at harvest-time. Landowners generally do not
provide agricultural inputs or share in the
cost of inputs.
Household Assets and Liabilities
The value of the total household assets of
NGO households owning less than half an
acre of land is substantially higher (31 per-
cent) than that of the eligible nonparticipants
(Table 4.3). In general, households hold their
wealth mostly in land. In spite of very small
landholdings, participants’and eligible non-
participants’ most important assets are their
land and their labor.
NGO households have much higher
savings deposits than nonparticipants. The
average monetary savings of NGO members
are about ﬁve times higher than the savings
of eligible nonparticipants. However, most
of the monetary savings of the NGO mem-
bers are compulsory savings that they are re-
quired to deposit each week. Thus, the value
of members’ savings rises with their length
of membership.
The participating NGO households have
a considerably higher ratio of debt to asset
value than do nonparticipants. Debt to the
formal ﬁnancial sector constitutes the largest
share of participants’liabilities. Overall, the
information provided in Table 4.3 indicates
strong potential demand by participants for
credit and savings options, particularly among
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Table 4.2 Land use by households in the 1993 Aman season (decimals)
Eligible Noneligible
NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households households
ASA BRAC RDRS households < 0.5 acre (< 0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre) All
Lowland for Aman 1993
Owned and cultivated 1.1 1.6 2.4 1.5 0.7 0.3 49.2 18.1
Owned but fallow 1.7 1.4 0.4 1.2 0.7 0.9 21.6 7.3
Owned but rented out 4.2 0.3 0.0 1.6 0.3 0.8 29.8 10.3
Rented in 0.8 7.5 15.1 7.7 8.7 0.6 3.5 3.9
Total lowland area cultivated 
by household 1.9 9.1 17.5 9.2 9.4 1.0 52.6 22.0
Total arable lowland owned 
by householda 7.0 3.3 2.8 4.3 1.7 2.0 100.6 35.7
Upland for Aman 1993
Owned and cultivated 1.7 4.4 5.5 3.9 2.2 1.9 99.7 30.9
Owned but fallow 5.8 3.9 3.2 4.3 2.8 2.1 46.4 13.8
Owned but rented out 3.9 6.7 4.5 5.0 1.4 1.2 42.6 12.6
Rented in 2.5 11.9 14.7 9.6 10.5 6.5 10.9 8.3
Total upland area cultivated 
by household 4.3 16.3 20.2 13.4 12.7 8.4 110.6 39.2
Total arable upland owned 
by householda 11.4 15.0 13.2 13.2 6.4 5.2 188.7 57.3
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Note: 1 acre = 100 decimals.
a Total arable land owned by household includes land with temporary user-rights (khashland or land received temporarily).poorer participants. It is noteworthy that par-
ticipants borrow more in absolute terms from
friends and relatives and from other informal
sources than do nonparticipants. As indicated
previously, this may be because members
borrow to meet the strict weekly repayment
schedules of NGO programs and that NGO
credit is a poor substitute for short-term in-
formal credit.
Household Income
The disposable income of households is made
up of net factor income, which is directly
derived from the factors of production (land,
labor, and capital), and nonfactor income.
The components of factor income are net
income from crop production (that is, total
revenue minus the costs of production), net
income from livestock production, wages and
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Table 4.3 Mean value of assets and liabilities of households in Round 1
Eligible Noneligible
NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households households
ASA BRAC RDRS households < 0.5 acre (< 0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre) All
Number of sample 
households 43 40 41 124 105 97 129 350
Assets (taka)
Total 1994 asset value 34,795 33,499 34,603 34,314 27,202 20,775 273,403 105,832
Total 1994 asset value 
per capita 7,603 7,723 7,711 7,677 6,074 5,559 48,112 28,744
Total 1994 asset value 
AEa 10,168 10,474 10,316 10,316 8,195 7,186 63,040 37,706
Share of asset categories
in total asset value (%)
Landb 47.9 49.0 48.8 48.6 43.7 50.8 79.3 57.8
House 16.7 12.9 7.4 12.4 13.3 18.3 8.2 6.7
Livestock and poultry 4.0 12.8 10.7 9.1 9.9 7.8 3.7 13.0
Agricultural production 
durables 4.7 3.3 5.0 4.4 4.7 4.3 2.3 4.1
Nonagricultural 
production durables 1.2 0.7 1.7 1.2 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.7
Consumption durables 8.4 5.8 7.0 7.1 7.8 9.2 2.5 6.5
Food stock 1.2 1.0 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.4
Jewelry 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.1
Savings deposit with 
NGO/banks 5.6 3.5 5.7 5.0 5.7 0.9 0.1 2.3
Savings deposit in 
informal sector 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3
Loan amount lent 7.6 9.3 10.3 9.0 10.3 5.4 1.0 6.1
Liabilities
Value of outstanding 
debt (taka) 5,235 4,460 4,918 4,880 4,183 1,180 9,312 4,926
To formal sector (%) 58.5 64.0 64.6 62.2 68.8 14.3 18.5 30.4
To friends and 
relatives (%) 20.5 19.4 19.2 19.7 18.5 51.4 37.8 34.1
To shopkeeper and other 
informal sector (%) 21.1 16.6 16.3 18.1 12.7 34.3 43.7 35.5
Net worth (taka) 29,560 29,038 26,686 29,433 23,019 19,595 264,092 100,906
Ratio of debt to total value 
of asset (%) 15.0 13.3 14.2 14.2 15.4 5.7 3.4 4.7
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Note: Round 1 took place in June and July 1994.
aAE stands for adult equivalent.
b Land excludes the value of khashland (or land received temporarily). It also excludes plots that are not yet inherited and are only temporarily shared with
family members. Such land cannot be mortgaged, because the household does not possess the land.income earned as contract labor, income from
self-employed off-farm activities, net income
from renting out land, and interest earned
from lending. Nonfactor income includes
income from sales of livestock, income from
sales of production and consumption dur-
ables; income from sales of land; net income
from gifts (that is, the value of gifts received
minus the value of gifts given) and remit-
tances; depletion of food stocks; cashed sav-
ings; and net borrowing or lending.
Table 4.4 presents estimated average in-
comes for participants and nonparticipants.
Per capita factor and nonfactor incomes are
higher for NGO households than for eligible
nonparticipants. The differences in nonfac-
tor income and disposable income between
NGO households owning less than 0.5 acres
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Table 4.4 Mean household income in 1994 (Boro, Aus, and Aman seasons), by program participation
Eligible Noneligible
NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households households
ASA BRAC RDRS households < 0.5 acre (< 0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre) All
Total annual household 
factor income (taka) 20,725 19,301 17,175 19,079 18,854 14,167 34,301 21,857
Factor income per capita . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  4,350
Factor income per AEa . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  5,788
Share of per capita factor 
income (%)
Crop production 3.2 6.0 25.9 11.0 9.7 11.4 50.7 28.5
Animal production 2.5 12.4 8.3 7.5 7.5 5.6 6.1 5.6
Wage and contract labor 18.1 52.5 33.8 34.1 36.7 44.1 19.8 26.1
Self-employed off-farm 
enterprises 73.5 27.4 30.1 45.3 43.8 38.1 15.9 35.8
Renting land out 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 7.2 2.8
Lending loans 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.2 0.6 0.2 1.2
Nonfactor income per 
capita (taka) 2,914 2,833 3,042 2,931 2,879 1,761 5,833 3,381
Share of per capita 
nonfactor income (%)
Divestment of animalsb 9.3 19.7 19.5 16.1 16.9 19.2 14.4 15.2
Divestment of landc 5.4 1.8 1.5 2.9 2.2 0.4 6.4 4.0
Divestment of other 
durablesc 5.0 1.3 2.4 2.9 2.5 2.8 5.0 4.3
Income from gifts and 
remittances received 3.5 2.8 5.8 4.1 4.4 8.6 12.4 8.7
Decrease in food stocks 11.4 7.4 20.4 13.3 12.7 19.1 27.5 21.2
Decrease in savings 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.7 7.2 6.8 5.6
Decrease in loan 
amount lent 5.0 2.9 9.3 5.8 5.8 7.6 1.6 4.8
Borrowed amount 57.2 60.6 37.7 51.5 51.9 35.2 25.9 36.1
Total disposable income 
per capita (taka)d 7,423 7,022 6,814 7,090 6,987 5,530 11,496 7,728
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: Differences in nonfactor income and disposable income between participants with less than 0.5 acres and eligible nonparticipants are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 0.01 level. The difference in factor income between these two groups is not signiﬁcant. Levels of signiﬁcance are based on the t-test.
aAE stands for adult equivalent.
b Divestment of animals = decrease in value of animal stocks from December/January 1994 to December/January 1995.
c Divestment of assets = decrease in value of land or other durable assets for production or consumption (including housing) from December/January 1994
to December/January 1995.
d Disposable income = [(factor income—cost for taking loan) + nonfactor income].and eligible nonparticipants are statistically
signiﬁcant. However, the difference in factor
income between these two subgroups is not
statistically signiﬁcant. The major difference
in income is due to the amount borrowed.
The average amount of borrowing for NGO
households is more than double that for
eligible nonparticipants.
Household Expenditure
Average monthly household expenditures
in 1994 by program participants and non-
participants are shown in Table 4.5. Total con-
sumption expenditures and their breakdown
into different items are presented. A com-
parison of total expenditures with income
(Table 4.4) suggests that the pattern of dis-
tribution of income among the participating
and nonparticipating household groups is
consistent with the one observed for expen-
ditures. Households participating in ASA,
BRAC, and RDRS programs report, respec-
tively, 29 percent, 18 percent, and 35 percent
higher expenditure than income. For the eli-
gible nonparticipants, estimated expenditure
is 21 percent higher than income. In contrast,
the noneligible nonparticipants show income
9 percent higher than their expenditures.
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Table 4.5 Mean monthly household expenditure in 1994
Eligible Noneligible
NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households households
ASA BRAC RDRS households < 0.5 acre (< 0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre)
Number of sample households 39 40 40 119 101 95 128
Total expenditure per capita (taka) 798 691 768 752 746 560 1,049
Share of per capita expenditure (%)
Food 51.1 57.8 39.9 49.3 49.6 62.3 46.1
Nonfood recurrent expenditure 10.3 11.1 5.7 9.0 8.7 10.8 12.3
Gifts/remittances given 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.2
Repayment of loan principal 18.3 15.3 28.8 21.0 21.8 6.2 7.2
Investment in animals 1.2 2.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.0 2.4
Investment in land 2.6 2.6 5.5 3.6 3.4 0.6 3.3
Investment in other durables 8.0 2.9 1.6 4.2 4.0 2.8 2.4
Investment in monetary savings 
and jewelry 0.8 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.3 2.8 5.4
Investment in food stocks 2.9 3.3 10.3 5.6 5.2 7.0 17.1
Investment in loan amount lent 3.9 2.8 4.4 3.8 3.7 5.8 2.8
Monthly food expenditure per capita 
(taka) 408 400 307 371 370 349 483
Share of food expenditure (%)
Rice 47.1 50.7 56.6 51.5 51.7 51.4 43.5
Wheat 0.7 1.0 2.0 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.1
Pulses 1.4 1.3 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.4 2.1
Edible oils 3.5 2.9 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.4
Fish, meat, eggs and milk 19.8 12.8 14.5 15.7 15.5 14.0 19.6
Fruits and vegetables 12.5 17.3 12.4 14.1 14.6 14.4 15.4
Other food 15.0 14.0 9.8 12.9 12.7 13.7 15.0
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: In each round, food consumption expenditure is obtained through a three-day recall, whereas recurrent nonfood expenditures are obtained through
varying recall periods (depending on the frequency of purchase). Both types of expenditure are then converted to monthly expenditures. Also, in each round,
gifts given and investment in assets are recalled for the preceding months. Again, total expenditure ﬂow during the recall period is converted to monthly
averages. Figures in this table represent the average household expenditure of all three rounds.
Investment in assets includes expenditures made for the purchase of land, major house improvements, and animals, and for production and consumption
durables (excluding increases in the value of monetary savings, the loan amount lent, and food stocks).
The difference in per capita monthly expenditure between NGO households with less than 0.5 acres and eligible nonparticipants is statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 0.01 level. The difference in food expenditure between these two groups is not signiﬁcant. Levels of signiﬁcance are based on the t-test.Average per capita expenditure by the
NGO participants is 33 percent higher than
that of eligible nonparticipants, and this dif-
ference is statistically signiﬁcant. Although
the share of food expenditure in total house-
hold expenditure is about 13 percent lower
for participants than for eligible nonpartic-
ipants, absolute food expenditure is 6 percent
higher for participants. However, the dif-
ference in food expenditure between partic-
ipants and nonparticipants is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
The breakdown of the household food
budget allocated to each food group suggests
that rice accounts for about half the budget
of participants and eligible nonparticipants.
This ﬁnding is consistent with previous re-
search—the IFPRI studies on targeted food
interventions in Bangladesh suggest that
the share of rice in total food expenditure is
53 percent for VGD households, 47 percent
for RMP households, and 43 percent for
households participating in the FFW pro-
gram. However, the household food budget
shares of wheat are much higher in VGD
(19 percent) and FFW (11 percent) house-
holds than in the NGO participating sample
households in this study, because VGD ben-
eﬁciaries receive a wheat ration, and FFW
participants receive wheat as their wage
(Ahmed 1993; Ahmed and Shams 1994).
Calorie and Protein Consumption
Table 4.6 reports the patterns of calorie and
protein consumption by participants and non-
participants. Calorie and protein consump-
tion is presented per capita as well as per
adult equivalent (AE) unit. Adult equivalent
units represent the calorie requirements of an
adult male. AE units are a more appropriate
indicator of nutrient consumption than the
per capita calculation, because they incorpo-
rate the speciﬁc calorie requirements for the
age and gender of individual family mem-
bers. Appendix B lists the adult equivalent
consumption units differentiated by age and
gender of the family member. These have
been calculated from IFPRI’s consumption
and nutrition survey data from Bangladesh
(Ahmed 1993).
Adjusting for the age and gender com-
position and occupation proﬁle (physical
activity level) of the Bangladesh population,
the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics estimated
the weighted average per capita daily calorie
intake requirement at 2,122 kilocalories (BBS
1991). Aprevious IFPRI study in Bangladesh
estimated the calorie requirement of an
adult male at 2,714 kilocalories (kcal) per
day (Ahmed 1993). In this study, the cutoffs
used for daily per capita and per adult equiv-
alent calories, respectively, are 2,122 kcal and
2,714 kcal.
On average, the ﬁgures for the per capita
and per adult equivalent calorie consumption
of participants are, respectively, 3 percent
and 4 percent higher than those for eligible
nonparticipants. The difference is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant only for adult equivalent
consumption. The difference in protein con-
sumption between these two groups is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
The average daily per capita calorie con-
sumption of participants in each of the NGO
programs is lower than the rural Bangladesh
average of 2,267 kcal per day in 1991/92, as
reported by the 1991/92 HES survey (BBS
1995). Only the noneligible nonparticipant
group has a higher per capita consumption
(2,373 kcal per day) than the rural average.
A study by the Grameen Bank conducted 
in 1985/86 suggests that Grameen Bank
members consumed, on average, 2,171 kcal,
whereas the control group consumed 1,982
kcal per capita per day. The same study
reports a daily per capita protein intake of
59 grams by Grameen Bank members and
48 grams by control group members (Rah-
man 1989).
In Bangladesh, the poverty line is de-
ﬁned by a calorie requirement of 2,122 kcal
per capita per day. Those who consume fewer
calories are termed “poor,” while those who
cannot even meet 80 percent of the poverty
line calorie requirement are generally termed
“hard-core poor.” According to this deﬁnition,
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BRAC participants, and 58 percent of RDRS
participants are poor; and 10 percent, 15 per-
cent, and 5 percent, respectively, in these pro-
grams are the hard-core poor. This implies
that slightly more than half of the clients of
the three microﬁnance programs are poor,
and that about 10 percent are extremely poor.
However, the proportions of poor and hard-
core poor in the eligible nonparticipant group
are 62 percent and 19 percent, respectively,
which suggests that the NGO clients are
somewhat better off than the eligible popu-
lation in general.
Table 4.6 also presents calorie composi-
tion by food group. In general, the estimates
show the overwhelming dominance of rice in
the diet. Foodgrains (rice and wheat) account
for about 81 percent of the total calorie in-
take for participants, and 80 percent for
eligible nonparticipants, implying very little
diversity in the diet. According to IFPRI
studies on targeted food interventions in
Bangladesh, foodgrains constitute 86 percent
of the total calorie intake of VGD beneﬁciary
households, 89 percent of RMP beneﬁci-
ary households, and 88 percent of FFW par-
ticipant households.
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Table 4.6 Mean calorie and protein consumption in 1994
Eligible Noneligible
NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households households
ASA BRAC RDRS households < 0.5 acre (< 0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre) All
Average nutrient intake
Calorie consumption 
per capita 2,118 2,152 2,069 2,113 2,100 2,032 2,373 2,127
Calorie consumption 
per AEa 2,912 2,935 2,807 2,884 2,879 2,757 3,160 2,892
Protein consumption 
per capita 49 47 48 48 48 46 56 50
Protein consumption 
per AEa 68 65 65 66 65 63 75 67
Calorie composition by 
food groups (%)
Rice 78.8 76.4 80.0 78.4 78.8 77.4 74.0 77.1
Wheat 1.6 1.8 3.4 2.3 2.0 2.9 2.5 2.5
Pulses 1.3 1.3 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.3 2.1 1.6
Edible oils 3.1 2.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.6 3.2 2.7
Fish, meat, eggs 
and milk 3.1 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.2 3.5 2.9
Vegetables and fruits 6.0 9.4 7.2 7.6 7.7 7.6 7.3 7.3
Other 6.1 6.5 3.4 5.3 5.2 5.9 7.4 6.0
Households below calorie 
requirement (%)
Per capita basisb 53.8 52.5 57.5 54.6 57.4 62.1 28.9 53.7
AE basisc 41.0 30.0 55.0 42.0 41.6 45.3 16.4 38.8
Per capita basis, below 
80% requirement 10.3 15.0 5.0 10.1 8.9 18.9 4.7 11.7
AE basis, below 80% 
requirement 5.1 2.5 0.0 2.5 1.0 12.6 2.3 6.0
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: In each round, food consumption is obtained through a three-day recall. Round 1 took place in June and July of 1994, Round 2 in September and Oc-
tober, and Round 3 in December 1994 and January 1995. Round 2 reﬂects the “hungry” season in Bangladesh. The ﬁgures report the food consumption of
household as the average of all three rounds.
aAE stands for adult equivalent. Appendix B shows the weights used for the calculation of the adult equivalent.
b Estimated by using a per capita calorie requirement of 2,122 kilocalories per capita per day.
c Estimated by using a per adult equivalent (AE) calorie requirement of 2,714 kcal/AE/day, as calculated by Ahmed (1993) for Bangladesh.The Nutritional Status 
of Preschool Children
Within households, some members are at
greater nutritional risk than others. An IFPRI
study conducted in rural Bangladesh ﬁnds
that preschool children are at the greatest
risk of undernutrition (Ahmed 1993). In the
present analysis, the patterns of nutritional
status of preschoolers in participant and non-
participant households are compared.
The nutritional status of preschool chil-
dren (aged 6 to 72 months) is determined on
the basis of anthropometric data for all pre-
school children in the sample households
relative to a particular growth standard. The
standards devised by the U.S. National Cen-
ter for Health Statistics (NCHS) are used.
The levels of nutritional status are expressed
in Z-score values13and in percentages below
critical cutoff points of a standard median.
Table 4.7 reports three indicators of
children’s nutritional status: height-for-age,
a measure of stunting; weight-for-height, a
measure of wasting; and weight-for-age, 
a measure of underweight. Weight-for-height
is a short-run measure (indicating acute
undernutrition), whereas height-for-age in-
dicates the nutritional status of children over
the long run (indicating chronic undernu-
trition). Weight-for-age can be viewed as a
medium-term indicator, reﬂecting both acute
and chronic undernutrition. The results are
compared between Round 2 (the lean or hun-
gry season; October and November 1994)
and Round 3 (the peak or plentiful season;
December 1994 and January 1995) of the
household surveys. The results presented in
Table 4.7 show that the seasonal difference
in the nutritional status of children between
Rounds 2 and 3 is captured by weight-for-
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13 Z-score = [actual measurement – (50th percentile standard/standard deviation of 50th percentile standard)]. Levels of
nutritional status in comparison with a reference population can be conveniently expressed in terms of Z-score values.
A Z-score value of 0 indicates a child who is “normal”; a negative Z-score value indicates an anthropometric meas-
urement below the one in the reference population.
Table 4.7 The prevalence of malnutrition among preschool children (aged 6−72 months)
Eligible Noneligible
All NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
households households (< 0.5 acre) households (≥0.5 acre)
Round 2
Number of observations 96 74 88
Height-for-age Z-score −2.40 −2.58 −2.38
Below 90% standard median (%) 51.00 55.40 38.60
Weight-for-age Z-score −2.28 −2.43 −2.22
Below 80% standard median (%) 64.60 78.40 68.20
Weight-for-height Z-score −1.14 −1.21 −1.04
Below 90% standard median (%) 52.10 56.80 50.00
Round 3
Number of observations 95 67 83
Height-for-age Z-score −2.51 −2.66 −2.43
Below 90% standard median (%) 52.60 61.20 45.80
Weight-for-age Z-score −2.25 −2.33 −2.07
Below 80% standard median (%) 67.40 77.60 63.90
Weight-for-height Z-score −1.03 −0.97 −0.74
Below 90% standard median (%) 43.20 44.80 39.80
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: Standard median represents the median of growth standards devised by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS).
The differences between program participants and the control group are not statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
Levels of signiﬁcance are based on the t-test.height, the short-run measure. It is interest-
ing to observe that the difference in the
short-run measure of nutritional status is
more prominent for eligible nonparticipants’
preschool children than for participants’
preschoolers. This may indicate a consump-
tion smoothing effect due to NGO programs.
There is, however, no statistically signiﬁcant
difference in preschooler nutritional status




The criteria used by different group-based
NGO institutions to select households for
participation in their credit programs were
discussed in Chapter 1. It was noted that,
within all systems, loans were restricted to
members of groups belonging to a NGO pro-
gram. In this section, using the household
survey data, the determinants of membership
in NGO programs are addressed in greater
detail.
Membership in a group-based NGO pro-
gram is not solely a supply-side outcome
because many households or individuals
choose, for some reason, not to apply for
membership. Because of this, membership
or participation in a group-based program
needs to be analyzed as an outcome of the
interaction between boththe demand for and
the supply of institutional services. From the
viewpoint of the household, its decision to
apply for membership depends on its calcu-
lations of the costs and beneﬁts of joining the
program.
The principal beneﬁt—the high proba-
bility of obtaining a loan at a substantially
lower interest rate (compared with the infor-
mal sector)—is very clear and requires no
further elaboration. However, there may be
other secondary beneﬁts such as risk-pooling
and collective bargaining, or access to various
education and skill development programs
run by NGO institutions.
Likewise, the cost of participation has
several components. First, there is a time cost.
All institutions require mandatory attendance
at all meetings, which are held, in most cases,
at weekly intervals, and last up to one hour.
Time costs are associated with screening and
co-selecting other members for forming a
group, and, once the group is formed, with
monitoring the activities of other group mem-
bers. The time cost associated with engag-
ing in other compulsory activities—such as
attendance at training sessions on social
awareness or on family planning—can also
be substantial. For poor households whose
main income-earning asset is labor, the op-
portunity cost of these activities can be sig-
niﬁcantly large. The joint liability nature of
group-based credit imposes an additional risk
burden on members, since they are partly re-
sponsible for the repayment actions of other
group members; as shown in Chapter 3, this
responsibility may go as far as having to bail
out members in difﬁculty by covering their
weekly payments. Third, because the terms
and conditions of loans are very strictly de-
ﬁned and frequently tied to a speciﬁc project
that has to be approved by peers and the
NGO agent, the cost of diverting funds to
other uses is high. Hence, if loan-tied activ-
ities do not coincide with the fund-use pref-
erence of the household, the full cost of loans
(with allowance made for the cost of divert-
ing funds) can be much higher than the stip-
ulated interest rate. Fourth, most programs,
including RDRS, BRAC, and ASA, require
their prospective members to make small
savings at regular (mostly weekly) intervals.
The opportunity costs of saving with the
NGO may be another hindrance to being in-
terested in becoming a member. Given the
array of costs and beneﬁts, a household or an
individual will decide to apply for member-
ship if the expected beneﬁts outweigh the
expected costs.
Asimilar accounting of beneﬁts and costs
may be made on the supply side. In the con-
text of granting membership, this can be
simply stated as a condition that the expected
cost of lending to a particular borrower is
lower than the expected marginal revenue.
However, as indicated before, the objective
of the group-based credit programs under
52 CHAPTER 4consideration often goes beyond simple proﬁt
maximization. Hence, the marginal beneﬁts
encompass considerations beyond purely
financial returns. As was pointed out in Chap-
ter 2, these programs explicitly target the
landless and near-landless households, using
cutoffs based on the amount of land owned. It
was further shown in Chapter 2 that program
placement is nonrandom (see also Pitt and
Khandker 1998). Embedding these consider-
ations or regulations in lenders’ decisions to
grant membership is therefore important.
The supply side is further complicated
by group-level considerations. Even though,
as noted in Chapter 3, it is the agent of the
NGO program who is the principal cata-
lyst in the process of group formation,
programs may encourage local initiatives.
Hence self- and co-selection of peers into a
group remains signiﬁcant. Issues related to
endogenous group formation processes are
complex (Glance and Huberman 1994).
These processes are not addressed explicitly
in the analysis, except to note that a mem-
bership application to a group-based system
needs to be approved not only by the NGO
agent but also by other members of the
group. Whatever the process involved, the
end result is a group whose members not
only meet the criteria of the ﬁnancial institu-
tions, but also perceive each other as partners
from the general pool of applicants. In gen-
eral, individuals and households who have
sufﬁcient information about each other’s as-
sets, incomes, and personal characters may be
expected to be more likely to accept each
other as partners. The two-way information
ﬂow between members, in turn, is aided not
only by their proximity, but also by the his-
tory of interhousehold transactions. Gener-
ally, the longer an applicant has resided in a
particular location, the higher the likeli-
hood of a greater number of previous trans-
actions. In this analysis, the distance from
the residence of a household head to the resi-
dences of the parents of the household head
and of his/her spouse is used both as a
measure of spatial proximity as well as an
indicator of the intensity of previous trans-
actions. Generally, newly arrived migrants
will be living further away from their par-
ents. Risk-pooling strategies also play an im-
portant role in the formation of such groups,
for example when individuals and house-
holds team up with others whose income
proﬁle is not similar to or highly correlated
with their own (Zeller 1998; Sadoulet and
Carpenter 1999).
The decision of the household to apply
and the decision of the NGO agent and
group to accept the application are modeled
as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, a latent variable,
Di* , is deﬁned such that the household de-
cides to apply for membership when Di*>0.
In the second stage, another latent variable,
Si*, is deﬁned such that the NGO group de-
cides to accept an application whenever Si* >
0. Di*and Si* are functionally speciﬁed as
Di*= f(Xi,Ci,)
Si*= g(Ei,X i,Ci),
where  Xi and  Ci are household-level and
community-level characteristics, respectively,
and Eiis some indicator stating a household’s
eligibility to participate in the program.
Moreover, two indicator variables, Diand
Si, are deﬁned such that
Di = 1 iff Di*> 0
Di = 0 otherwise,
Si = 1 iff Di*> 0
Si = 0 otherwise.
Within this formulation note that what is ob-
served in the data is not Di and Si separately,
but a single indicator variable, P = DiSi,
which equals 1 when a household is a mem-
ber and 0 when it is not. This problem there-
fore can be cast in terms of a bivariate probit
model with partial observability (Abowd and
Farber 1982).
As Maddala (1983) points out, identiﬁ-
cation of the demand and supply equations
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least one nonoverlapping variable in func-
tions f( ) and g( ). In this case, the identify-
ing variable used is Ei.Though NGOs impose
several eligibility conditions, the most im-
portant of these is the eligibility cutoff point
based on landownership (0.5 acres for
BRAC and ASA and 1.5 acres for RDRS).
Hence, ELIGIBILITY—a dummy variable
that equals 1 whenever land owned by the
household is less than 0.5 acres in ASA or
BRAC villages or less than 1.5 acres in
RDRS villages—is used in the supply equa-
tion but not in the demand equation. All the
other variables are common to both equa-
tions. LAND is the land owned by the
household 10 years prior to the survey date.
ADMALE and ADFEMALE are the number
of adult males and females in the household,
respectively, and measure the stock of labor
resource in the household. AGEHH and
AGEHHSQ are the age of the household
head and its square; they measure the accu-
mulation of local knowledge and experience.
MALEDU and FEMEDU measure the
highest level of education attained by fe-
males and males in the household, respec-
tively. HHSIZE is the total household size.
GENDERHH is a binary variable that takes
the value of 1 when the head of household
is a male and 0 otherwise. Finally, HPDIST
and SPDIST measure the distance (in kilo-
meters) from the residence of the household
head and spouse to the residence of the par-
ents of the household head and the spouse,
respectively. HPDIST and SPDIST are not
only proxies for the length of residency of
the household in the particular area (those
whose parents live further away are more
likely to have migrated into the area); they
also indicate the ease with which the house-
hold can engage in interhousehold economic,
social, and other transactions. In addition,
village dummy variables were used to ac-
count for across-village differences. Descrip-
tive statistics of the variables used in the
estimation of the demand and supply equa-
tions are presented in Table 4.8. The esti-
mated equations are presented in Table 4.9
and discussed below.
On the demand side, the estimated equa-
tion for the decision to apply for membership
indicates that the likelihood of applying for
membership declines as more land is owned.
This is an expected result for three reasons.
First, as land increases, especially when it is
over the eligibility cutoff point, households
are less likely to apply because of the knowl-
edge (or expectation) that their application
faces the risk of being denied. Second, an in-
crease in landownership increases access to
other sources of ﬁnancial services, in both the
formal and informal sectors. Households with
more land are also likely to be wealthier,
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Table 4.8 Description of the variables used in the regression analysis
Variable Variable description Mean Standard deviation
LAND Land owned ten years ago (decimals) 80.081 146.93
HHSIZE Household size 5.18 2.36
HHSIZE2 Square of household size 32.31 31.81
AGEHH Age of household head 42.58 13.16
AGEHHSQ Square of age of head of household 1,985.87 1,236.73
MALEDU Highest education of male in household 0.90 2.21
FEMEDU Highest education of female in household 0.37 1.37
ADMALE Number of adult males in household 1.39 0.84
ADFEMALE Number of adult females in household 1.30 0.65
GENDERHH Gender of household head (dummy with male = 1) 0.95 0.23
ASA_BRAC Credit limit in ASAor BRAC 1,058.75 2,541.48
HPDIST Distance to home of parents of household head (km) 0.86 0.35
SPDIST Distance to home of parents of spouse of household head (km) 0.33 0.47
ELIGIBILITY Dummy variable = 1 if household is eligible
VILLAGE1-6 Village dummies for six of the seven villageswith increased ability to self-ﬁnance projects.
Third, though NGO loans carry relatively low
interest rates, they nonetheless carry other
indirect costs such as compulsory participa-
tion in other institutional activities (training
and social activities), some minimum amount
of paperwork, and, in particular, time that
needs to be devoted to group meetings and
group monitoring. Because all these activi-
ties are relatively labor intensive, the real
cost of loans increases as the opportunity
cost of household labor rises. Hence, to the
extent that an increase in land size results 
in increases in the marginal productivity of
labor (and hence its opportunity cost), loans
from NGOs become less attractive when full
labor costs are accounted for.
The coefﬁcient of HHSIZE is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Con-
trolling for everything else (especially phys-
ical assets and adult male and female labor),
it is likely that larger households are also
poorer households, simply because the
income-earning resources per household
member are fewer. Not only do such house-
holds have less access to alternative sources
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Table 4.9 Determinants of membership in NGO credit groups
Variables
Demand side (ﬁrst-stage) Supply side (second-stage)
Demand side (ﬁrst-stage) Coefﬁcients t-values Coefﬁcients t-values
LAND −0.016** −2.707 0.010 1.429
HHSIZE 0.954** 2.950 0.025 0.302
HHSIZE2 −0.038 −1.090 0.033 −0.829
MALEDU −0.035 −0.174 −0.236 −0.810
FEMEDU 1.306 0.905 −0.438* −1.848
ADMALE −0.715** −2.464 0.201 0.547
ADFEMALE −0.146 −0.457 0.138 0.418
GENDERHH 0.417 0.787 −5.012** −2.564
HPDIST −0.885** −2.258 1.405** 2.780
SPDIST 0.310 1.073 0.508 1.440
VILLAGE1 −2.090** −2.242 1.230 1.370
VILLAGE2 −1.478 −1.372 3.070* 1.730
VILLAGE3 −0.608 −0.536 0.579 0.730
VILLAGE4 −0.292 −0.297 −0.271 −0.393
VILLAGE5 −1.584 −1.478 0.747 0.617
VILLAGE6 −2.123** −2.108 10.589 0.001
ELIGIBILITY 2.997** 3.045
N = 350
Log likelihood =− 151.246
Chi-squared = 152.551
Notes: The dependent variable is membership in group-based programs, which takes the value of 1 if the household is a cur-
rent member of an NGO credit program, otherwise 0.
* = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level
Description of variables used in regression model:
LAND land owned ten years ago
HHSIZE household size
HHSIZE2 household size squared
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in household
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
GENDERHH gender of household head
HPDIST distance to home of parents of household head
SPDIST distance to home of parents of spouse of household head
VILLAGE1-6 village dummies
ELIGIBILITY dummy variable that equals 1 if household is eligible and 0 otherwiseof credit, but they also have greater demand
for ﬁnancial services to cope with various
threats to their livelihood.
The coefﬁcient for the number of male
adults in the household (ADMALE) is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
This result can be explained by at least two
factors. First, ADMALE is an important
household income-earning asset in rural
Bangladesh, and generally, for a given family
size, the more males of income-earning age,
the better off the household—with increased
ability to self-ﬁnance household projects
and less demand for livelihood maintenance
loans. Second, income-earning males are
good collateral substitutes because they
provide lenders with easily veriﬁable infor-
mation on the income-earning capacity of
the household.
The coefﬁcient of HPDIST is negative
and signiﬁcant. Relatively recent migrant
households are likely to have less information
about other village residents. This makes
them less willing to participate in group-
based risk-sharing schemes. For the same rea-
son, such households may decide not to apply
for membership on the basis of the (possibly
wrong) expectation that their application will
be rejected precisely because they are viewed
as relative “outsiders” in the village.
On the supply side, the following factors
emerge as being important determinants of
access. ELIGIBILITYis positive and signif-
icant at the 5 percent level (pvalue =.0001).
LAND is not signiﬁcant even at the 10 per-
cent level, indicating that the landownership
rule is signiﬁcantly enforced and that, apart
from this land cutoff criterion, the area of
land owned does not matter. The efforts 
of NGOs to target female-headed house-
holds are shown by the negative coefﬁcient
of GENDERHH, which is signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level (p = .002). The coefﬁcients
of both HPDIST and SPDIST are positive,
though only that of HPDIST is signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. This result appears
counterintuitive, at least initially, as it is usu-
ally expected that relatively new village
residents will be less preferable partners in
group formation because of possible infor-
mation-related problems. However, if it is
also the case that these relatively recent mi-
grant families are endowed with different sets
of labor skills and assets than the resident
population, their incomes are likely to be less
covariant with those of village residents. The
newer residents may then present themselves
as better risk-sharing partners. It was noted
in the discussion of the demand equation that
relatively new migrant families are less likely
to apply for membership because of their
limited social connectedness with other vil-
lage residents. The supply equation, on the
other hand, shows that those households that
do apply (presumably because they have
greater social capital) have a greater proba-
bility of being accepted, presumably because
they are better partners in intra-group risk-
pooling. The coefﬁcient of FEMEDU is
negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that ap-
plications from households with less edu-
cated females are more likely to be accepted,




Once membership in an NGO credit group
has been granted, an individual is eligible to
apply for a loan. This section describes the
sources, uses, repayment, and interest rates
of loans obtained by 350 sample households
from formal as well as informal sectors. All
household members older than 13 years of
age were asked in each of three rounds about
their credit transactions.
The Uses and Sources of Loans
Table 4.10 presents information on the types
of use to which the loans were put. Loans are
differentiated by informal and formal sec-
tors. The formal sector here includes all of
the following institutions: group-based credit
programs of NGOs, nationalized commercial
banks (NCBs), and specialized agricultural
development banks. The informal sector
includes family, friends, collectors, shop-
keepers, landlords, and informal groups.
56 CHAPTER 4Before the patterns of loan use are de-
scribed, it is important to address the issue of
fungibility of ﬁnancial funds. Loans are
fungible because they affect the household
by relaxing the intertemporal capital con-
straint. It is therefore not analytically easy to
classify loans as being either “consumption
loans” or “production loans,” unless it is pos-
sible somehow to observe how the house-
hold would have allocated its resources had
the loan been denied. To illustrate this point,
suppose a household borrows money and
then buys an agricultural input—say, a
plough. Is this unambiguously a production
loan? It would be if, had the loan been de-
nied, the household did not buy the plough
and left all other expenditures unchanged.14
If, however, the household reduced con-
sumption so as to ﬁnance the purchase of a
plough, the loan would take the character
more of a consumption loan, since loan de-
nial, in this case, would have resulted in re-
duced consumption. With this example in
mind, information on the purpose of loans
should be interpreted in the following con-
text: the classiﬁcation of loans as “consump-
tion” or “production” should be taken to
indicate where the thrust of the expenditure
cuts would have been had the loan been de-
nied. In the survey, respondents were asked
to report on how the loan was actually used.
Up to 12 different types of use, with their
corresponding percentages, were recorded.
Given this caveat, a number of inter-
esting patterns emerge from Table 4.10. A
greater proportion of loans from informal
sources are used to ﬁnance consumption
expenditures. About 34.5 percent of the loan
amount borrowed from the informal sector is
used to ﬁnance expenditures on food, health,
social events, education, and consumption
durables. The corresponding ﬁgure for loans
from the formal sector is only 15.8 percent.
This is an expected result because loans from
formal sources, especially from the NGO
institutions, are usually tied to income-
increasing projects, so that there is a consid-
erable cost involved in diverting funds to
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Table 4.10 The uses of formal and informal credits
Informal (n = 2,567) Formal (n = 338)
Mean share of Mean share of
amount used Average amount used Average
(% of total amount (% of total amount
Use amount borrowed) used (taka) amount borrowed) used (taka)
1. Food 15.1 133.82 7.1 260.66
2. Health 6.3 55.93 0.3 11.61
3. Social events 5.3 47.25 1.7 62.07
4. Education 4.0 35.75 0.4 13.76
5. Consumption durables 3.8 33.78 6.3 231.38
6. Farm implements and 
livestock 18.5 164.82 31.0 1,137.57
7. Farm inputs 9.5 84.66 9.7 354.77
8. Nonfarm inputs 14.1 125.16 24.3 893.40
9. Reimbursement of other 
loans 8.9 79.35 11.2 411.86
10. Other uses 14.4 128.11 7.7 284.30
Aggregate 100.00 888.62 99.7 3,661.38
Source: IFPRI 1994.
14 Even this is not a pure production loan, because the use of the agricultural input now increases output in the next pe-
riod and therefore “ﬁnances” a higher rate of consumption in the future.other uses. Also, consumption needs are, at
times, such that loans have to be available at
very short notice. In such circumstances, it
is often not feasible to borrow from formal
sources despite the fact that both BRAC
and ASAallow for emergency consumption
loans up to an amount somewhat less than
the savings deposited by the applicant with
the NGO.
For both formal and informal sector loans,
the largest percentage of loans goes towards
financing “directly” productive activities, that
is, farm implements and livestock, farm in-
puts, and nonfarm inputs (65.0 and 42.1 per-
cent, respectively). Financing debt payments,
that is, the rolling over of debt, accounts for
an average of roughly 10 percent of loan use.
The ﬁgure for formal loans (11.2 percent) is
slightly higher than that for informal loans
(8.9 percent). Since most formal loans are
provided by NGO-based schemes, and since
new loans are given only after full repayment
of the previous NGO loan, part of the NGO
loans seems to be used to honor repayment
obligations to informal lenders. As noted
above, informal lenders fulﬁll important con-
sumption smoothing functions. This pattern
suggests that membership in NGO schemes
may indirectly improve creditworthiness in
the eyes of informal lenders.
Loan Size, Duration, and Repayment
More detailed information on loan size, loan
duration, and repayment characteristics is
provided in Tables 4.11 and 4.12.
The number of loan transactions reported
in the informal sector (2,233) is more than
six times the number in the formal sector.
This underscores the immense importance of
the informal ﬁnancial market in Bangladesh.
Average loan size, however, is signiﬁcantly
larger in the formal sector (Tk 3,672.15) than
in the informal sector (Tk 618.31). This is
because informal sources, especially friends
and relatives, are more constrained for funds
compared with formal ﬁnancial institutions.
Informal sources, especially friends and rel-
atives, are, in any case, not in a position to
risk loaning large sums of funds.
Whereas there is very little difference in
the average size of loans from different agents
within the informal sector, loans from com-
mercial banks are about twice as large as
those from the NGO sector. This is because
commercial and agricultural development
banks lend mostly to households with larger
farm sizes, which not only have a demand
for bigger loans, but also possess the neces-
sary collateral to secure such loans.
There is also a difference in the duration
of loans. The informal sector provides sig-
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Table 4.11 Loan amount, duration, and repayment, by sector
Informal sector Formal sector
Friends and Other All Other All
relatives informal informal NGOsa formal formal
Number of observations 1,396 837 2,233 295 43 338
Average loan amount (taka)b 585.55 672.95 618.31 3,137.80 7,338.09 3,672.15
Average loan duration (days)b 75.57 104.62 86.46 358.97 483.30 374.78
% of loans fully paid on timec 50.90 48.10 49.80 70.20 24.10 63.80
% of loans fully paid, but latec 31.70 29.40 30.80 25.30 13.80 23.70
% of loans defaulted 17.40 22.50 19.30 4.50 62.10 12.60
If paid late, average number 
of days in arrearsc 32.20 27.70 30.60 84.00 239.50 96.70
Source: IFPRI 1994.
aASA, BRAC, GTZ, the Grameen Bank, and other NGOs.
b Excludes loans with an open-ended repayment date.
c Excludes loans with repayment dates after the ﬁnal survey.niﬁcantly shorter-term loans than the formal
sector. On average, loans in the informal
sector have to be paid back in about three
months, whereas loan duration in the formal
sector averages around one year.
Interesting, too, is the difference in de-
fault rates across loan types.15 Default rates
are lowest for the NGOs, lower even than
those for friends and relatives. This indicates
the enhanced capability of group-based lend-
ing to maintain ﬁnancial discipline among
borrowers. On the other hand, default rates
are highest in the “other” formal ﬁnancial
sector, where they average an astounding
62 percent. This is consistent with other
ﬁndings (for example, Adams, Graham, and
von Pischke 1984), which all point out that
a combination of lack of incentives (on 
the supply side) and lack of discipline (on the
demand side) has led to widespread abuse
of formal ﬁnancial institutions. Even where
loans to such formal institutions are paid
back, the survey data show that they are
paid back very late: an average of about eight
months late. Default rates for individual
NGOs (Table 4.12) range from 2.7 percent
(for ASA) to 6.7 percent for the Grameen
Bank (GB). Again, many of these “defaulted”
loans may be repaid in the future.
Terms and Conditions of Loans
In the survey, households were asked to re-
port side-conditions (other than interest pay-
ments) for each of the loans transacted. The
percentage of loans that had different types
of side-conditions in both the informal and
the formal sector is presented in Table 4.13.
Loans are disaggregated by formal and in-
formal sectors. On average, not only are the
proportions of loans that require collateral
low in both the formal and the informal sec-
tors, but they are also, remarkably, at the
same level. However, the picture in the
formal sector is considerably distorted by
NGOs, because they do not, as a rule, require
collateral. A signiﬁcantly higher proportion
(76.7 percent) of the loans from NCBs and
agricultural banks require collateral. Another
major difference between loans from the two
sectors is that whereas 73.0 percent of infor-
mal loans do not have any conditionalities
attached, most of the formal sector loans
(61.8 percent) have such conditionalities.
Within the formal sector, conditionalities are
more common with loans from NCBs than
with loans from NGOs.
The meaning of bakshishor “gifts” takes
on a different complexion in the formal and
informal sectors. In the informal sector, a
“gift” is just another component of the regu-
lar cost of obtaining a loan. In the formal
sector, however, it may mean bribes paid to
loan ofﬁcers to secure loans. Not surpris-
ingly, the incidence of providing “gifts” is
much higher in the “other” formal sector.
The practice of charging arrears at a
higher interest rate exists in both the infor-
mal and formal sectors, although it is much
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Table 4.12 Repayment rate in the formal sector, by institution (%)
Institution
Repayment Grameen Bank BRAC ASA RDRS All other
Loans fully paid on timea 66.7 60.0 74.0 77.5 24.1
Loans fully paid, but latea 26.7 34.0 23.3 17.5 13.8
Loans defaulteda 6.7 6.0 2.7 5.0 62.1
Source: IFPRI 1994.
a Excludes loans with repayment dates after the ﬁnal survey.
15 Defaulted loans include all loans that were not fully repaid as of the ﬁnal survey round. They therefore include loans
that were partially repaid and those that would eventually be fully repaid.more common in the formal sector. More
than one-half of the transactions in the for-
mal sector had such a clause (again, mostly
for loans given by NGO schemes); the cor-
responding ﬁgure in the informal sector was
only 17 percent.
Interest Rates and Repayments
Table 4.14 presents information on interest
and repayment rates for various subgroups
of loans differentiated by sectoral source and
the maturity of the loan. In order not to treat
small loans, which usually carry higher in-
terest rates, the same as larger loans, the in-
terest rates shown in Table 4.14 are weighted
averages of annual nominal interest rates on
all loans in a particular subgroup. The interest
rate for each transaction was weighted by the
share of the particular loan in the total loan
amount borrowed in a particular subgroup.
Whereas all types of loan in the formal
sector carry interest charges, this is not al-
ways the case in the informal sector. Alarge
number of credit transactions in the informal
sector, especially those among friends and
relatives, are conducted at a nominally zero
rate of interest. However, having stated this,
it is important to point out that, in a signiﬁ-
cant number of cases, even among friends
and relatives, interest is charged on credit
transactions. Interest is charged especially
on loans with a maturity of more than one
month. Whereas only 18.0 percent of all
credit transactions among friends and rela-
tives carried positive charges, this share in-
creases to 32.7 percent for loans involving a
period greater than a month. The same kind
of a jump was observed in the case of loans
from informal lenders other than friends and
relatives. Such cases, therefore, are impor-
tant in driving up the mean interest rate for
the informal sector.
Interest rates are generally much higher in
the informal sector than in the formal sector.
Also, longer-period loans not only are more
likely to be charged interest, but get charged
at a higher rate. In the case of transactions
between friends and relatives, the mean in-
terest charged on loans with a maturity of
more than one month is 46.0 percent per
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Table 4.13 The relative frequency of loan conditions, by sector (% of all loans)
Friends and Other All Other All
other relatives informal informal NGO formal formal
Condition (n = 1,599) (n = 968) (n = 2,567) (n = 295) (n = 43) (n = 338)
Collateral required 6.60 12.20 8.7 0.30 76.70 10.1
Bakshish gift given 0.40 0.00 0.2 0.30 39.50 5.3
Must work for lender 
without wages 0.19 0.62 0.4 0.00 0.00 0.0
Work for lender at very 
low wage 0.25 0.31 0.3 0.00 0.00 0.0
Credit disbursed with 
witness 2.88 5.99 4.1 45.76 6.96 40.8
Must sell (part of) 
harvest to lender 0.00 0.41 0.2 0.00 2.35 0.3
Must buy something 
from lender 0.06 0.52 0.2 0.34 0.00 0.3
If repaid late, interest 
will rise 13.76 22.11 16.9 52.88 62.79 54.1
Mortgage out land 6.57 11.36 8.4 0.00 65.12 8.3
Other conditions 3.06 4.34 3.5 0.34 4.65 0.9
No conditions 76.61 63.74 73.0 42.03 11.63 38.2
Source: IFPRI 1994.Table 4.14 Interest and repayment rates, by type of lender and by maturity of loan
Type of lender
Other
Formal Friends and informal All
lender relatives lenders lenders
Mean of variables A A B A B A
Number of loans obtaineda 207 1,181 500 697 344 2,085
% of loans with positive 
interest rates 100.0 18.0 32.7 36.3 64.0 32.2
% of loans repaid at due dateb 63.8 50.9 44.6 48.1 43.9 51.2
% of loans paid (including 
late payments)b 87.4 82.6 73.6 77.5 69.2 81.3
Average amount borrowed 
(taka)a 3,358.15 511.07 914.17 596.79 926.57 822.39
Mean annual interest rate
charged (%) 19.7 40.9 46.0 70.2 77.0 39.4
Loan amount as % of total 
loans with a maturity of 
more than one month 47.3 . . .  31.1 . . .  21.7 100.0
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: A= all loans (in corresponding subgroup); B = loans with maturity of more than one month.
a Excludes loans with open-ended repayment date that are not repaid at the end of survey (n=334, all from the informal sec-
tor). The average loan amount for this subgroup is Tk 2,695.95.
b Excludes loans that have a repayment date due after the survey ended (n = 486). This subgroup includes informal as well
as formal loans.
year; this mean falls to 40.9 when all loans
are considered. A similar pattern is notice-
able in the case of loans from other informal
lenders. Such a maturity-dependent interest
differential does not exist in the formal sec-
tor, where loans (mostly annual) are charged
at a mean rate of 19.7 percent per annum.
The loan maturity is longer for the formal
sector, too. Of the total loans with a matu-
rity of more than a month, 47.3 percent are 
from the formal sector, 31.0 percent are from
friends and relatives, and 21.7 percent are
from other informal lenders. The average an-
nual interest rate paid on loans in rural
Bangladesh is 39.4 percent. At an inﬂation
rate of about 5 percent during the survey year
this charge constitutes a rather high real rate
of interest. Of course, in order to be sustain-
able, the ﬁnancial systems—be they formal
or informal—need to cover the transaction
costs of making loans. These are undoubt-
edly higher for lending in rural areas.
Loan Size and Interest Rate by Type
of Borrower
Tables 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 show the credit
transactions of different types of households
from three sources: friends and relatives,
other informal lenders, and formal lenders,
respectively. Information is presented for
each round of the survey. A number of ob-
servations follow.
• Nonparticipants with more than 0.5 acres
of land generally borrow substantially more
from all sources, including formal ones.
This reﬂects the fact that wealthier house-
holds have a higher demand for credit as
well as a higher credit limit from informal
and formal lenders.
• Comparing NGO households with the
eligible nonparticipant households, it is
seen that the amounts borrowed from in-
formal sources are not that different for the
two groups, though borrowing by NGO
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4.15 and 4.16). Several interpretations
come to mind. Loans from NGOs are not
completely substitutable for loans from
other informal sources. Had the loans been
substitutable, informal loans for NGO par-
ticipants would have been smaller. In gen-
eral, the more project-tied the NGO loans,
the less substitutable they are likely to be
with other informal loans. Another expla-
nation is that projects that become feasible
(for the household) with the availability of
NGO loans may require supplementary
financing, especially in order to cover unan-
ticipated production costs and shortfalls
in revenue. If these supplementary funds
are made available from other lenders in
the informal market, then informal loans
are not likely to decrease as a result of
access to NGO loans, and may even in-
crease. Finally, NGO participants may have
to resort to borrowing money from infor-
mal sources to meet the strict repayment
schedules of NGO lenders, in particular if
projects funded by the NGO loan do not
immediately generate income (such as
animal fattening), but require weekly re-
payment installments right from the ﬁrst
week after taking the loan.
• In the informal market, the interest charges
paid by nonparticipant households with
more than 0.5 acres of land to lenders are
generally lower than those paid by house-
holds with less than 0.5 acres of land
(Tables 4.15 and 4.16). This suggests ex-
planations related to market segmentation
and the risk portfolio of the borrower.
First, poorer households face a thinner
market for credit compared with high-
income households. Because poorer house-
holds have access to only a smaller number
of willing lenders, loans are more likely to
be monopolistically priced. The higher
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Table 4.15 Loans from friends and relatives: Amount borrowed per month and interest rates, 
by program participation and by round of survey
Eligible Noneligible
nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households
households (<0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre)
January 1994 to Round 1
Number of households 81 62 85
Amount borrowed (taka) 184.0 141.0 342.0
Interest rate (%) 31.4 50.08 38.9
Round 1 to Round 2
Number of households 71 61 64
Amount borrowed (taka) 265.0 214.0 537.0
Interest rate (%) 47.7 55.3 24.4
Round 2 to Round 3
Number of households 65 48 67
Amount borrowed (taka) 280.0 204.0 674.0
Interest rate (%) 84.6 69.8 14.2
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: The amount borrowed per month by a household is calculated as follows. First, the cumulative loan amount obtained
from each type of lender during the recall period for the survey round is computed. For small loans of less than 50 taka or of
50–300 taka, the loans obtained were recorded only for the preceding four weeks or preceding three months, respectively.
For these two loan sizes, the cumulative loan amount was extrapolated for the entire recall period. Then, the cumulative loan
amount was divided by the length of the recall period to obtain a monthly ﬁgure.
The nominal annual interest rate is a weighted average of annual nominal interest rates in a particular cluster. Each in-
terest rate for a particular credit transaction was weighted by the share of the particular loan amount in the total monthly loan
amount obtained in the respective cluster.
Households that did not borrow from friends and relatives during the recall period are reﬂected in the average loan
amount.
Round 1 took place in June and July of 1994, Round 2 in October and November, and Round 3 in December 1994 and
January 1995.interest rate, therefore, can be interpreted
as resulting from the monopolistic segment
of the market that the poor face. Second,
poorer households may present them-
selves as higher risks to potential lenders.
For this reason, they are charged a higher
interest rate. However, as pointed out later,
data on repayment rates do not indicate
signiﬁcant differences between the two
groups. Third, poorer households borrow
smaller loan amounts, thus raising the unit
transaction costs of the lender compared
with a large loan. This higher transaction
cost is then covered by a higher interest
charge. Zeller (1994) ﬁnds a similar pat-
tern in interest rate differentials for the
informal market in Madagascar.
• The rates of interest show considerable
seasonal movements. What is interesting
is that the movement patterns vary ac-
cording to type of lender as well as type of
borrower, indicating, once again, consider-
able market segmentation. For households
with less than 0.5 acres of land, interest
rates on loans from friends and relatives
increase during the lean season in the
second round, and again during the third
round, when it was clear to the villagers
that the Aman harvest that year would be
worse than average. Not only would de-
mand for loans (especially to smooth con-
sumption) in these two periods be high,
but this would be accompanied by a si-
multaneous contraction in the supply of
credit from their negative shocks to their
incomes because of the downturn in in-
comes. However, these kinds of changes
in demand and supply are less likely to
take place among higher-income house-
holds. Quite the opposite pattern of inter-
est rate change is observed in the case of
“other” informal borrowers, suggesting,
again, that credit markets are considerably
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Table 4.16 Loans from other informal lenders: Amount borrowed per month and interest rates, 
by program participation and by round of survey
Eligible Noneligible
nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households
households (<0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre)
January 1994 to Round 1
Number of households 52 45 55
Amount borrowed (taka) 120.0 112.0 399.0
Interest rate (%) 129.7 100.4 44.8
Round 1 to Round 2
Number of households 49 39 33
Amount borrowed (taka) 288.0 191.0 634.0
Interest rate (%) 97.8 80.5 77.7
Round 2 to Round 3
Number of households 51 32 40
Amount borrowed (taka) 436.0 216.0 431.0
Interest rate (%) 62.0 78.8 59.5
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: The amount borrowed per month by a household is calculated as follows. First, the cumulative loan amount obtained
from each type of lender during the recall period for the round is computed. For small loans of less than 50 taka or for 50–
300 taka, the loans obtained were recorded only for the preceding four weeks or preceding three months, respectively. For
these two loan sizes, the cumulative loan amount was extrapolated for the entire recall period. Then, the cumulative loan
amount was divided by the length of the recall period to obtain a monthly ﬁgure.
The nominal annual interest rate is a weighted average of annual nominal interest rates in a particular cluster. Each in-
terest rate for a particular credit transaction was weighted by the share of the particular loan amount in the total monthly loan
amount obtained in the respective cluster.
Households that did not borrow from other informal lenders during the recall period are reﬂected in the average loan
amount.
Round 1 took place in June and July of 1994, Round 2 in October and November, and Round 3 in December 1994 and
January 1995.segmented. Finally, there is no evidence
suggesting systematic interest differen-
tials in the informal market between NGO
households and eligible nonparticipants.
• Loans from the formal sector are largest
for households with more than 0.5 acres of
land, indicating their superior access to
NCBs and agricultural banks. Formal sec-
tor loans increase in the later rounds for all
households. The reason is likely to be re-
lated to the loan disbursement schedules
of NGOs and other formal sector banks in
the survey regions.
Table 4.18 provides information on re-
payment rates for informal loans by program
type. Signiﬁcant differences either between
lender types or between borrower types are
not discernible. This suggests that the inter-
est differentials discussed above are likely to
be the result more of market segmentation—
likely due to imperfect information ﬂows—
than of differences in the risk proﬁle of
different types of borrowers.
Credit Limits
In the survey, borrowers were asked the
maximum amount of loan they could poten-
tially borrow from each source.16 Access to
formal credit is often confused with partic-
ipation in formal credit programs (Diagne
and Zeller 2001). Indeed, the two concepts
are used interchangeably in many studies. A
household has access to a particular source
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Table 4.17 Loans from formal lenders: Amount borrowed per month and interest rates, 
by program participation and by round of survey
Eligible Noneligible
nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households All
households (<0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre) households
January 1994 to Round 1
Number of households 71 0 8 79
Amount borrowed (taka) 578 n.a. 994 620
Interest rate (%) 21.60 n.a. 22.14 21.69
Round 1 to Round 2
Number of households 23 1 4 28
Amount borrowed (taka) 1,252 833 1,621 1,290
Interest rate (%) 15.56 15.00 24.20 17.10
Round 2 to Round 3
Number of households 20 2 6 28
Amount borrowed (taka) 1,596 1,010 2,528 1,754
Interest rate (%) 18.75 24.84 20.96 19.69
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: The amount borrowed per month by a household is calculated as follows. First, the cumulative loan amount obtained
from each type of lender during the recall period for the round is computed. For small loans of less than 50 taka or for 50–
300 taka, the loans obtained were recorded only for the preceding four weeks or preceding three months, respectively. For
these two loan sizes, the cumulative loan amount was extrapolated for the entire recall period. Then, the cumulative loan
amount was divided by the length of the recall period to obtain a monthly ﬁgure.
The nominal annual interest rate is a weighted average of annual nominal interest rates in a particular cluster. Each in-
terest rate for a particular credit transaction was weighted by the share of the particular loan amount in the total monthly loan
amount obtained in the respective cluster.
Households that did not borrow from formal lenders during the recall period are reﬂected in the average loan amount.
Round 1 took place in June and July of 1994, Round 2 in October and November, and Round 3 in December 1994 and
January 1995.
n.a. = not applicable.
16 Every borrower, irrespective of their wealth and other attributes reﬂecting their creditworthiness, faces a ﬁnite limit to
the amount they are able to borrow from lenders at the going market interest rate. For a detailed discussion of the con-
cept of the credit limit and its empirical measurement, which was also the basis for this section, see Diagne and Zeller
(2001).of credit if it is able to borrow from that
source, whether or not it chooses to borrow.
The extent of access to credit is measured by
the maximum amount a household can bor-
row (its credit limit). If this amount is posi-
tive, the household is said to have access.
Table 4.19 provides information on credit
limits by type of household. Whereas the
bigger landowners reported the highest
average credit limit in the informal sector,
the NGO participants reported the highest
credit limit in the formal sector. Compared
with eligible nonparticipants, NGO mem-
bers have a 500% higher formal credit limit.
Table 4.20, which compares the perceived
credit limit of NGO households differenti-
ated by their length of participation in credit
programs, provides further evidence of the
way in which credit access improves with par-
ticipation in NGO-promoted credit groups.
Note that it is the perceived credit limit, as op-
posed to the actual credit limit, that inﬂuences
investment, production, and consumption
plans. The average credit limit of those in the
upper tercile is more than 75 percent higher
than that of those in the lower tercile. This
tabulation suggests a hypothesis of graduated
lending, which is tested in the following.
Multivariate Analysis 
of Credit Limits
The descriptive analysis based on Tables 4.19
and 4.20 is extended here with a multivariate
econometric analysis that takes into account
self-selection bias. Taking account of this
bias is important because, in this survey,
information on credit limits was obtained
only from borrowers, a subsample of all sur-
vey households. This is similar to the case of
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Table 4.18 Repayment rates for informal loans, by program participation and by type of lender
Eligible Noneligible
nonparticipant nonparticipant
All NGO households households
households (<0.5 acre) (≥0.5 acre)
Friends and relatives
Number of loans obtained 405 312 464
Repayment rate at due date 50.60 44.90 55.20
Repayment rate (including late repayment) 82.00 80.80 84.30
If paid late, average days in arrears 27.69 17.93 48.27
Other informal lenders
Number of loans obtained 229 221 247
Repayment rate at due date 50.70 44.80 48.60
Repayment rate (including late repayment) 81.70 77.80 73.30
If paid late, average days in arrears 28.86 24.27 30.31
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Note: Figures include all loans borrowed from the informal sector during the entire recall period where the due date of the
loan was before the end of the survey or where the repayment date was indeﬁnite but the loan was fully repaid.
Table 4.19 Per capita credit limits, by sector and by 
program participation
Participants Nonparticipants
All < 0.5 acre >0.5 acre
Informal sector
Credit limit (taka) 571 441 1,561
Number of observations 123 95 127
Formal sector
Credit limit (taka) 1,236 248 737
Number of observations 118 34 59
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Notes: Each individual adult household member who reported having borrowed during the
recall period was asked about their formal (including NGOs) and informal credit limit. The
question referred to the particular lender identiﬁed in the observed credit transactions during
the recall period. Thus, data on credit limits were obtained only from those adults who had
borrowed during the recall period. In Round 1, the recall period was the previous three years,
whereas the other two rounds recalled only the time between the rounds. The table shows
the credit limit averaged over the three rounds.studies on labor markets that collect informa-
tion on wages only from a sample of working
individuals (Heckman 1979; Maddala 1983).
Therefore, a two-step econometric proce-
dure is used. In the ﬁrst stage, a probit func-
tion is estimated that provides the likelihood
of participating in a borrowing transaction in
the formal sector and a Mills ratio (Heckman
1979) is computed. In the second stage, the
Mills ratio is used as an additional regressor
in the credit limit equation estimated, using
data on the subsample of borrowers.
Because the main objective in estimating
the ﬁrst-stage probit equation is to obtain a
correction factor for the selected credit limit
equation, it is estimated in the reduced form.
The probit equation contains the eligibility
status indicator ELIGIBILITY as a regres-
sor, though this is not included in the credit
limit equation, because 90 percent of the
“selected” households were members of
NGO institutions. All the variables in both
the equations—those controlling for house-
hold and community-level characteristics—
are the same as those used in the bivariate
probit model of participation in group-based
programs (Table 4.21). However, because
credit limit is likely to be strongly condi-
tional on length of membership in the insti-
tution, a variable LENGTH (the number 
of years a household has been a member of 
an NGO organization) is interacted with all
variables except the regional dummies. For
the 10 percent of households that were not
members, LENGTH is computed as zero;
hence, the estimated equation provides in-
formation on the determinants of the credit
limit for member households only. Thus,
ELIGIBILITY and LENGTH are important
identifying variables in the selection model
presented in Table 4.21. Because the ﬁrst-
stage probit is estimated in the reduced form,
the estimated coefﬁcients reﬂect the con-
founded effects of both demand and supply
factors and therefore are not reported here.17
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Table 4.20 Per capita credit limits in the formal sector, by length of
NGO membership
Length of NGO membership
Lower Medium Upper
tercile tercile tercile
Mean years of membership 1.52 4.96 10.34
Credit limit (taka) 891.00 1,296.00 1,581.00
Number of observations 40 46 32
IFPRI 1994.
Table 4.21 Determinants of the formal credit limit per 
borrowing household




















Notes: The dependent variable is the credit limit (in taka) reported to be available by bor-
rowing households from the formal sector.
* = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
Description of variables in regression model:
AGEHH age of the household head
AGEHHSQ square of the age of household head
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in household
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
LENGHT lenght of membership in group-based NGO
GENERHH gender of household head
LAND land owned ten years ago
HPDIST distance of home of parents of household head
SPDIST distance of home of parents of spouse of household head
REGION1-3 region dummies
LAMBDA Mills ratio from ﬁrst-stage probit equation
17 A bivariate model of participation in NGO programs that separated out the effects of demand and supply factors was
presented earlier in this chapter.The second-stage credit limit equation is
presented in Table 4.21 and is discussed
below.
The estimated coefﬁcients of the credit
limit equation point to some interesting ﬁnd-
ings. The coefﬁcients of both the age of the
household head and its square are signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. The average age of
household heads for the entire sample is 
43 years. It is precisely for ages above this
average that credit limit increases with age.
Because the age of the household head is
likely to be positively correlated with a greater
degree of local knowledge and experience,
and possibly also higher income-earning ca-
pacity, it does make older household heads a
better credit risk relative to younger ones.
Neither the male nor the female education
variable is signiﬁcant; however, households
with more female adults are likely to have a
lower credit limit.
The estimated equation indicates that
length of membership in the group-based
institutions is statistically signiﬁcant in de-
termining credit limits. This result conﬁrms
the ﬁnding in Table 4.20 that institutions
follow a graduation policy in loan allocation
whereby a credit limit is increased on the
basis of past repayment record and successful
participation in the credit program. Female-
headed households have a signiﬁcantly lower
credit limit than male-headed households. It
is indeed ironic that, although NGOs make
special efforts to reach out to female-headed
households (Kabeer 1998), once such house-
holds become members they are allocated
lower credit limits. The gender-based differ-
ences in credit limits probably reﬂect gender-
based differences in earning potential. In
Bangladesh, not only do women generally
earn signiﬁcantly less than men, but female-
headed households constitute some of the
poorest households.
Finally, the estimated equation indicates
that the amount of land owned (LAND) is
not an important determinant of credit limits.
The statistical insigniﬁcance of the land vari-
able emphasizes the prime importance of
labor earning power in determining credit risk
and hence credit limits.
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Analysis of the Household-Level 
Impact of Group-Based Credit 
Institutions in Bangladesh
I
n this chapter, the impacts of group-based ﬁnancial institutions on a variety of behavioral
and welfare outcome variables are estimated. The chapter begins with a descriptive analy-
sis of responses by survey households regarding the perceived change in social capacity,
social attitudes, and livelihood. This tabular analysis of qualitative impact indicators suggests
a signiﬁcant and positive impact on household welfare. The chapter then presents an econo-
metric analysis of impact of credit access on selected behavioral outcomes. By and large, the
econometric analysis conﬁrms the results of the tabular analysis of qualitative indicators. In
particular, three areas of possible impact of credit access are explored: adoption of new tech-
nology, income generation, and food and calorie consumption. The new technology consid-
ered here is the modern high-yielding variety of rice (HYV rice), and the question asked is
whether or not increased access to credit leads to higher adoption levels of HYV rice. Regard-
ing household income and welfare outcomes, examination is made whether superior access
to credit results in higher levels of (1) monthly per capita total consumption expenditure as
a proxy measure of income, (2) monthly per capita off-farm income, (3) monthly per capita
food expenditure, and (4) monthly per capita calorie consumption. Throughout the econo-
metric analysis, the household credit limit that was presented and estimated in Chapter 4 is
used as the measure of access to credit.
The ﬁrst section of this chapter begins with a tabular descriptive analysis of perceived
changes in social capacity and attitudes as well as livelihood. The second section then high-
lights the main issues in assessing the impact of programs such as those offered by the group-
based institutions in Bangladesh. It discusses the impact on HYV adoption, and presents the
results for the impact regressions related to income and consumption. These results on the
income effects of credit access are ﬁnally compared with the average costs of providing credit
access, as discussed in Chapter 3.A Comparative Analysis of
Qualitative Indicators of
Credit Program Impact
Related to Social Change 
and Livelihood
Effects on Social Capacity 
and Attitude18
Recent trends in development literature have
increasingly expanded the purview of the
development focus to include issues of social
change. However, the empirical understand-
ing of what constitute meaningful indicators
of social change remains rather tenuous. The
current exercise is in the nature of a prelim-
inary ﬁeld-testing of an analytical framework,
which correlates development initiatives such
as innovative targeted credit programs and
selected indicators of social change.
The proposed analytical framework oper-
ationalizes the concept of social change along
two major dimensions: (1) social capacity
and (2) social attitude. Attitudes deﬁne the
quality of the social environment, while ca-
pacity deﬁnes the extent to which opportuni-
ties afforded by such an environment can be
realized. The interplay of these two dimen-
sions can provide an operationally meaning-
ful approximation of the concept of social
change as it may pertain to the impact of de-
velopment programs.
In the third round of the survey, a separate
questionnaire was used to collect information
designed to capture the impact of the targeted
credit programs on social change. The pro-
gram participants were asked questions for
the current period (the “present” situation)
and for the period ﬁve years previously (the
“past” situation). For most participants, the
“past” represents the situation before their
program participation. Control households
(the eligible nonparticipants) were also asked
to undertake a “with and without” compari-
son. In every case, answers were sought sep-
arately from male and female respondents in
each household.
Table 5.1 presents the ﬁndings of the
social impact component of the survey. The
dimension of social capacity is represented
by four indicators: decisionmaking, coping
capacity, social participation, and physical
mobility.
Rural Bangladesh is strongly character-
ized by what sociologists term “patriarchal
dominance,” that is, the domination of the
male head of household over all decision-
making governing the household. Social
change in such a context can be taken to
mean a weakening of patriarchal dominance
through greater female participation in deci-
sionmaking. Table 5.1 shows the incidence
of male–female joint decisionmaking for
the past and present comparison. Sizable
change is detected for only one out of ﬁve
decision problems, namely children’s educa-
tion: whereas only 36 percent of couples in
participating households jointly decided on
matters related to children’s education ﬁve
years previously, 50 percent of the same
households do so now. This difference is
statistically signiﬁcant with a probability of
error of less than 10 percent19 The remain-
ing observed differences, including those for
the “with and without” comparisons, are not
statistically signiﬁcant.
A critical indicator of household well-
being is the capacity to cope with emergen-
cies, and maintaining access to emergency
credit is an important coping strategy in many
societies. The data in Table 5.1 show sizable
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18 Dr. Hossain Zillur Rahman of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) is the principal contributor to
this section of the report.
19 To test whether the observed differences between the past and present situation for the same households are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, a paired t-test was performed. For the “with and without” comparison, an independent t-test was con-
ducted with the assumption of variances not being equal. Statistical signiﬁcance throughout the discussion of results
for Tables 5.1 and 5.2 refers to a probability of error of 10 percent or less. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the
tabular analysis, even if statistical signiﬁcance is detected, can be only indicative of an impact of program participa-
tion on social change and changes in livelihood because the t-test does not control for other variables inﬂuencing the
differences between the groups.differences for this indicator for both types of
comparison. Of participating women, 30 per-
cent now have access to ﬁve or more sources
of emergency credit, whereas only 20 percent
in the same group of women had such access
ﬁve years previously. Moreover, 13 percent
of women report access to emergency credit
of Tk 1,000 or more, whereas only 4 percent
could borrow such an amount ﬁve years pre-
viously. This suggests that participation in
group-based programs also improves access
to informal consumption credit. These differ-
ences are statistically signiﬁcant. Similar siz-
able and statistically signiﬁcant differences
exist for the “with and without” comparison.
Roughly half of female members were
found to have some say in decisions that
concern the family overall. This limited em-
powerment of women is also discernible from
their restrictions on physical mobility, that
is, being allowed to leave the homestead for
visits outside the village or for attending so-
cial events. The survey ﬁndings show a very
large and statistically signiﬁcant change in
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Table 5.1 Indicators of social change (% of afﬁrmative responses)
“Past and present”a “With and without”b
Five Eligible
Now years ago Participant nonparticipant
Male—female joint decisionmaking
Children’s education 50 36 50 58
Son/daughter’s marriage 60 64 60 61
Purchase of consumer durables 51 56 51 49
Land purchase 61 55 61 60
Major investments 54 51 54 43
Coping capacity
Female access to 5 or more sources of
emergency credit 30 20 30 25
Female access to 1,000 taka or more as
emergency credit 13 4 13 6
Physical mobility
Female mobility beyond village 55 25 55 22
Female mobility for purposes other than 
social visits 55 32 55 31
Participation in development programs
Male . . . . . .  44 42
Female . . . . . .  15 5
Male attitudes
Do not approve dowry . . .  . . .  57 62
Voting as I think ﬁt . . .  . . .  73 81
Protest unjust shalish decision . . . . . .  46 37
Marriage age for girls to be above 20 . . .  . . .  30 18
Do not approve female income-earning . . .  . . .  34 34
Do not approve family planning . . .  . . .  25 27
Female attitudes
Do not approve dowry . . .  . . .  60 46
Voting as I think ﬁt . . .  . . .  24 20
Protest unjust shalish decision . . . . . .  16 12
Marriage age for girls to be above 20 . . .  . . .  28 28
Do not approve female income-earning . . .  . . .  16 27
Do not approve family planning . . .  . . .  21 23
Source: IFPRI 1994.
a “Past and present” examines changes among participants since ﬁve years ago.
b “With and without” examines changes between participant and control groups. Control groups in this context refer to per-
sons who are part of the target group but are not participants in the credit schemes, that is, eligible nonparticipants.this indicator for both types of comparison.
Women in participating households are more
than twice as likely to be able to travel be-
yond the village, compared with ﬁve years
previously. Women in eligible nonpartici-
pant households are roughly half as likely to
attend social events or to travel outside the
village. These ﬁndings of an increase in the
scope of physical mobility among women in
participating households are indicative of a
process of empowerment and social change
in general.
Greater participation by the poor in var-
ious social events suggests a process of
empowerment of the poor. Program partici-
pation appears to have no impact on male par-
ticipation in development programs, whereas
women in participating households are three
times more likely to participate compared
with women in eligible nonparticipant house-
holds (15 percent compared with 5 percent).
The latter difference is statistically signiﬁcant.
Besides the issue of social capacity, the
other crucial dimension of social change 
is the social attitudes of women and men.
However, the use of memory recall was not
deemed appropriate to capture changes in
attitude. Therefore, only a “with and with-
out” comparison was included in the survey.
Table 5.1 shows that female members of
participating households are more likely to
disapprove dowry than are female members
of target nonparticipant households (60 per-
cent against 46 percent). The other ﬁve in-
dicators related to female attitudes show the
expected differences, but they are smaller
and not statistically signiﬁcant. The effects
of program participation on men are, as ex-
pected, less distinct, and none is statistically
signiﬁcant.
In summary, the tabular analysis ﬁnds
some evidence of social change, in particular
in the areas of intrahousehold decisionmaking
and women’s empowerment, women’s cop-
ing capacity, the physical mobility of women,
and social attitudes of women. For all of these
indicators, the targeted NGO credit programs
appear to have brought about distinct and
favorable changes, despite the fact that tar-
geted rural credit schemes are but one factor
among the totality of factors that affect these
areas of behavior.
Changes in Livelihood
One of the ﬁrst modules of the household
survey sought information about longer-term
changes in livelihood. All heads of house-
holds were asked about their perception of
change in their livelihood during the previous
seven years. The interviewer was trained not
to mention the issue of program participation
when asking these questions so as to mini-
mize respondent bias as much as possible.
The responses are summarized in Table 5.2.
Of the participating households, 50 per-
cent reported a positive change in their live-
lihood, while 44 percent perceived a negative
change. The corresponding ﬁgures for eli-
gible nonparticipants, in contrast, are 39 and
56 percent. The observed differences between
participants and eligible nonparticipants are
statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that partic-
ipation in the group-based ﬁnancial institu-
tion improved the livelihood of the members
compared with nonmembers. It is interesting
to see that nonparticipants owning more than
0.5 acres of land reported negative change
more frequently than did participating house-
holds (49 percent compared with 43 percent
for participants).
The general question about the change in
livelihood was followed by detailed questions
on various aspects of livelihood, as listed at
the bottom of Table 5.2. Of the total house-
holds reporting positive change, about 90
percent of participating and 85 percent of non-
participating households reported improve-
ments in their food consumption in terms of
quantity as well as quality. Very stark and
statistically signiﬁcant differences are found
for positive changes related to the health
status of family members (52 percent for
participants against 34 percent for eligible
nonparticipants) and even more so for the
education of children (50 percent against 
26 percent).
These qualitative results are consistent
with other impact studies in Bangladesh. With
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and Schuler (1997b) ﬁnd a positive impact
of women’s participation in microﬁnance
programs in Bangladesh. Pitt and Khandker
(1998) identify large and signiﬁcant effects
of group-based institutions on health and
children’s schooling, especially if the loans
are targeted at women as opposed to men.
However, using the same data set, Morduch
ﬁnds no signiﬁcant impact on these outcome
variables (Morduch 1998a; 1999).
Econometric Analysis of
Program Impact
General Issues in Impact Analysis
Because it is impossible to observe a house-
hold with and without program participation
simultaneously, and lacking a panel data set
that allows observation of households before
and after program participation, impact analy-
sis in this chapter is based on comparing
household outcomes differentiated by access
to credit while simultaneously controlling for
various other factors that affect the outcome
in question (for example, levels of prior-
owned human and physical capital). How-
ever, not all of the “other factors” can be
measured or even observed. For example,
factors such as innate abilities, entrepreneur-
ship, social skills, and management abilities
make some households more productive than
others, but these cannot be fully observed or
adequately measured. If these same factors
also affect a household’s participation or
acceptance in credit programs, selectivity
bias results and attribution becomes difﬁcult
(Heckman 1979). As reported in Morduch
(1997), this type of selection bias can lead to
an overestimation of impact by as much as
100 percent (McKernan 1996). It could also
lead to underestimation of beneﬁts in cases
where programs take special care to select
clients who have some inherent but unmea-
surable weaknesses.
Further, if programs tend to be placed in
locations with better infrastructure, not ac-
counting for this fact will again lead to the
overstating of beneﬁts, and vice versa if they
are placed in worse-off communities. As indi-
cated in Chapter 2, placements of branches of
NGO institutions were by no means random:
they heeded poverty considerations, with
services geared more toward poor pockets
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Table 5.2 The effects of program participation on livelihood
Eligible Noneligible
All NGO nonparticipant nonparticipant
households households (<0.5 acre) households (≥0.5 acre)
Number of observations 124 97 129
% of households reporting
No change 6.5 5.2 3.1
Positive change 50.0 39.2 48.1
Negative change 43.5 55.7 48.8
Number of households reporting 
positive change 62 38 62
Main areas of positive change (%)
Quantity of food 90.3 84.2 71.0
Quality of food 91.9 86.8 71.0
Quality of drinking water 41.9 34.2 29.0
Health of members 51.6 34.2 43.5
Education of children 50.0 26.3 54.8
Housing 59.7 55.3 67.1
Source: IFPRI 1994.
Note: The questions referred to the change in livelihood, as perceived by the household head, during the previous seven years.of relatively well-developed areas. Location
considerations have therefore been explic-
itly accounted for in the estimated impact
equations.
The methods used in this chapter are
based on Kochar (1997) for the adoption of
high-yielding varieties (HYV) of rice and on
Morduch (1998a) for welfare impact. In the
assessment of the effect of credit access on
household income and expenditures, villages
with RDRS programs are used as control vil-
lages. The method involves comparing wel-
fare indicators of eligible households in 
the ASA and BRAC villages with eligible
households in the RDRS village to derive an
average impact of the ASA and BRAC pro-
grams. The estimated impact level therefore
represents the net impact of ASAand BRAC
services relative to the effect of other pro-
grams, including the RDRS credit program,
in the control villages. The RDRS’s credit
program was initiated in 1992 (only two years
prior to the survey). Since a reallocation of
consumption expenditures is usually linked
to changes in some notion of the “permanent”
income of the household, it is likely that only
a small fraction of the full impact would be
realized in such a short time span. This is
because there is likely to be a time lag—or
an interim period—during which the house-
hold completes a subjective assessment of the
permanence of the institution and assured
access to credit. For this reason, the estimated
net impacts of BRAC and ASA are likely 
to be quite close to the full impact of their
services. Of course, the present-day reality
of Bangladesh is such that it is now difﬁcult
to ﬁnd a control village that is strictly “un-
contaminated” by social services provided by
some type of NGO institutions. This means
that the absolute level of impact is likely to
be higher than the net impact measured in
most cases.
The treatment/control groupings were not
used in assessing the impact on HYV adop-
tion for two reasons. First, relating the level
of credit access to the extent of HYV adop-
tion necessitated working with a subsample
of adopters-cum-group member households,
and further subgrouping these into treatment
and control villages led to a very small num-
ber of observations in each of the groups.
Second, HYV rice in Bangladesh is not a
new technology whose adoption is condi-
tional upon an initial learning period. Hence,
whereas it is reasonable to expect that the full
effects of increased credit access on house-
hold consumption behavior will occur after
some time lag, there is less reason to believe
that there will be such a time lag in the adop-
tion of HYVrice, especially where the house-
hold already possesses land suitable for the
cultivation of HYVrice. The method used to
assess impact is therefore based on estimation
of a two-stage regression equation linking
adoption with credit access that incorporates
information on the decision to adopt as well
as the decision to participate in group-based
credit programs (Kochar 1997).
Credit Access and HYV Adoption
Access to credit may affect the adoption of
HYV rice principally in two ways. First, by
relaxing the liquidity constraint, credit fa-
cilitates timely purchase and use of various
agricultural inputs, including seed, fertilizer,
pesticides, water, and labor at appropriate
stages of production and in combinations that
maximize returns. HYV rice production is
not only signiﬁcantly more input intensive
than traditional varieties, but also more sen-
sitive to the timing of application. Hence the
ability to ﬁnance the timely purchase of agri-
cultural inputs is expected to be an important
determinant of the proportion of land allo-
cated to HYV rice. Financial constraints are
especially relevant to small and marginal
farmer-households for whom liquidity bot-
toms out during the planting season, when
stocks of food and agricultural products from
the previous harvest have already been de-
pleted. Second, HYV rice is less adaptable
and less resilient in the face of commonly
occurring adverse climatic events (Bera and
Kelley 1990), so access to unused credit lines
enables poor households an uphold essential
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protection provided by credit makes it pos-
sible for poor households to reduce their
dependence on traditional rice varieties that
have a low risk and a lower average proﬁt-
ability. Hence an increase in access to credit
is likely to be associated with an increased
allocation of available land to HYV rice.
An earlier IFPRI study examined the
effects of increased access to credit on HYV
rice cultivation in Bangladesh and concluded
that lack of access to credit did not constrain
cultivation (Hossain 1988). However, the
methodology used in that study did not ad-
equately address endogeneity problems aris-
ing out of self-selection into programs, thus
leading to an examination of this issue once
again.
In the methodology used here, three sep-
arate, but not unrelated, activities are brought
together: (1) the household’s participation in
a group-based organization, (2) its decision
on whether or not to cultivate HYV rice,
and—conditional upon (1) and (2)—(3) its
decision in how much land to allocate to
HYV rice cultivation. The methodology is
described below.
Let A be the amount of land devoted to
HYV rice. The decision to cultivate HYV
rice (the adoption decision) is determined by
a latent variable A* such that
A = A* if A* > 0
= 0 otherwise.
A* is speciﬁed as
Ai * =β 0 + Xiβ1 +β 2Ci +β 3Vi + ui, (5.1)
where Xi is a vector that includes household
speciﬁc characteristics, Ci is the household
credit line (limit) at the group-based credit
program, Vi represents community-level ef-
fects, and ui is a random term. Now, let P*
denote the latent variable determining par-
ticipation in a group-based credit program
such that a household participates if and only
if P* >0. The area allocated to HYVrice can
therefore be written as
E(A*) =∂ 0 + Xi∂1 +∂ 2Ci
if (P*1 > 0, A*i > 0)
=∂ 0 + Xi∂1 if P*i ≤ 0, A*i > 0)
= 0 otherwise (5.2)
Only the ﬁrst line of equation system (5.2) is
estimated and this is rewritten as
(A|P* > 0, A* > 0) 
=∂ 0 + Xi∂1 +∂ 2Ci + ei (5.3)
Since E(ei|P* > 0, A* > 0) ≠ 0, estimating
equation (5.3) in its current form results in
biased estimates of δ(Heckman 1979; Greene
1993). For this reason, equation (5.3) is es-
timated in two steps. In the ﬁrst stage, the
joint probability of participating in a group-
based institution and adopting HYV is esti-
mated using reduced form speciﬁcations
of (1) the marginal probability of adoption and
(2) the marginal probability of participation in
group-based credit programs. The marginal
probability of adoption is essentially the bi-
nary representation of equation (5.1), where
the dependent variable ADOPT=1 if A* >0
and takes the value 0 otherwise. The marginal
probability of participation is the reduced
form version of the bivariate speciﬁcation
of participation in Chapter 4. In the second
stage, inverse Mills ratios, λ1 and λ2 (see
Kochar 1997 for relevant expressions), are
computed from the estimated bivariate func-
tions and used as additional regressors in the
ﬁnal estimating equation as follows:
Ai|C* i > 0, A* i > 0 =∂ 0 + Xi∂1 +∂ 2Ci
+σ 1λ1 +σ 2λ2 + wi. (5.4)
Because of the potential endogeneity of Ci
in equation (5.4), an instrumental variable
(IV) estimation of ∂2 is obtained using pre-
dicted limits from the estimated equation in
Table 5.1 as instruments. Also, use of esti-
74 CHAPTER 5mated values of the λ’s as well as IV esti-
mation of ∂2 means that the conventional
formula cannot be used to compute standard
errors of the regression estimates. Standard er-
rors of estimated coefﬁcients were therefore
obtained by bootstrapping (500 replications).
Two further points are noted. First, ac-
cess to informal credit is not speciﬁed as a
structural variable on the right-hand side of
equation (5.4). Though the important role
of informal credit in the ﬁnancial transac-
tions of poor rural households in Bangladesh
is acknowledged, the inability to ﬁnd an in-
strument that could legitimately identify the
informal credit access equation prevented its
inclusion as a structural variable. Of course,
since access to informal credit depends on
the same set of observable household and
community characteristics included in equa-
tion (5.4), its effects are already embedded in
their estimated coefﬁcients. Hence, it is im-
portant to note that, although the impact of
informal credit was not quantiﬁable, its ef-
fects are controlled in assessing the impact
of group-based credit—the main focus of
analysis in this report.
The second point regards irrigation sta-
tus and land type. Because both these factors
are critical in determining the ﬁnancial re-
turns to HYV rice, and hence its adoption, it
is important to specify these characteristics
accurately in the estimating equation. This
creates a problem for the Amanseason, since
no information was collected on land type
in the survey. As indicated in Chapter 4, in
the Aman season, the traditional variety of
broadcast Aman (deep-water Aman) rice is
grown in the lowland area, while both local
and HYV rice are cultivated in the uplands.
Hence, not specifying upland/lowland infor-
mation in the regression equation would lead
to fairly serious speciﬁcation bias, because
demand for credit—and thus the extent of
supply constraint—is likely to be highly cor-
related with land type.
In contrast, the lowland/upland distinc-
tion is not as important for the dry Boro sea-
son, since ﬂooding is not a problem and
irrigation status is quite unambiguously de-
fined. For this reason, the impact equation
is estimated only for the Boro season crop.
Because weather-related uncertainty plays a
much lesser role in the Boro season, one un-
intended consequence of restricting analysis
to the Boroseason is that impact now focuses
more on the effects of relaxing the liquidity
constraint and less on the insurance effects
of credit.
The estimation results on adoption of
HYVrice are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4
(means and standard deviations of variables
are presented in Table 4.8). Table 5.3 presents
the ﬁrst-stage participation and adoption
equations. Two estimation approaches were
tested: one in which the error terms in the
participation and adoption equations were
assumed to be correlated, and the other in
which each function was estimated as an
independent probit function. A likelihood
ratio test rejected the null hypothesis that the
two models were different, and the inde-
pendent probit functions were chosen as the
preferred model because they were more con-
sistent with the second-stage result reported
below. Determinants of participation in credit
programs have already been discussed in de-
tail in Chapter 4 and will not be pursued here.
As for HYV rice, apart from the location
dummy variables and the intercept term, the
only other statistically signiﬁcant determi-
nants of adoption of HYV rice are access to
irrigated land and the gender of the house-
hold head—female-headed households are
less likely than male-headed households to
adopt HYV. The importance of irrigation in
HYV adoption is further emphasized in the
second-stage equation, which relates the area
devoted to HYV rice to various household
characteristics (Table 5.4). The estimated
equation rejects the hypothesis that credit
lines in group-based programs determine the
extent of HYV adoption; the only variable
that has a statistically signiﬁcant effect is
access to irrigated land.
Although the above result indicates that
access to irrigation is the primary determi-
nant of the extent of adoption of HYV rice,
it is important not to conclude that ﬁnancial
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adoption. From the point of view of the
farmer with access to irrigated land, high
returns to HYV adoption make even high
interest rates worth paying in order to ob-
tain adequate amounts of timely credit. For
informal lenders, on the other hand, house-
holds that own or otherwise have access to
irrigated land are preferred clients, because
their higher and also less uncertain levels of
income (compared with those who depend
on rainfed agriculture) make them better
borrowers. Thus, favorable factors operating
on both the demand and supply sides mean
that access to irrigated land is highly likely
actually to facilitate obtaining credit from in-
formal lenders. It may be for this reason that
credit lines in group-based institutions do
not seem to matter.
Credit Access and 
Household Welfare
The impact of credit on a household welfare
indicator Wican, as in the case of HYVadop-
tion, be linearly speciﬁed as
Wi =β 0 + Xiβ1 +β 2Ci +β 3Vi + ui. (5.5)
Though the endogeneity of Ciremains a prob-
lem, the dependent variable, unlike in the
adoption equation, is no longer censored. As
indicated previously, the treatment/control
approach was used in evaluating impact. This
involves comparing the welfare indicators of
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Table 5.3 Independent probit estimates for program participation and the HYV adoption decision
Propensity to adopt Program participation
Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic
Explanatory variables coefﬁcient t-ratio coefﬁcient t-ratio
Constant −2.907** −1.910 −3.142 −1.407
AGEHH 0.031 0.534 0.088 0.859
AGEHHSQ 0.0002 −0.379 −0.001 −0.973
LAND . . . . . .  −0.045** −4.374
IRRILAND 0.023** 5.744 . . . . . .
HHSIZE −0.080 −1.029 0.358** 3.068
MALEDU 0.008 0.135 −0.051 −0.540
FEMEDU −0.043 −0.435 0.208 1.411
GENDERHH 1.419* 1.634 0.622 0.926
ADMALE 0.293 1.387 0.075 0.220
ADFEMALE . . . . . .  0.748* 1.933
REGION1 0.504 1.517 −0.098 −0.203
REGION2 0.600 1.275 0.434 −0.797
REGION3 0.779** 2.096 −0.931* −1.726
ELIGIBILITY . . . . . .  1.226* 1.826
Source: IFPRI household survey data 1993–94.
* = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level; ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
Description of variables used in different regression equations:
AGEHH age of the household head
AGEHHSQ square of the age of household head
LAND total land owned
IRRILAND total irrigable land
HHSIZE total number of household members
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in household
GENDERHH gender of household head (dummy, 1 = male)
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
REGION1-6 region dummies
ELIGIBILITY dummy variable that equals 1 if household is eligible and 0 otherwiseeligible households in the ASA and BRAC
villages with eligible households in the RDRS
village in order to derive the average impact
of the ASA and BRAC programs. This is
done by deﬁning two binary variables, one
indicating eligibility in the ASA/BRAC
program (ei), and the other indicating the
presence of ASA/BRAC credit services in
the village (bi). Equation (5.5) is rewritten as
y =β 0 +β 1eibi +β 2ei
+ Xiβiβ3 +β 4Vi + ui. (5.6)
Hence, once the effects of village and house-
hold characteristics as well as eligibility sta-
tus are separately controlled, the coefﬁcient
of  eibi (β1) identiﬁes the impact due to
program availability (Morduch 1998a). A
slightly different version of the above equa-
tion is used for estimation in this study: in-
stead of using eibi as a regressor, credit limit
(Ci) was used as the regressor, and instru-
mented by eibi (see Morduch 1997). This
obtained an average impact per taka rather
than a total impact (Morduch 1997). Further,
because household outcomes vary seasonally,
impact is assessed for three major cropping
seasons—the Aman, Aus, and Boro seasons.
For all equations estimated, White’s (1981)
method is used to correct for possible hetero-
skedasticity in the data set.
As Tables 5.3–5.6 show, the results, un-
like Morduch’s (1998a), reveal that credit
access as measured by the credit limit in
general has positive and signiﬁcant impacts
on households’well-being (means and stan-
dard deviations of variables are presented in
Table 4.8). These are discussed separately
below.
Total Household Income
In the following analysis, household income
is proxied by total consumption expenditures
on food and nonfood goods and services.
The dependent variable is per capita monthly
total consumption expenditures. The effect
of credit access on total household income is
statistically signiﬁcant at a probability error
of 5 percent in the Aus and Aman seasons,
but not in the Boro season (Table 5.5). On
average, and depending on the season, each
additional 100 taka of credit limit raises per
capita monthly income by 0.84 taka (the Aus
season), by 1.55 taka (Aman season), and by
0.52 taka (Boro season). These coefﬁcients
are calculated with the following formula:
Marginal impact: dy/dx = y * bx,
ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL IMPACT OF GROUP-BASED CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN BANGLADESH 77






















(F 17,119) = 21.58
Adjusted R2 = 0.75
Source: IFPRI household survey data 1993–94.
** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
Description of variables used in different regression
equations:
CRLIMIT predicted credit limit
AGEHH age of the household head
AGEHHSQ square of the age of household head
IRRILAND total irrigable land
HHSIZE total number of household members
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in house-
hold
GENDERHH gender of household head (dummy, 
1 = male)
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
HPDIST distance to home of parents of house-
hold head
SPDIST distance to home of parents of spouse
of household head
LAMBDA Mills ratio obtained from ﬁrst-stage
probit equation
REGION1-6 region dummieswhere bx = regression coefﬁcient for ASA/
BRAC credit limit in Table 5.5 and y=mean
of dependent variable. It is noteworthy that
the income effects of credit access are higher
in the Aman season, compared with the Aus
and Boro seasons. The Boro season follows
the Aman harvest, the main harvest of the
year, and is therefore the most favorable
season for income for the poor, because liq-
uidity is less of a problem. Thus, the shadow
interest rate, or the return to credit access, is
lower in the Boro season. Credit access has
a signiﬁcant impact on improving income
levels during the relatively unfavorable Aus
and Aman seasons. The higher income ef-
fects of formal credit access in the lean sea-
sons can also be explained by the reduced
cost to the household for consumption stabi-
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Table 5.5 Impacts of ASA/BRAC credit limit on log of monthly per capita consumption expenditure
Aus season Aman season Boro season
Explanatory variables Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic
Constant 6.471790 23.37 6.83474 23.15 6.250690 22.78
AGEHH −0.005097 −0.45 −0.00874 −0.81 0.005797 0.66
AGEHHSQ 0.000005 0.04 0.00006 0.54 −0.000061 −0.66
LAND 0.001081 6.74 0.00127 4.43 0.001056 6.46
HHSIZE −0.102832 −8.42 −0.10505 −5.92 −0.107064 −7.62
MALEDU 0.006326 0.61 0.04247 2.62 0.035380 2.71
FEMEDU 0.016780 0.90 0.00262 0.10 0.020528 0.73
GENDERHH −0.176824 −2.58 −0.09629 −0.94 −0.122877 −1.39
ADMALE 0.185460 5.76 0.18608 4.50 0.223682 6.83
ADFEMALE 0.030504 0.94 −0.00346 −0.07 −0.010778 −0.29
SPDIST 0.001112 2.61 0.00007 0.11 0.000224 0.61
HPDIST −0.000097 −0.15 0.00124 2.12 −0.000295 −0.46
ASA/BRAC ELIGIBILITY −0.110420 −1.97 −0.12821 −1.64 −0.152957 −2.57
ASA/BRAC credit limit 
(× 1,000) 0.000022 2.70 0.000026 2.71 0.000012 1.34
Village1 0.129812 0.97 0.18914 1.25 0.081635 0.41
Village2 0.105937 0.66 0.12356 0.64 0.290310 1.29
Village3 0.091842 0.63 0.10883 0.63 0.199930 0.97
Village4 −0.168292 −1.23 0.00629 0.04 −0.070656 −0.36
Village5 −0.120581 −0.82 0.02038 0.12 −0.073774 −0.35
Village6 0.171078 1.26 0.16889 1.10 0.149107 0.75
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.44 0.45
Model signiﬁcance (F 19,330) = 15.40 10.27 15.95
P-value = 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly per capita total consumption expenditure (in taka) in the Aus, Aman, and Boro seasons, with means of 379.93,
595.86, and 437.03, respectively.
Description of variables used in the regression model (see Table 4.8 for descriptive statistics):
AGEHH age of the household head
AGEHHSQ square of the age of household head
LAND land owned ten years ago
HHSIZE household size
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in household
GENDERHH gender of household head (dummy, 1 = male)
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
HPDIST distance to home of parents of household head
SPDIST distance to home of parents of spouse of household head
VILLAGE1-6 village dummies
ELIGIBILITY dummy variable that equals 1 if household is eligible and 0 otherwiselization compared with households that have
to rely on costly borrowing from the infor-
mal sector. A positive link between credit
access and consumption stabilization is also
found by Morduch (1998a; 1999), who uses
a data set from Bangladesh.
The elasticity of per capita monthly in-
come with respect to the credit limit at the
mean is estimated to be 0.0233 and 0.0275
for the Aus and the Aman seasons, respec-
tively, and 0.0127 for the Boro season. Be-
cause of the semi-log speciﬁcation of the
regression model, the elasticities are com-
puted as the product of the regression coefﬁ-
cient (for the credit limit) and the value of the
average credit limit (that is, elasticity = bi*
credit limit). Apart from credit access, im-
portant determinants of income in all three
seasons are the size of land owned and male
labor power. Female-headed households
generally have signiﬁcantly lower income
levels, especially during the hungry Aussea-
son. Women’s education levels appear not
to matter for household income, but those
of men do, especially in the Aman and Boro
seasons.
Per Capita Food Expenditure
As in the case of income, the impacts of
credit access on per capita monthly food
expenditures are statistically signiﬁcant at a
5 percent probability of error in the Aus and
Aman season (Table 5.6). For the Boro sea-
son, the positive affect is signiﬁcant at a
probability of error of 15 percent. On aver-
age, each additional 100 taka of credit limit
raises monthly per capita food expenditure
by 0.67 and 0.69 taka in the Aus and Aman
seasons, respectively. For the Boro season,
the corresponding effect is only 0.43 taka.
Also, the elasticity at the mean is higher 
for the Aus season (0.0213) than for the
Aman (0.0191) and Boro (0.0138) seasons.
The major determinants of food expendi-
tures are the same as for income. It is worth
noting that female-headed households have
lower levels of food consumption than male-
headed households, especially during the Aus
season.
Per Capita Off-Farm 
Self-Employment Income
The impact of credit access on self-employ-
ment income is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 95 percent level in all three seasons
(Table 5.7). In addition, the estimated elas-
ticities with respect to the credit limit at the
mean level (0.17 for Aus,0.14 for Aman,and
0.19 for Boro) are higher than the income
elasticities reported above. For example, for
the Aus season, the elasticity of total income
is 0.0233, whereas it is 0.17 for off-farm in-
come. This result suggests that access to credit
from the group-based microﬁnance institu-
tions increases overall household income, but
encourages a shift out of agricultural, wage,
and other income sources into off-farm micro-
enterprises. As far as wage labor income is
concerned, this is consistent with the de-
clared objective of microﬁnance institutions
to enable the poor to reduce their depend-
ence on wage labor income by entering into
or expanding existing microenterprises. This
result indicates the strong off-farm credit
focus of the microﬁnance institutions. It fur-
ther supports the view that informal lenders
play an important role in ﬁnancing agricul-
tural operations (as the previous result for
HYV adoption implied). As for the other de-
terminants, apart from the village dummies,
the only variable that is consistently signiﬁ-
cant across seasons is male labor power.
Per Capita Calorie Consumption
The estimates indicate that the observed im-
pacts of credit access on income (proxied by
total expenditure) and food expenditures 
do not translate into increased calorie intake
(Table 5.8). The coefﬁcients for the credit
limit are positive in all three seasons, but in-
signiﬁcant at a probability of error of 10 per-
cent. However, the coefﬁcient for the lean Aus
season is signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.
The latter result provides weak evidence that
credit access may increase calorie consump-
tion in the hungry season. In view of the
signiﬁcant income and food expenditure
effects shown above, these results suggest a
household preference toward improving the
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its quantity. In other words, a substantial part
of the additional income generated through
credit access appears to be spent on increas-
ing the quality of food or on nonfood items.
Do Microﬁnance Programs
Really Help the Poor?
The question of whether microﬁnance pro-
grams really help the poor was raised by
Morduch (1998a). In the following, we seek
to summarize our results, and compare them
with those of Morduch (1998a; 1999) and Pitt
and Khandker (1998).
As presented above, the impacts of credit
access on total per capita monthly house-
hold income, on per capita monthly food
expenditures, and on monthly off-farm self-
employment income are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant. However, it is important
to consider the size of the effects. Based on
the computed elasticities of income with
respect to the credit limit, a 100 percent in-
crease in the credit limit increases per capita
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Table 5.6 Impacts of ASA/BRAC credit limit on monthly per capita food expenditure
Aus season Aman season Boro season
Explanatory variables Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic
Constant 6.263260 25.59 5.989920 26.66 5.966440 27.30
AGEHH −0.002136 −0.23 0.002126 0.29 0.005908 0.78
AGEHHSQ −0.000020 −0.19 −0.000034 −0.45 −0.000066 −0.85
LAND 0.000886 4.50 0.000676 4.94 0.000886 7.51
HHSIZE −0.092959 −7.52 −0.081265 −6.05 −0.098084 −7.38
MALEDU 0.007070 0.68 0.038105 3.31 0.025851 2.17
FEMEDU 0.009655 0.51 0.001993 0.09 0.010110 0.38
GENDERHH −0.158001 −2.39 −0.048335 −0.67 −0.109208 −1.30
ADMALE 0.164204 5.17 0.169357 4.92 0.180157 5.85
ADFEMALE 0.019670 0.59 0.014573 0.44 0.016952 0.47
SPDIST 0.001175 2.60 0.000094 0.19 0.000145 0.43
HPDIST −0.000203 −0.36 0.001105 2.27 −0.000207 −0.34
ASA/BRAC ELIGIBILITY −0.117153 −1.98 −0.127325 −2.45 −0.125725 −2.27
ASA/BRAC credit limit 0.000020 2.54 0.000018 2.46 0.000013 1.61
VILLAGE1 0.152595 1.18 0.282967 2.05 0.067365 0.47
VILLAGE2 0.088427 0.56 0.111765 0.68 0.199764 1.13
VILLAGE3 0.117173 0.82 0.163782 1.10 0.150760 0.94
VILLAGE4 −0.153220 −1.16 −0.029153 −0.21 −0.091145 −0.63
VILLAGE5 −0.075756 −0.53 0.102095 0.61 −0.040489 −0.25
VILLAGE6 0.168070 1.28 0.186346 1.32 0.150070 1.02
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.36 0.37
Model signiﬁcance (F 19,330) = 12.41 11.31 11.59
P-value = 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly per capita food consumption expenditure (in taka) in the Aus, Aman, and Boro seasons, with means of 336.97,
387.61, and 333.62, respectively.
Description of variables used in the regression model (see Table 4.8 for descriptive statistics):
AGEHH age of the household head
AGEHHSQ square of the age of household head
LAND land owned ten years ago
HHSIZE household size
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in household
GENDERHH gender of household head (dummy, 1 = male)
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
HPDIST distance to home of parents of household head
SPDIST distance to home of parents of spouse of household head
ELIGIBILITY dummy variable that equals 1 if household is eligible and 0 otherwise
VILLAGE1-6 village dummiesmonthly income in the range of 0–2.3 per-
cent, depending on the season. Because of
the larger effect found for off-farm income
—ranging from 14 to 19 percent, depending
on the season—the results overall suggest
that program participation partly substitutes
wage labor income and other income sources
with off-farm income. This is consistent with
results by Khandker, Khalily, and Khan
(1995), who found that the Grameen Bank
increased the rural wage rate by 4 percent.
They argued that the shift from wage labor
to self-employed microenterprises ﬁnanced
by Grameen Bank credit resulted in a re-
duced supply of labor that pushed rural
wages upward. The above substitution effect
in our analysis supports this result.
The size of the impacts, and their signif-
icance, show considerable seasonal variation.
The effects on total income and food expen-
diture are lower in the Boroseason compared
with the other two seasons. The realities of
rural Bangladesh explain this pattern quite
well. The Boro season is when employment
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Table 5.7 Impacts of ASA/BRAC credit limit on log of monthly per capita off-farm self-employment income
Aus season Aman season Boro season
Explanatory variables Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic
Constant 1.21956 0.85 −0.8987 −0.60 −0.14184 −0.09
AGEHH −0.00654 −0.14 0.075155 1.43 0.045587 0.78
AGEHHSQ −1.28 × 10−5 −0.03 −0.00087 −1.61 −0.00049 −0.79
LAND −0.00049 −0.47 −0.00102 −0.93 0.001249 1.01
HHSIZE −0.03092 −0.41 0.04033 0.52 −0.12685 −1.47
MALEDU 0.0812 0.97 0.162297 2.04 0.074342 0.92
FEMEDU 0.18393 1.37 −0.05079 −0.50 0.013925 0.11
GENDERHH −0.39491 −0.79 0.223107 0.48 0.384281 0.53
ADMALE 0.513097 2.69 0.523479 2.51 0.557117 2.50
ADFEMALE −0.36581 −1.61 −0.60852 −2.92 −0.51468 −2.11
SPDIST 0.002601 1.17 0.001385 0.86 −0.00238 −0.59
HPDIST −0.00583 −1.47 −0.00178 −0.33 −0.00829 −2.78
ASA/BRAC ELIGIBILITY 0.959806 2.87 0.443575 1.26 1.36933 3.84
ASA/BRAC credit limit 0.000158 3.49 0.000127 2.28 0.000182 4.01
Village1 1.62987 1.79 1.44368 1.62 1.0405 1.09
Village2 0.45539 0.42 0.224461 0.22 0.311286 0.27
Village3 −0.33636 −0.35 −0.18008 −0.19 −0.0306 −0.03
Village4 0.387879 0.43 0.307239 0.35 −0.02039 −0.02
Village5 1.68832 1.62 1.36803 1.38 1.6291 1.50
Village6 3.57887 3.90 3.60742 4.06 3.44232 3.62
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.28 0.29
Model signiﬁcance (F 19,330) = 8.62 8.26 8.41
P-value = 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly per capita off-farm income (in taka) in the Aus, Aman, and Boro seasons, with means of 17.46, 15.49, and 13.33,
respectively.
Description of variables used in the regression model (see Table 4.8 for descriptive statistics):
AGEHH age of the household head
AGEHHSQ square of the age of household head
LAND land owned ten years ago
HHSIZE household size
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in household
GENDERHH gender of household head (dummy, 1 = male)
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
HPDIST distance to home of parents of household head
SPDIST distance to home of parents of spouse of household head
ELIGIBILITY dummy variable that equals 1 if household is eligible and 0 otherwise
VILLAGE1-6 village dummiesopportunities for wage earners are higher
and even smaller farmers possess some stock
of food from the just harvested Aman crop.
On the other hand, during the Ausseason and
the preharvest Aman season, both demand
for agricultural labor and foodstocks are low.
It is in these lean seasons that access to credit
appears to matter signiﬁcantly for income
generation and food consumption.
It is possible that the methodology used
here (which is similar to that employed by
Morduch 1998a) systematically underesti-
mates the impact of group-based ﬁnancial
institutions, because of the lack of a totally
“uncontaminated” control village in the data
set. The control villages were exposed to the
RDRS program for one to two years. How-
ever, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd true “control vil-
lages” in rural Bangladesh that have not yet
been reached by some sort of development
program, if not by a group-based ﬁnancial
institution. Morduch (1998a), who ﬁnds no
signiﬁcant program impacts on consumption
levels, also points out that the control villages
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Table 5.8 Impacts of ASA/BRAC credit limit on log of monthly per capita calorie consumption
Aus season Aman season Boro season
Explanatory variables Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic Estimated Asymptotic
Constant 7.74080 31.07 7.540400 42.34 7.789510 29.76
AGEHH 0.00560 0.72 0.001800 0.34 −0.004042 −0.29
AGEHHSQ −0.00005 −0.62 −0.000012 −0.22 0.000063 0.43
LAND 0.00042 1.81 0.000269 3.45 0.000323 3.50
HHSIZE −0.05299 −4.67 −0.031895 −3.54 −0.039798 −3.16
MALEDU −0.03999 −0.76 0.000873 0.13 0.012354 1.65
FEMEDU 0.02195 0.66 0.000330 0.03 −0.006101 −0.55
GENDERHH −0.06611 −1.12 0.073978 1.22 0.026532 0.33
ADMALE 0.09791 2.91 0.095709 4.44 0.093581 3.81
ADFEMALE 0.02182 0.68 −0.018208 −0.67 0.016654 0.67
SPDIST −0.00100 −0.54 −0.000036 −0.15 −0.000282 −1.70
HPDIST −0.00081 −1.62 −0.000052 −0.15 0.000184 0.45
ASA/BRAC ELIGIBILITY −0.10985 −1.07 −0.062373 −1.82 −0.123345 −2.48
ASA/BRAC credit limit 0.00001 1.51 0.000004 0.79 0.000003 0.67
Village1 −0.01731 −0.15 0.053909 0.39 −0.063583 −0.47
Village2 −0.05591 −0.20 0.052936 0.35 0.032523 0.21
Village3 −0.11691 −0.48 0.078316 0.55 0.018935 0.14
Village4 −0.13326 −1.11 0.027927 0.20 −0.177436 −1.15
Village5 −0.04535 −0.33 0.073032 0.50 −0.034660 −0.25
Village6 0.05413 0.45 0.007581 0.05 0.043436 0.32
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.034 0.032
Model signiﬁcance (F 19,330) = 2.20 1.65 1.61
P-value = 0.003 0.040 0.053
Description of variables used in the regression model (see Table 4.8 for descriptive statistics):
AGEHH age of the household head
AGEHHSQ square of the age of household head
LAND land owned ten years ago
HHSIZE household size
MALEDU highest education of male in household
FEMEDU highest education of female in household
GENDERHH gender of household head (dummy, 1 = male)
ADMALE number of adult males in household
ADFEMALE number of adult females in household
HPDIST distance to home of parents of household head
SPDIST distance to home of parents of spouse of household head
ELIGIBILITY dummy variable that equals 1 if household is eligible and 0 otherwise
LENGTH length of membership in group-based NGO
VILLAGE1-6 village dummiesin his data set may not yet have credit pro-
grams, but they are served in other ways by
social service organizations. He concludes
therefore that “it should not be surprising that
strong positive differences between treat-
ment and control villages remain elusive. The
microﬁnance programs may make important
absolute differences in the lives of borrowers,
even if the relative differences are small.”
Using the same data as Morduch (1998a),
Pitt and Khandker (1998) ﬁnd sizable and
signiﬁcant effects of microcredit on house-
hold income. They ﬁnd that every additional
Tk 100 borrowed by women signiﬁcantly
increased annual household income by Tk 18
(for borrowing by men, the impact is only
Tk 11). In order to compare their results with
ours, some calculations need to be performed
to adjust our results. This is described next.
As shown above, each additional Tk 100 of
credit limit raises per capita monthly income
by Tk 0.84 in the Aus season and Tk 1.55 in
the Aman season; the coefﬁcient is not sig-
niﬁcant for the Boro season. To make these
ﬁgures comparable with the results on an-
nual household income by Pitt and Khandker
(1998), they need to be multiplied by a fac-
tor of 12 (so as to arrive at yearly income)
and multiplied by the average household size
of participant households (which is 5.16).
Following this, the marginal effects of credit
access in the amount of Tk 100 on annual
household income are Tk 52 in the Aus sea-
son, Tk 96 in the Aman season, and Tk 0 in
the Boro season (this latter coefﬁcient is not
signiﬁcant).
Moreover, Round 1 took place in June
and July of 1994, and recalled the expendi-
tures during the Boro season (since January
1994). Thus, the Boroseason is equivalent to
six months of recall time. Round 2 recalled
all expenditures since Round 1 (during the
Aus season), and took place in October and
November 1994. Accordingly, the Ausseason
accounts for approximately three months of
recall time. The third and ﬁnal round took
place in December 1994 and January 1995,
and recalled all expenditures since Round 2.
Again, the approximate recall period is three
months. Hence, to arrive at an annual ﬁgure,
the average expenditures weighted by the
recall periods for the three seasons are used.
Assuming that the income effect in the Boro
season is nil, this results in an average annual
income effect of Tk 37 for each additional
Tk 100 of credit limit. This is about double
the estimate provided by Pitt and Khandker
(1998), who estimated the effect on annual
household income to range between Tk 11 and
TK 19 for each additional Tk 100 borrowed.
However, the result could be due to the fact
that the method used here, in contrast to that
of Pitt and Khandker (1998), measures not
only the effect of actual borrowing, but also
the effect of access to credit. This has the ad-
vantage of being able to capture the poten-
tially beneﬁcial effects of having access to
credit, that is, the ability to borrow sometime
in the future even if the household in the cur-
rent period chooses not to borrow (Diagne,
Zeller, and Sharma 2000; Diagne and Zeller
2001). These indirect beneﬁcial effects of
credit access include the reduced costs of
consumption smoothing, such as a decrease
in distress sales and an increased risk-bear-
ing capacity favoring more proﬁtable pro-
duction and investment portfolios. The large
difference between the effect of borrowing,
as shown by Pitt and Khandker (1998), and
the total effect of credit access suggests that
poor households can derive much beneﬁt by
simply being in a position to be able to bor-
row if faced by shocks jeopardizing their al-
ready low consumption levels.
In summary, the analysis in this chapter
has conﬁrmed, by and large, the results of the
descriptive analysis. Anumber of signiﬁcant
and quite sizable effects of credit access 
on income and food consumption have been
identiﬁed. The effect of Tk 100 additional
credit limit provided to a participant house-
hold by BRAC or ASA is estimated to be 
an additional Tk 37 in annual household in-
come. As shown in Chapter 3, the social cost
of providing credit access for the sample of
104 MFIs (costs are 7.9% of debt) is Tk 7.9
per Tk 100 of outstanding loan balance. In
other words, the social investor needs to
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100 of credit access. The net beneﬁt to soci-
ety of providing Tk 100 more of credit access
would therefore be quite sizable (Tk 37.0 –
Tk 7.9 = Tk 29.1). Although this calculation
falls short of a full cost–beneﬁt analysis,
since it does not take into account the sizable
start-up costs of the microﬁnance institutions
(including the costsof failed experiments and
pilot projects not going to plan), it provides
evidence that large and comparably efﬁcient
MFIs such as ASAand BRAC can generate
net social beneﬁts even if the funds pro-
vided by donors and governments are val-
ued at market prices.
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Conclusions and Implications for Policy
T
his study comprised analysis at the level of group-based ﬁnancial institutions, focus-
ing on determinants of placement, outreach, and performance, and at the level of
households, exploring the impact of access to such institutions on household income
generation as well as on welfare outcomes. Although a full cost–beneﬁt analysis is beyond
the scope of this research, the study aimed to investigate the following three main issues that
form the critical triangle of microﬁnance: outreach to the poor, ﬁnancial sustainability, and
impact (Zeller and Meyer 2001).
Such an analysis is important for policy purposes because all three issues are central to
the recent policy debate on the role of public action—led either by the state or by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)—in innovating and building ﬁnancial institutions that
reach the poor and contribute to poverty alleviation. In general, from a welfare economy
standpoint, such public action to address market failures can be justiﬁed if its social beneﬁts
outweigh its social costs. On the beneﬁts side, the study investigates, in particular, the issues
of outreach, that is, the placement of group-based institutions in rural areas and the coverage
of poor clients within those areas, and the issues related to the impact of participation in
group-based schemes on household income and consumption. On the costs side, the study
investigates the determinants of loan default in group-based financial institutions, recog-
nizing that loan default is the major cost component in lending activities. The study further
reviews secondary data, from a sample of 104 relatively successful microﬁnance institutions
(MFIs), on costs for lending and the subsidies required to achieve ﬁnancial sustainability. A
number of conclusions related to these three issues of the critical triangle of microﬁnance are
derived.
Outreach to the Poor
The analysis of determinants of placement of group-based ﬁnancial institutions shows that
NGOs in Bangladesh tend to place their branch ofﬁces within better-developed rural areas
with lower costs of access to roads, telecommunications, and banking infrastructure. More-
over, NGO schemes seem to shy away from areas that are known to be at high risk of being
affected by ﬂoods and other distress factors. On the other hand, within these somewhat more
advantaged rural areas, NGO branch ofﬁces seek out and are successful in penetrating poorervillages with their ﬁnancial services and,
within these villages, in reaching out to very
poor people, mostly women.
Although NGOs overwhelmingly target
and succeed in reaching those owning less
than half an acre of land, the poorest of the
poor are underrepresented among members.
Groups such as the physically or mentally
disabled, the old, or those not having a per-
manent residence are often unable to conduct
a proﬁtable enterprise for which it is worth
borrowing. Others may not be accepted
into a group by their peers in the village be-
cause they either are new migrants or other-
wise have not established a reputation as
reliable partners. Many of the ultra-poor
thus lack either the human and physical cap-
ital that is required for establishing a micro-
enterprise, or the social capital necessary to
get accepted as group members. Assisting
these ultra-poor people through microﬁnance
schemes appears to be an unsuitable policy
option. It may very well be that social secu-
rity or safety-net interventions would be
more appropriate for this group among the
poorest of the poor.
Having noted this caveat regarding the
ultra-poor, the analysis of placement and
outreach at the institutional level as well as
the determinants of participation derived in
the household-level analysis suggest that
NGOs have achieved remarkable progress in
reaching large numbers of very poor people
in rural Bangladesh. This is particularly note-
worthy when compared with the dismal
record of other rural banking schemes that
simply have not been able to service this
clientele even when armed with signiﬁcant
levels of government subsidy.
Financial Sustainability
This study has noted the appalling loan re-
payment rates of the state-owned rural
banking sector, which insists on land as loan
collateral and thereby in effect excludes any
poor people as their clientele. The repayment
rates of the state-driven rural banking system
hovered around 20–30 percent during the
1980s and 1990s, and this required huge gov-
ernment subsidies just to keep these institu-
tions solvent. Since the interest rates in these
schemes were well below the opportunity
cost of capital, the full level of subsidization
was even higher. In fact, the state-driven rural
banking system could be described as an
income transfer program, albeit one that was
not only ill-targeted, because it beneﬁted only
the better-off landowning class, but also un-
scrupulously inefﬁcient.
The NGO schemes, on the other hand,
charge interest rates that are 10–20 percent
above the inﬂation rate and achieve repay-
ment rates in excess of 95 percent, and as high
as an average of 98 percent over the years.
Once a branch ofﬁce is established, many of
the better-managed NGOs described in this
report are likely to cover most if not all of
their operational costs, as, for example,
ASA claims in its 1996 annual report (ASA
1996b). With respect to the criteria of ﬁnan-
cial sustainability then, the NGO-supported
group-based institutions far outperform the
traditional rural banking approach.
With respect to overall indicators of ﬁ-
nancial sustainability, Chapter 3 reviews data
on operational and ﬁnancial sustainability
from a sample of 104 MFIs. These MFIs
are, without any doubt, among the most ad-
vanced and efﬁcient worldwide. According
to these data, the group of large MFIs in Asia
(which includes ASA and BRAC), once es-
tablished at a large scale, can perform their
current operations, on average, without any
subsidies. This positive picture for ASAand
BRAC might, however, be somewhat bleaker
if the very successful and highly proﬁtable
village banking system of the Bankya Rakyat
in Indonesia were not part of this group.
However, according to these secondary data,
smaller MFIs in South Asia spend about
US$0.17 per dollar lent, of which $0.05 needs
to be covered by subsidies in order for the
MFIs to cover all their costs. For a social in-
vestor seeking to generate a net social beneﬁt,
the minimum social return generated by the
borrowing household (net economywide ef-
fects) would need to exceed the $0.05 sub-
sidy. It is of note, however, that the data on
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count past subsidies used to establish and
expand the MFIs in the sample. Thus, the
relatively low ﬁgures for subsidies required
to transfer capital in the form of loans would
be substantially higher if past subsidies re-
ceived by the MFIs during the innovation and
expansion phases were taken into account.
Nonetheless, the subsidy ﬁgures appear quite
favorable in comparison with other forms
of transferring capital to the poor, such as
the pilot food price subsidy scheme in the
Philippines (Garcia and Pinstrup-Andersen
1987), which was found to cost US$0.19 for
each dollar of subsidy, assuming for the pur-
poses of comparison with a credit scheme
that the recipient repays the dollar of food
price subsidy after one year at no transaction
cost to the government.
Impact
The descriptive and econometric analysis pre-
sented in this report provides strong evidence
of the group-based ﬁnancial institutions’pos-
itive impact on a range of household-level
behavioral and outcome variables. Anumber
of qualitative impact variables were used to
assess changes in livelihood, social attitudes,
and social capacity, as perceived by the sur-
vey respondents. This and other descriptive
analyses presented in the report suggest pos-
itive impacts on the quantity and quality of
food consumed, on the health status of family
members, and on children’s education. The
survey on social attitudes and self-reported
changes in social capacity provides further
evidence of social change, in particular in
the areas of intrahousehold decisionmaking,
women’s coping capacity, and women’s
physical mobility and social attitudes. On all
of these indicators, the targeted NGO credit
programs appear to have brought about dis-
tinct and favorable changes.
By and large, the econometric analysis
conﬁrms the results of the tabular analysis
of qualitative indicators. In particular, it ex-
plores three areas of possible impact of credit
access: adoption of high-yielding rice vari-
eties, level of income generation, and food
and calorie consumption. In the latter two
areas, a robust, signiﬁcant, and positive ef-
fect of credit access is obtained; the effect of
improved credit access provided by group-
based ﬁnancial institutions on the adoption
of high-yielding rice varieties, albeit positive,
proved to be statistically insigniﬁcant. The
analysis yielded an average annual effect of
Tk 37 in annual household income for each
additional Tk 100 of credit limit provided to
a household belonging to ASAor BRAC. This
estimate is more than double the estimate
provided by Pitt and Khandker (1998), who
estimated the effect on annual household in-
come for the Grameen Bank and BRAC to
range between Tk 11 and Tk 19 for each ad-
ditional Tk 100 borrowed. However, the
discrepancies in the results could be due to
the fact that the method used in this study
measures not only the effect of actual bor-
rowing, as Pitt and Khandker (1998) did,
but also other effects of access to credit. This
has the advantage of being able to capture
the potentially beneﬁcial effects of having
access to credit, that is, the ability to borrow
sometime in the future, even if the house-
hold in the current period chooses not to bor-
row (Diagne and Zeller 2001). These indirect
beneﬁcial effects include the reduced costs of
consumption smoothing, such as a decrease
in distress sales and an increased risk-bear-
ing capacity favoring more proﬁtable pro-
duction and investment portfolios. The large
difference between the effect of borrowing,
as shown by Pitt and Khandker (1998), and
the total effect of credit access suggests that
poor households can derive much beneﬁt by
being able to borrow if faced by shocks
jeopardizing their already low consumption
levels.
Finally, when comparing the social costs
of about Tk 5 (in the case of small and
medium-sized successful MFIs in South
Asia) for the provision of Tk 100 of credit
access with the increase in annual household
income of Tk 37, one arrives at a net social
beneﬁt of Tk 32. Admittedly, as indicated
above, the cost side is likely to be substantially
underestimated because past subsidies dur-
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into account. Nonetheless, the ﬁgures sug-
gest that MFIs have the potential to generate
sizable social beneﬁts in the long run.
Implications for Policy
In a nutshell, the analysis presented in this
report supports the overall conclusion that
the group-based ﬁnancial institutions sup-
ported by the NGOs investigated in this study
have made remarkable progress in effectively
reaching very poor people in Bangladesh,
and in providing ﬁnancial services to rural
women and men that enable them to increase
their income and food consumption as well
as triggering social change in a number of
important areas. In light of these results,
continuing public support for the expan-
sion of group-based ﬁnancial institutions 
in Bangladesh therefore appears warranted.
However, the report falls short of a classical
cost–beneﬁt analysis that considers the full
social costs of bringing the MFIs studied here
to their present scale of operation. Moreover,
most of the start-up MFIs that are subsidized
by social investors in Bangladesh and else-
where will not succeed in growing to the
outreach levels and efﬁciency of BRAC and
ASA, but eventually will fail. These costs of
failure in promoting the MFI sector overall
need to be taken into account when evaluat-
ing on an aggregate level whether or not to
invest in MFI development as opposed to
other areas in rural development. Thus, al-
though the results certainly provide some
arguments for continued support of the MFI
sector, they need to be appreciated in the
light of the limitations of the study in per-
forming a cost–beneﬁt assessment. More-
over, the group-based institutional approach
may seem to be an effective response to state
and market failures concerning rural ﬁnance
in Bangladesh, but simple replication of
group lending techniques elsewhere should
proceed with caution and in full cognizance
of differing social, economic, and cultural
settings. After all, successful institutional
innovation necessarily involves adapting the
organizational set-up, structure, and conduct
of member-based ﬁnancial institutions—such
as credit and savings cooperatives and village
banks, or the solidarity credit groups investi-
gated in this study—to the different socio-
economic and agroecological environments.
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Survey Modules, Sampling Frame,
and Location of Survey Sites
Survey Modules
In order to address the research questions described in Chapter 1, data were collected at the
level of community, group, and household.
At the household level, the questionnaire covered modules on demography, family events,
membership in a credit program, agricultural production (by crop), animal production, land-
ownership and land rental transactions, ownership of other assets as well as monetary savings,
food consumption and nonfood expenditures, credit lent and borrowed, gifts and remittances
received or given, time allocation of adults and children, social capacity and attitudes among
men and women, and the incidence of sickness and nutritional status among preschoolers and
their mothers.
In order to cover seasonal variations in income, consumption, indebtedness, nutritional
status, and savings, the household survey was administered in three rounds. The ﬁrst round
of data collection was conducted in June and July of 1994, at the beginning of the rainy sea-
son following the harvest of the Boro rice crop. The second round was conducted in October
1994, that is, during the lean season immediately before the commencement of the harvest
of the major rice crop called Aman. The third round was administered from mid-December
1994 to mid-January 1995, that is, after the Aman rice crop was harvested. Thus, the survey
covered the peak season and the lean season in rural Bangladesh during 1994.
The survey at the community level obtained data on village characteristics that are ex-
pected either to inﬂuence the formation of savings and credit groups or to inﬂuence the in-
come generation and consumption opportunities of households. The modules covered the
general characteristics of the village, its access to rural service centers, the major crops grown
in the village, the seasonal ﬂuctuations of wages and rice prices, the existence of formal credit
programs and informal self-help groups, the structure of markets for major agricultural inputs
and outputs, and major production, storage, and marketing risks in the village, as well as the
natural catastrophes and other shocks that occurred during the previous 10 years in the vil-
lage. Key respondents for this survey were the chairmen or members of the union council,
resident school teachers, and respected village members identified by the villagers. Whenappropriate, such as for population size of
village or number of credit group members in
the village, the information obtained for se-
lected community survey modules was cross-
checked with ofﬁcials from government and
nongovernment organizations.
The survey at the group level obtained
information on the process of group for-
mation, the socioeconomic characteristics
of group members, internal rules set by 
the groups themselves, and the savings and
credit transactions of the group and its re-
payment record. The respondent for this
module was the president of the group.
In addition to these primary data col-
lection efforts, data were obtained from
selected nongovernmental organizations on
the structure, outreach, conduct, and per-
formance of their group-based savings and
credit programs. Additional secondary data
at the county (thana) and higher levels were
collated from published reports of the Bang-
ladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS).
Sampling Procedure
Bangladesh is administratively divided into
5 divisions, 21 so-called “old” districts
(whichwere later redrawn into 64 “new” dis-
tricts), and 489 thanas (counties). Each thana
is further divided into unions, which perform
some lower-level administrative functions
for a number of small villages. Each thana
has, on average, about 9 unions, and each
union administers about 15 villages.
Athree-stage sampling method was used
randomly to select the survey villages for the
community, group, and household surveys.
In the ﬁrst stage, 5 districts were purposely
selected from 19 of the old districts in
Bangladesh (excluding Bandarban and Chit-
tagong Hill tracts). The selection aimed at
reducing logistical costs while preserving as
much variability in the major determinants
of ﬁnancial market development. In the
selection of these districts, a number of con-
siderations were made. First, the ﬁve districts
were selected from four of the ﬁve divisions
of the country. Second, the ﬁve districts were
each required to represent one of the quin-
tiles of population density by district in the
country. Third, districts were ranked accord-
ing to an index computed by Helen Keller
International (HKI) in Bangladesh, which
measures the exposure of the district to dis-
tress and natural disasters. Again, the selec-
tion of districts was made in a way that each
of the quintiles of the distress factor were
represented. These three criteria limited the
possible number of combinations for the
selection to a considerable extent. The ﬁnal
selection was then based on two additional,
but subordinate, criteria. Here again, the ob-
jective was to achieve diversity. The criteria
were cropping intensity in the district and its
infrastructure (proxied by kilometers of tarred
road per 1,000 inhabitants).1 Based on these
criteria, the following districts were chosen:
Jessore, Rangpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, and
Dhaka.
In the second stage, a complete enumer-
ation of thanas for these ﬁve districts was
undertaken. For each of the 160 thanas in
these districts, secondary data were obtained
on population density, percentage of villages
electriﬁed, and presence of ASA, BRAC, or
RDRS programs. From each district, two 
to three thanas were purposely selected in
which at least one of these credit programs
was active. The selection also had to con-
form with the restriction that one of the
thanasselected must represent thanasabove
the median for the district-speciﬁc popula-
tion density, while the other thana was drawn
from less densely populated thanas. Other
less stringent criteria for selection were the
percentage of villages electriﬁed and the
distribution of farm sizes. Again, these other
criteria were subordinate but were consid-
ered in order to achieve diversity. The fol-
lowing 12 thanaswere selected based on the
second-stage sampling: Daulatpur, Saturia,
Bajitpur, Trishal, Kotchandpur, Manirampur,
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1 Data for these characteristics came from two sources: BBS, Statistical yearbook, various issues, and HKI 1994.Nilphamari Sadar, Gaibandha Sadar, Habi-
ganj Sadar, Bahubal, Rajarhat, and Ulipur.
In the third stage, all unions in each of the
12  thanas were listed. Five unions were
randomly selected from each thana, but ex-
cluding unions that were part of thana head-
quarters in order to avoid urban samples. For
each of the unions, a complete enumeration
of villages based on secondary data was un-
dertaken. Two villages were then randomly
selected from each union.
In summary, 120 villages were ran-
domly drawn for the community-level sur-
vey, based on the preceding purposeful
selection of 12 thanas.In each of the 120 vil-
lages, a community-level questionnaire was
administered. This questionnaire also ob-
tained information on the presence of credit
and savings programs administered through
the Association for Social Advancement
(ASA), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC), and Rangpur-Dinajpur
Rural Services (RDRS). The information
was cross-checked with branch ofﬁces of
the NGOs.
Not all of the 120 randomly selected vil-
lages were reached by credit schemes of any
of the three NGOs. In the subset of villages
that had credit groups formed by BRAC,
ASA, or RDRS, the group-level survey was
administered to all existing groups in these
villages.2
Finally, among those villages with ASA,
BRAC, or RDRS programs, seven villages
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2 Table A.1 of this appendix gives a complete listing of the 120 villages, as well as a breakdown of villages surveyed for
the community, group, and household modules. Figure A.1 shows the locations of the community, group, and house-
hold surveys on the map of Bangladesh.
Figure A.1 Location of the survey thanasTable A.1 List of villages for the community, group, and household surveys
Level of questionnaires
Credit/
Old District Thana Union Village Community savings group Household
Manikganj Daulatpur Bachamara Hashadia Y . . . . . .
Bachamara Rohal Y . . . . . .
Baghutia Saizuddin matbar para Y . . .  . . .
Baghutia Azhar moliapara Y . . .  . . .
Dhamsar Bill pauli Y Y . . .
Dhamsar Laxmidia Y Y . . .
Jiyanpur Khaspantirchha Y . . . . . .
Jiyanpur Jainta Y Y . . .
Kaliya Rambatia Y . . . . . .
Kaliya Tepri Y Y . . .
Manikganj Saturia Baraid Dhulat Y Y . . .
Baraid Patillapara Y Y . . .
Dargram Teghari Y . . . . . .
Dargram Uttar shimulia Y Y Y
Dighalia Jalsuka Y . . . . . .
Dighalia Baro chachitara y Y . . .
Hargaz Dakshin para Y . . .  . . .
Hargaz Naya para y Y Y
Tilli Salai gobindapur Y . . .  . . .
Tilli Dakshin aynapur Y Y . . .
Mymensingh Bajitpur Dighirpur Dighirpur mialdi Y . . .  . . .
Dighirpur Kallag Y . . . . . .
Dilalpur Sonakanda Y . . . . . .
Dilalpur Tatal char Y Y . . .
Humaipur Ujaikhali Y . . . . . .
Humaipur Hossainpur Y . . . . . .
Maizchar Shibpur Y . . . . . .
Maizchar Boali das para Y . . .  . . .
Pirijpur Nayahati Y . . . . . .
Pirijpur Nilakhi Y . . . . . .
Mymensingh Trishal Harirampur Golabhita Y . . . . . .
Harirampur Harirampur Y . . . . . .
Kanihari Baghadaria dak Y . . .  . . .
Kanthal Muhuria bari Y Y . . .
Kanihari Taltala Y . . . . . .
Kanthal Nalchira Y Y . . .
Rampur Darila Y . . . . . .
Rampur Birrampur ujanpara Y Y Y
Shakhua Akhrail Y Y . . .
Shakhua Gandakhola Y . . . . . .
Jessore Kotchanpur Balahar Parlet Y . . . . . .
Balahar Ramchandrapur Y Y . . .
Dora Chuadanga Y . . . . . .
Dora Dhopablia Y . . . . . .
Elangi Jagadishpur Y Y . . .
Elangi Elangi Y Y . . .
Kushna Ghaga Y Y . . .
Kushna Harindia Y Y . . .
Safdarpur Datiarkathi Y . . . . . .
Safdarpur Salkopa Y Y . . .
(continued)
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Level of questionnaires
Credit/
Old District Thana Union Village Community savings group Household
Jessore Monirampur Bhojgati Pathalia Y . . . . . .
Bhojgati Donar Y . . . . . .
Dakuria Barpara Y . . . . . .
Dakuria Uttarpara Y . . . . . .
Durbadaga Kushorkona Y . . . . . .
Durbadaga Khatuadanga Y . . . . . .
Kultia Amrojhuta Y . . . . . .
Kultia Poradanga Y . . . . . .
Rohita Noapara Y . . . . . .
Rohita Bagdob Y . . . . . .
Rangpur Nilphamari Kachukata Taluk manushmara Y . . .  . . .
Kachukata Mahabbat bajitpara Y Y . . .
Kundapukur Salhati Y Y . . .
Kundapukur Gurguri Y . . . . . .
Palashbari Kishmat bhutian Y Y . . .
Palashbari Nilphamari Y . . . . . .
Sangalshi Kadikol Y . . . . . .
Sangalshi Dighal dangi Y Y . . .
Tapamari Nityanandi Y . . . . . .
Tapamari Kismat dogachhi Y Y . . .
Sylhet Habiganj Gopaya Sripur Y . . . . . .
Gopaya Tetuiya Y Y . . .
Lukhra Gobindapur Y Y . . .
Lukhra Fandrail Y . . . . . .
Nizampur Daulatpur Y . . . . . .
Nizampur Gourangar chak Y . . .  . . .
Nurpur Dushashan Y Y . . .
Nurpur Brahmandora Y Y . . .
Poil Daria Y . . . . . .
Poil Atghoria Y . . . . . .
Rangpur Gaibandha Boali Paschim batakamari Y . . .  . . .
Boali Khamar boali Y . . .  . . .
Kholahati Kisamat balua Y Y . . .
Kholahati Purbakamarnai Y . . . . . .
Laxmipur Gobindapur Y . . . . . .
Laxmipur Khorda malibari Y Y . . .
Malibari Kachuar khamar Y . . .  . . .
Malibari Kismat malibari Y Y . . .
Shahapara Laxmipur Y Y . . .
Shahapara Bhabanipur Y . . . . . .
Sylhet Bahubal Lamatashi Chuapur Y . . . . . .
Lamatashi Tarapasha Y Y Y
Mirpur Purba dattapara Y . . .  . . .
Mirpur Kachuadi Y . . . . . .
Putijuri Noapara Y . . . . . .
Pitijuri Mandal kapan Y . . .  . . .
Satkapon Telikandi Y Y Y
Satkapon Sarangpur Y . . . . . .
Snanghat Ramchandrapur Y . . . . . .
Snanghat Nidanpur Y Y . . .
(continued)
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level survey. In each of these villages, a
census was undertaken to obtain data on
household possession of land and member-
ship in ASA, BRAC, or RDRS programs.
Based on this village census, a stratiﬁed
random selection of households was under-
taken. The ﬁrst stratiﬁer was land possession
above and below 1 acre (British acre). The
sample households owning 1 acre or more
were drawn in proportion to their distribu-
tion in the village, irrespective of their mem-
bership in NGO programs. For households
owning less than 1 acre of land, participant
households were oversampled so that about
55 percent of households were members of
BRAC, ASA, or RDRS and 45 percent were
nonparticipant households. The oversampling
of participating households in the strata of
households owning less than 1 acre of land
was necessary in order to increase the num-
ber of survey households in this category.
Thus, in each survey village, the sample
households are representative of the distribu-
tion of land ownership found in the village.
However, because participant households in
the strata below 1 acre are oversampled, av-
erages of all households for a particular vil-
lage must be weighted by the village-speciﬁc
sampling ratios for participants and nonpar-
ticipants owning less than 1 acre.
The cutoff of 1 acre was chosen because
ASA and BRAC stipulate that households
owning less than 0.5 acre are eligible to join
a program. However, it is possible that par-
ticipating households have increased their
land possession since joining the program.
For this reason, a proportional selection of
survey households was undertaken for house-
holds owning above and below 1 acre. If
participating households owning more than
0.5 acres had been a priori excluded from the
sample, the measured effects of program par-
ticipation on income and asset accumulation
could potentially have been biased down-
ward. Indeed, 19 of the participating sample
households were found to own more than





Old District Thana Union Village Community savings group Household
Rangpur Ulipur Dharanibari Abdul hakim Y . . .  . . .
Dharanibari Modhupur Y . . . . . .
Pandul Siddhanta maltibari Y . . .  . . .
Pandul Baro mahishmuri Y . . .  . . .
Tabakput Hazipara Y . . . . . .
Tabakpur Zamer darga Y Y . . .
Thetrai Bakshipara Y . . . . . .
Thetrai Darikishorepur Y . . . . . .
Durgapur Brahmanpara Y . . . . . .
Durgapur Paikpara Y Y Y
Rangpur Rajarhat Bidyananda Tongar kuti Y . . .  . . .
Chinai Noyapara (napitpara) Y Y . . .
Chinai Kismat paikpara Y . . .  . . .
Ghariadanga Bhatia para Y . . .  . . .
Ghariadanga Nama bharat Y . . .  . . .
Nazim khan Dararpar Y . . .  . . .
Nazim khan Ratiram pathanpara Y . . .  . . .
Umar majid Dhananjay Y . . .  . . .
Umar majid Umar panthabari Y Y . . .
Note: Total sample is 120 villages for community survey, 128 groups in 42 villages, 350 householdsAPPENDIX B
Adult Equivalent Consumption Units
Differentiated by Age and Gender
Table B.1 Adult equivalent consumption


























Source: Computed from IFPRI’s Consumption and Nutri-
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